Risk Quadruplet: Integrating Assessments of Threat, Vulnerability, Consequence, and Perception for Homeland Security and Homeland Defense by Hill, Kara Norman
Old Dominion University
ODU Digital Commons
Engineering Management & Systems Engineering
Theses & Dissertations Engineering Management & Systems Engineering
Spring 2012
Risk Quadruplet: Integrating Assessments of
Threat, Vulnerability, Consequence, and Perception
for Homeland Security and Homeland Defense
Kara Norman Hill
Old Dominion University
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/emse_etds
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Operational Research Commons, and the
Risk Analysis Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Engineering Management & Systems Engineering at ODU Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Engineering Management & Systems Engineering Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ODU
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@odu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hill, Kara N.. "Risk Quadruplet: Integrating Assessments of Threat, Vulnerability, Consequence, and Perception for Homeland
Security and Homeland Defense" (2012). Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), dissertation, Engineering Management, Old Dominion
University, DOI: 10.25777/t546-1573
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/emse_etds/74
RISK QUADRUPLET: INTEGRATING ASSESSMENTS OF THREAT, 
VULNERABILITY, CONSEQUENCE, AND PERCEPTION FOR HOMELAND 
SECURITY AND HOMELAND DEFENSE 
by 
Kara Norman Hill 
B.S. May 2002, Virginia Commonwealth University 
M.S. December 2006, The George Washington University 
A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of 
Old Dominion University in Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT 
OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY 
April 2012 
Approved by: 
Adrian Gheorght (Director) 
Ariel Pirn it^fyferhber) 
Charles Keating ( 
Barry Ezell (Member) 
ABSTRACT 
RISK QUADRUPLET: INTEGRATING ASSESSMENTS OF THREAT, 
VULNERABILITY, CONSEQUENCE, AND PERCEPTION FOR HOMELAND 
SECURITY AND HOMELAND DEFENSE 
Kara Norman Hill 
Old Dominion University, 2012 
Director: Adrian Gheorghe 
"Where there is much to risk, there is much to consider." 
- Platen 
Risk for homeland security and homeland defense is often considered to be a function 
of threat, vulnerability, and consequence. But what is that function? And are we defining 
and measuring these terms consistently? Threat, vulnerability, and consequence 
assessments are conducted, often separately, and data from one assessment could be 
drastically different from that of another due to inconsistent definitions of terms and 
measurements, differing data collection methods, or varying data sources. It has also long 
been a challenge to integrate these three disparate assessments to establish an overall 
picture of risk to a given asset. Further, many agencies conduct these assessments and there 
is little to no sharing of data, methodologies, or results vertically (between federal, state, 
and local decision-makers) or horizontally (across the many different sectors), which 
results in duplication of efforts and conflicting risk assessment results. 
Obviously, risk is a function of our perceptions and those perceptions can influence our 
understanding of threat, vulnerability, and consequence. Some assessments rely on 
perceptions (elicited from subject matter experts) in order to qualify or quantify threat, 
vulnerability, and consequence. Others exclude perception altogether, relying on objective 
data, if available. Rather than fault the subjectivity of our perceptions, or muddle objective 
assessments with personal opinions, it makes sense to embrace our perceptions, but 
segregate them as a unique component of risk. 
A risk quadruplet is proposed to systematically collect and integrate assessments of 
threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception, such that each dimension can be 
explored uniquely, and such that all four components can be aggregated into an overall risk 
assessment in a consistent, transparent, traceable, and reproducible manner. The risk 
quadruplet draws from the fields of homeland security, homeland defense, systems 
engineering, and even psychology to develop a model of risk that integrates all four 
assessments using multicriteria decision analysis. The model has undergone preliminary 
validation and has proven to be a viable solution for ranking assets based on the four 
proposed components of risk. 
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"Suppose a person of the fourth dimension, condescending to visit you, were to say, 
'Whenever you open your eyes, you see a plane (which is of two dimensions) and you infer 
a solid (which is of three); but in reality you also see (though you do not recognize) a 
fourth dimension, which is not color nor brightness nor anything of the kind, but a true 
dimension, although I cannot point out to you its direction, nor can you possibly measure 
it.' What would you say to such a visitor? Would not you have him locked up? Well, that is 
my fate; and it is as natural for us Flatlanders to lock up a Square for preaching the third 
dimension, as it is for you Spacelanders to lock up a Cube for preaching the fourth. Alas, 
how strong a family likeness runs through blind and persecuting humanity in all 
dimensions! Points, Lines, Squares, Cubes, Extra-Cubes — we are all liable to the same 
errors, all alike the slaves of our respective dimensional prejudices..." 
- Edwin A. Abbott, Flatland 
Risk, in most contexts, is a two dimensional function of probability and consequences. 
Risk, in the field of homeland security and homeland defense, however, is often considered 
to be a function in three dimensions: threat, vulnerability, and consequence. And still we 
find those three dimensions lacking. This function is not clearly defined and even if we 
knew the function, we do not define and measure these terms consistently. These threat, 
vulnerability, and consequence assessments are conducted separately; in addition, the 
measurements are inconsistently defined, the data collection methods vary, and the data 
sources differ. Further, many different agencies conduct these risk assessments and there is 
little to no sharing of the data, methodologies, or results vertically (between federal, state, 
and local decision-makers) or horizontally (across the many different sectors). This results 
in duplication of efforts and conflicting risk assessment results. 
In addition to these issues, it is also a challenge to integrate these three disparate 
assessments to establish an overall picture of risk to a given asset. There are many different 
types of risk assessments performed on assets and those different assessments explore risk 
from different perspectives. Is the asset a critical power plant, essential to electricity 
2 
generation? Is it a large dam, critical to the water supply? Is it a major road, critical to 
transportation? Or is it a major tourist attraction, critical to national morale? Or, like the 
Hoover Dam, is it all of these things? Which risk assessment is right? How can all of these 
risk assessments be integrated? Are certain risk assessments more important than others? 
Obviously, risk is a function of our perceptions and those perceptions can influence our 
understanding of threat, vulnerability, and consequence. Furthermore, our perceptions may 
not always agree with the results of our risk assessments. While some assessments rely 
solely on perceptions in order to qualify or quantify threat, vulnerability, and consequence, 
other assessments seek to exclude perception altogether from the assessment process, 
relying on objective data. Rather than fault the subjectivity of our perceptions, or muddle 
our objective assessments with personal opinions, it makes more sense to embrace our 
perceptions, but to segregate them as their own unique component of risk. A risk 
quadruplet is proposed to systematically collect and integrate assessments of threat, 
vulnerability, consequence, and perception, such that each dimension can be explored 
uniquely, and such that all four components can be aggregated into an overall risk 
assessment in a systematic, transparent, traceable, and reproducible manner. 
Although it has been argued that risk to our nation can be assessed and quantified 
objectively through some application of the homeland security risk triplet (threat, 
vulnerability, and consequence), this risk assessment approach does not account for the 
type of entity, be it Critical Infrastructure (CI), Key Resource (KR), or Key Asset (KA). 
The type of asset being assessed intuitively impacts our perceptions and our perceptions 
may even contradict our quantitative risk assessments. Literature reviews reveal that there 
is confusion about the definitions of CIKRKA. 
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Many talk about risk as a function of threat, vulnerability, and consequence (National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2009; H. H. Willis, 2007). Multiple risk assessments which 
seek to assess threat, vulnerability, and consequence to a specific asset or facility could 
vary widely. Risk assessments could be based on risk data or perceptions. The data from 
one assessment could be drastically different from the data of another assessment; one 
assessment could incorporate factors such as whether the risk was voluntary or involuntary, 
while another might attempt to calculate risk using traditional risk equations (Turner, 
1994). 
There is also confusion about the definitions of threat, vulnerability, and consequence, 
let alone how to assess those nebulous concepts. The many different definitions of these 
concepts can drastically affect risk calculations. Threat could be viewed as a single 
scenario, or the likelihood of that scenario. Vulnerability could be seen as a probability, or 
it could be viewed as a state of the system, from which conditional probabilities of threat 
might be derived. And there are many types of consequences (economic, environmental, or 
in some cases loss of life) which must all be assessed in order to give the best possible 
overall risk picture. Most of this confusion arises from our inherent perceptions. There is, 
inevitably, an element of subjectivity to any risk assessment, and that subjectivity is 
currently missing from the risk assessment approach. It only makes sense to integrate our 
threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments with our perceptions into an overall, 
improved, risk assessment approach, thus defining a new risk paradigm. A risk quadruplet 
is proposed in this dissertation that incorporates threat, vulnerability, consequence, and 





Figure 1.1. Proposed Risk Quadruplet © 
1.1 Research Definitions 
Many of the following definitions will be discussed in further detail in the Literature 
Review (5.4APPENDIX C). However, below is a list of terms and their intended meanings 
when used throughout this research. Some of these definitions are pulled straight from the 
literature. Others are modified from definitions provided in official, government 
documents, such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Risk Lexicon. All of 
these definitions, as they are presented here, reflect the intents and purposes of this 
research. 
• Critical Infrastructure: government and private systems essential to the 
operation of our nation in any or all aspects of the lives of its citizens (health, 
safety, economy, etc.), such as utilities, facilities, pipelines, etc. 
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• Key Resources: public or private resources essential to the operation of our 
nation's government and economy, such as fuel or goods. 
• Key Assets: those buildings, geographic regions, monuments, or icons, whose 
destruction would cause a crushing blow to our nation's ego, morale, and 
identity, but which are not essential to the operation of our nation, such as the 
Washington Monument or the Statue of Liberty. 
• Asset: assets are the collective, generalized term used to represent the 
combination of all critical infrastructure, key resources, and key assets. 
• Risk Scenario: natural or man-made occurrence, hazard, individual, entity, or 
action that has or indicates the potential to damage an asset. 
• Threat: the threat of a risk scenario to an asset. The threat of an intentional 
risk scenario is generally estimated as the likelihood of an attack (that 
accounts for both the intent and capability of the adversary) being attempted 
by an adversary. For other risk scenarios, threat is generally estimated as the 
likelihood that the risk scenario will manifest; however, threat can also be 
estimated qualitatively as perceived likelihood. 
• Vulnerability: ability of an asset to endure a risk scenario despite physical 
features, operational attributes, characteristics of design, location, security 
posture, operation, or any combination thereof that renders an asset open to 
exploitation or susceptible to a given risk scenario. Vulnerability can be 
estimated qualitatively, or quantitatively, as the likelihood of a successful risk 
scenario given the risk scenario is identified, which implies that vulnerability 
is also related to resilience. 
Consequence: effect of a successful risk scenario on an asset. Consequence is 
commonly assessed along four factors: human, economic, mission, and 
psychological, but may also include other factors such as impact on the 
environment; consequence can be measured quantitatively if data exists, but 
can also be measured qualitatively either along a set of scales or along a single 
integrated consequence scale for which all consequence factors are considered 
as a whole. 
Risk Perception: subjective judgment about the severity of a risk scenario to 
an asset; may be driven by sense, emotion, or personal experience; generally 
measured qualitatively; referred to merely as perception throughout this 
research. 
Risk: potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from a risk scenario, as 
determined by the threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception of that 
risk scenario to an asset. Risk is often measured and used to compare different 
future situations, as well as to rank assets for the purposes of risk mitigation 
and budgeting for emergency preparedness, response, and recovery. 
Systems: comprised of interrelated or interdependent objects. Systems exhibit 
holistic properties not necessarily evident at the level of individual objects or 
subsystems; seek to achieve some final goal or state, and in order to reach this 
goal they transform inputs into outputs; tend to devolve into entropy without 
regulation and are typically organized in a hierarchical system of nested 
subsystems where the subsystems are specialized with different functions 
within the system. Systems either diverge, in which case it has many ways of 
achieving a single goal, or converge, where, from an initial state, it could 
achieve many different goals (Skyttner, 2005). 
• System of Systems: possess the same definition as systems, but on a larger 
scale. For a hierarchy of systems, in which systems are components or 
subsystems of other systems; component systems each have a purpose of their 
own and would continue to operate even if separated from the overall system. 
Each component system is managed individually, rather than being managed 
within the context of the entire system of systems. System of systems often 
exhibit characteristics of complexity and widespread geographic distribution. 
The combination of several interdependent CI showing the characteristics of a 
single system, but lack an overarching management entity (Gheorghe, Masera, 
& Voeller, 2008; Maier, 1998; Skyttner, 2005). 
1.2 Research Purpose 
The risk quadruplet consists of three phases (Figure 1.2). The first phase is the 
perception assessment. The second phase consists of threat, vulnerability, and consequence 
assessments. The final phase is the assessment integration phase, where the assessments of 
threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception are all assimilated. These phases will be 











Figure 1.2. Risk Quadruplet Phases © 
The purpose of this research, as shown in Figure 1.3, is three-fold. First, it is necessary 
to determine how to assess the perceptions of CIKRKA given a risk scenario. We are less 
concerned with the perception data, itself, or even with which method is considered the best 
way to collect perception data; rather, we are concerned with integrating perception data, 
once collected, with threat, vulnerability, and consequence data. It is assumed that data for 
the threat, vulnerability, consequence, and even perception could be leveraged from 
previous assessments, collected as part of the research, or simulated, if necessary, in order 
to demonstrate the viability of the risk quadruplet methodology. 
9 
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Figure 1.3. Research Purpose 
Next, an integrated risk quadruplet assessment methodology must be researched. The 
belief is that the currently accepted homeland security risk triplet (threat, vulnerability, and 
consequence) is inadequate for characterizing risk to CIKRKA and that a risk quadruplet 
should be explored to incorporate perception into the current risk assessment approach. But 
exactly how those components of risk are integrated must be decided. The improved risk 
assessment integration methodology, based on threat, vulnerability, consequence, and 
perception assessments, will be developed and presented. This methodology will 
systematically integrate all four assessments in a meaningful, traceable, and reproducible 
approach. 
The end result will be a ranking of CIKRKA, based on the risk quadruplet 
methodology. This will allow for a more comprehensive ranking of these disparate entities 
along multiple risk scales. This ranking system will improve resource allocation for risk 
mitigation efforts in support of homeland security and homeland defense missions. Figure 
10 
1.4 gives a mind map of the different areas covered by this research. It depicts how these 
seemingly disparate fields are related when exploring risk to CIKRKA. It also reiterates the 
goal of the research, which is to ultimately integrate threat, vulnerability, consequence, and 
perception assessments of CIKRKA using systems engineering techniques such as risk 
analysis and Multi Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA). 
Homeland Security Homeland Defense 
Research Areas 
Systems Engineering/ 
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Figure 1.4. Mind Map of Research Areas 
12 
1.3 Research Questions and Assumptions 
The research will seek to address the two questions presented in Figure 1.5. These 
questions, and their associated assumptions, are the culmination of an intensive Literature 
Review (5.4APPENDIX C), which highlighted a number of issues and questions that 
require resolution in the field of risk analysis for homeland security and homeland defense. 
There remains confusion about the definitions of CIKRKA. Definitions of threat, 
vulnerability, and consequence are also inconsistent and do not offer reliable modes of 
measurement. Perceptions are included haphazardly, often jumbled with threat, 
vulnerability, and consequence assessments, if they are included at all, which is why the 
homeland security risk triplet is inadequate. Risk calculation methods can be 
mathematically misleading and while risk assessments seek objectivity instead of 
embracing subjectivity, perceptions may contradict risk assessment results. Lastly, the 
current methodology for integrating threat, vulnerability, and consequence is undefined, 
leaving analysts to assimilate the results of these disparate assessments indiscriminately, 
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Figure 1.5. Research Questions and Assumptions 
Question 1 
What perception methodologies exist that can be applied to CIKRKA? Can a perception 
model be applied to CIKRKA, and if so, how? Do we only seek perceptions from 
homeland defense and homeland security experts? Do we include risk experts? Do we 
include regular citizens since the consequences of threats to CIKRKA could affect them? 
Can we apply the model to each category separately, using a blocked experimental design? 
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Does the type of entity at risk (CI, KR, or KA) have an effect on perception? Perception 
models, such as the Social Amplification of Risk Framework, the Cultural Theory Model, 
and the Psychometric Model will be explored. 
We must assume that a perception methodology exists which can be applied to 
CIKRKA. Then, assuming that methodology exists and can be exploited to obtain 
perception data, we would need to integrate that data with data from threat, vulnerability, 
and consequence assessments. We will explore a number of MCDA approaches to integrate 
the four components of risk proposed by the risk quadruplet. 
Question 2 
How can MCDA be used to integrate threat, vulnerability, consequence, and 
perception into a comprehensive risk quadruplet methodology to rank CIKRKA? Could 
perception be incorporated into a new risk quadruplet for an improved, overall risk 
assessment methodology, and if so, how? What is the best way to integrate the results of 
threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception assessments? MCDA models, such as 
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), Analytic Network Process (ANP), Multi Attribute 
Utility Theory (MAUT), or Evidential Reasoning (ER) will be explored. 
What is the output of such a risk assessment approach? An overall risk score, a ranked 
list of CIKRKA, or both? Could this be applied to items other than CIKRKA? For 
example, could this approach be used to rank regions or sectors? Could regions or sectors 
be added as additional criteria in the MCDA model? Or would this methodology only give 
us a single value for each CI, KR, or KA, in which case how do we integrate those resulting 
scores across dependent and interdependent CIKRKA. We must assume that the 
application of this risk quadruplet, which will employ MCDA to integrate threat, 
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vulnerability, consequence, and perception assessments, and would result in a ranked list of 
CIKRKA which could be used to better inform decision makers about the risks to multiple 
assets. 
1.4 Research Significance 
There are two main contributions proposed for this research (Figure 1.6). First, this 
research will present an MCDA model for integrating assessments of threat, vulnerability, 
consequence, and perception, incorporating them all into a risk quadruplet assessment 
approach. Second, this research will produce a methodology for deploying the risk 
quadruplet model, to include a means for collecting perception data for CIKRKA, and then 
integrating it with threat, vulnerability, and consequence data. 
Development of a 
risk quadruplet model 





' S, Development of a 
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Figure 1.6. Research Contributions 
1.5 Research Limitations Overview 
There are some limitations to this research related to data access or collection, model 
selections, and technology. A perception assessment model must be selected that will 
ultimately produce results compatible with the MCDA model selected. Threat, 
vulnerability, consequence, and perception data will need to be leveraged, collected, or 
simulated, and again those data must be compatible with the selected MCDA model. And, 
of course, an MCDA model must be selected from a number of potential options. Finally, 
the research is at the mercy of the technology available to conduct the assessments, as well 
as to integrate the assessments during the third phase of the risk quadruplet methodology. 
All of these limitations are discussed in detail in 5.4APPENDIX B. 
In addition to those limitations, there is one additional limitation to be addressed. It 
would be ideal to validate the risk quadruplet methodology in vivo or in the real world, 
using real data, collected anew, with a full scale model of multiple CIKRKA to compare 
and rank. However, due to the constraints of scope, cost, and schedule, this type of model 
verification and validation is beyond the scope of our research. Instead, we intend to 
explore this model in vitro, literally in a petri dish, although in our case, the petri dish is a 
computer. Given that one of our research contributions is to develop a methodology for 
deploying the risk quadruplet model, we cannot ignore the in vivo aspect of this research, 
so we will address data collection methodologies that could be employed in the real world, 
including surveys and a simplified version of the risk quadruplet model that could be 
generalized and adapted to more complex problems in the future. Additionally, we will 
offer a parallel in vitro risk quadruplet methodology viability testing solution (Figure 1.7) 
that directly corresponds to the in vivo approach. The in vitro approach will rely on 
simulated data to emulate the real world, a series of risk quadruplet model examples that 
can be analyzed and compared in order to offer insight into reality, sensitivity analyses, and 
a preliminary verification and validation of the risk quadruplet model. This will allow us to 
explore the in vitro risk quadruplet model without risking the exposure of sensitive (in 
vivo) information that might otherwise jeopardize the very CIKRKA we seek to protect. 
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In Vivo 
• Perception Assessment 
Threat, Vulnerability, and 
In Vitro 
• Perception Data Simulation 
Conseq 
Figure 1.7. Risk Quadruplet Viability Testing Options: In Vivo versus In Vitro 
The risk quadruplet methodology proposed in CHAPTER 3 (and further described in 
5.4APPENDIX D) is the methodology which would be used in vivo. The in vitro solution 
is also presented in CHAPTER 3 and is crafted to parallel the in vivo methodology. Ideally, 
future research would verify and validate the risk quadruplet methodology in vivo, based 
on the lessons learned in vitro. The exploration of research limitations provided in 
5.4APPENDIX B is limited to the in vivo application of the model, as the in vitro viability 
testing does not have the same limitations. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CURRENT STATE ASSESSMENT 
"The first step in the risk management process is to acknowledge the reality of risk. Denial 
is a common tactic that substitutes deliberate ignorance for thoughtful planning." 
- Charles Tremper 
We conducted an analysis of four areas of literature related to this research 
(5.4APPENDIX C). First, we explored national risks, focusing on the evolution of 
homeland security, the definitions of risk and related terms, and the classification of 
CIKRKA in the United States (US). Next we explored international risks, specifically an 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) report on risk 
management for six countries and the annual global risks reports issued by the World 
Economic Forum (WEF) since 2006. The international perspective also presented a 
smattering of risk management programs, tools, assessment techniques, as well as 
visualizations for communicating risk. Delving into Systems Engineering and System of 
Systems Engineering, we explored whether CIKRKA could be considered systems or 
system of systems. Finally, we reviewed the risk analysis literature, focusing on risk 
calculation and risk perception. 
We saw problems with risk definitions and calculations when exploring how risk is 
addressed in a global context. The international community does rely on risk perception for 
large scale risk assessments, perhaps to a fault, as other threat, vulnerability, and 
consequence data are likely available. The approach to risk communication is elegant and 
appears to be more advanced than what we see at the national level. Clear visualizations are 
used to describe the complex and numerous dimensions associated with risk, which is often 
described as a function of likelihood and consequence, although sometimes multiple 
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consequence scales were explored (economic versus human loss), and sometimes other risk 
dimensions were visualized, such as the degree of consensus for the risk or the degree of 
correlation between risks. 
From a national perspective, risk is considered to be a function of threat, vulnerability, 
and consequence. Numerous government documents exist to describe risk, threat, 
vulnerability, consequence, perception, and CIKRKA, such as executive orders, 
presidential decision directives, acts, homeland security presidential directives, as well as 
national strategies, guidelines, and plans. We analyzed all of these documents, specifically 
looking at how risk is defined for homeland security. We noted that risk definitions, 
including threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception, were inconsistent. Further, the 
lack of clear definitions complicated the description of risk calculations, making it difficult 
to know exactly how to go about conducting risk assessments. The definitions of CIKRKA 
were equally muddled, and the term KA has been abandoned by DHS, although we argue 
that it should be resurrected as it is a distinct type of asset. Perception was not formally 
included in the risk assessment process for CIKRKA, even though DHS was criticized for 
not including diverse perceptions of risk impacts in its approach to risk management. 
In reviewing the system and system of systems analysis literature, we acknowledge that 
a system of systems analysis approach seems both logical and necessary for exploring the 
dependencies and interdependencies, not only within each CIKR sector, which in and of 
itself is a system of systems, but also between these CIKR systems, analyzing their 
vulnerabilities, and planning for their protection as a whole. However, this approach might 
not be appropriate for KA, which are dependent on CIKR system of systems, but which are 
not, themselves, typically components of the greater system of systems. In fact, we 
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conclude that further research is necessary to determine whether KA are systems and 
whether traditional risk assessments as performed on systems should be applied to KA. 
After examining the literature for risk analysis, we see that risk is traditionally 
calculated separately from studies of risk perception. Similar to what we saw in our review 
of international risks, risk is often calculated as the product of the probability that a risk 
event will occur (likelihood) and the magnitude of the consequences should the risk event 
occur. Therefore, the function for risk in homeland security (a triplet of threat, 
vulnerability, and consequence) is already deviating from the normal approach. 
Furthermore, an exploration of the calculation used in homeland security reveals some 
potential mathematical pitfalls. Moving on to risk perception, we note that there have been 
no attempts to integrate formal perception assessments into the overall risk assessment 
process. Often, perceptions are incorporated in an ad hoc, haphazard manner, where subject 
matter expert opinions are elicited for all components of risk (threat, vulnerability, and 
consequence) or are included alongside quantitative data for threat, vulnerability, and 
consequence, but the methodology is inconsistent and the parts of the overall risk score 
attributed to perception versus actual data cannot be extracted. We need a way to 
systematically incorporate subject matter expertise, or even public opinion, alongside actual 
data (no matter how limited that data may be). This way, sensitivity analyses can be 
conducted to determine how much of the overall risk score is being driven by our 
perceptions, which will aid in the decision-making process, as well as the risk 
communication process. 
All of this research shows a clear gap in the literature that the risk quadruplet will fill. 
We propose separating perception from threat, vulnerability, and consequence, as its own 
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attribute of risk. We would collect data for threat, vulnerability, and consequence and then 
integrate that data with data collected from perception assessments. The resulting risk 
quadruplet will offer a transparent, reproducible, and systematic methodology for 
integrating perception with threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessment data to 




"People who don't take risks generally make about two big mistakes a year. 
People who do take risks generally make about two big mistakes a year. " 
- Peter F. Drucker 
The research methodology consists of a number of steps that relate to the three phases 
of the risk quadruplet (Figure 1.2), including the selection of the model used to conduct the 
perception assessment in the first phase, the decision to leverage existing assessment data 
or conduct new threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments in the second phase, as 
well as the selection of the model which will integrate these four assessments in the third, 
and final, phase. It also covers the research purpose (Figure 1.3), the research questions and 
assumptions (Figure 1.5), as well as the research contributions (Figure 1.6). It addresses the 
research limitations, including whether to test the viability of the risk quadruplet in vivo or 
in vitro (Figure 1.7), and it details the risk quadruplet methodologies for both approaches. 
Finally, the research methodology addresses the sensitivity analyses along with the 
preliminary verification and validation of the risk quadruplet model (in vitro). A 
comprehensive description of the entire risk quadruplet research methodology is given in 
Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1. Research Methodology 
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The research methodology begins with the first purpose of the research, to assess risk 
perceptions of C1KRKA. In order to do this, we addressed the first research question, 
"What risk perception methodologies exist that can be applied to CIKRKA?" and its 
assumption, that "there exists a risk perception methodology that can be applied to 
CIKRKA". To address this, we reviewed a number of risk perception models, including the 
Social Amplification of Risk, the Cultural Theory Model, as well as the Psychometric 
Model. Details of this review can be found in 5.4APPENDIX B. After reviewing these 
models, it was decided that the Psychometric Model was best suited to our needs, however, 
it was recognized that it might need to be adapted as we explored other aspects of the risk 
quadruplet methodology, such as the model selected for the assessment integration. Thus 
we had defined the first phase of the risk quadruplet methodology. 
The second phase of the risk quadruplet methodology consists of the threat, 
vulnerability, and consequence assessments. It was assumed that threat, vulnerability, and 
consequence data could be leveraged from prior assessments, or could be collected in new 
assessments. Either way, it appeared that the data could easily be fit to the risk quadruplet 
model. An obvious limitation of the research is acquiring access to this sensitive data. 
Whether leveraging old assessments or conducting new ones, CIKRKA assets are, by their 
very definitions, considered important or critical to national operations or morale. Even if 
permission is granted to collect threat, vulnerability, and consequence data on such assets, 
that data is likely to be categorized as sensitive information and therefore not publicly 
available. This is detrimental to research endeavors. Furthermore, conducting multiple 
assessments, in addition to the perception assessment, would adversely affect the scope and 
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schedule of this research. These research limitations are addressed through alternative risk 
quadruplet approaches later in the research methodology. 
The second purpose of this research is to determine a methodology for integrating 
threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception assessments, which directly relates to the 
third phase of the risk quadruplet (assessment integration). This also directly relates to our 
second research question and its associated assumption. The second research question is, 
"how can MCDA be used to integrate threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception 
into a comprehensive risk quadruplet methodology to rank CIKRKA?" The second 
assumption is that "there exists a MCDA methodology which can integrate threat, 
vulnerability, consequence, and perception into a comprehensive risk quadruplet 
methodology to rank CIKRKA". We reviewed four MCDA models: AHP, ANP, MAUT, 
and ER. The best candidate for our purposes was ER. Once we selected the assessment 
integration model, we realized that the outputs of a traditional Psychometric Model (from 
the first phase of the risk quadruplet) might not be immediately compatible with our 
assessment integration model (ER), so we adopted a simplified psychometric survey 
instead of a lull blown Psychometric Model. 
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Figure 3.2. Risk Quadruplet Model 
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The methodology also includes the definition of the risk quadruplet model for our 
research (Figure 3.2). The risk quadruplet model consists of alternatives, which in our case 
is a set of CIKRKA assets. Further defining the model, we have a parent attribute denoted 
as risk (the overall value we are seeking to calculate), as well as child attributes (threat, 
vulnerability, consequence, and perception), all of which are part of the risk function. We 
also define grades for the child attributes, as they relate to the alternatives, using a linguistic 
set (none, very low, low, medium, high, very high). Weights are chosen to relate the child 
attributes to the parent attribute. Utilities are assigned to relate the grades to the parent 
attribute. The first set of belief degrees relates grades to the parent and child attributes. In 
other words, does the linguistic set choice of none for threat, vulnerability, consequence, 
and perception directly correlate to a linguistic set choice of none for the parent attribute of 
risk? What about the choice of very low? If so, the belief degrees assigned to relate those 
relationships would be higher than those relating a grade of none for a child attribute to a 
grade of high for the parent attribute. 
The second set of belief degrees are derived from the assessment data and are used to 
relate grades to the alternatives within each child attribute. For the perception assessment, 
the belief degrees are the proportions calculated based on how many respondents selected 
each of the linguistic set choices. The perception assessment will be discussed later in the 
research methodology, as will the number and types of respondents providing perception 
data. For the threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments, the belief degrees would 
be translated to the linguistic set if the data was leveraged from historical assessments, or 
that data could be collected in a new set of assessments using the linguistic set. 
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With the methodology defined, the next problem was how to test its viability. One 
option would have been to test it in vivo, but a number of research limitations made that 
infeasible. Furthermore, we did not want the first test of this methodology to rely on subject 
matter experts and their risk perception data, along with real threat, vulnerability, and 
consequence data (all of which, for obvious reasons, could be sensitive). It is more 
appropriate to test the risk quadruplet in a safe setting first, in vitro, to ensure that the 
details of the methodology are validated, that the models selected perform as expected, and 
that the outcome of the entire risk quadruplet produce the desired results (a ranking of 
CIKRKA assets from most to least risky, as defined in the third purpose of this research). It 
was decided that an in vivo methodology would be proposed in detail, as if we intended to 
deploy the risk quadruplet methodology using real data. However, we would actually test 
the methodology in vitro, which allowed us the freedom to explore more complex versions 
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Figure 3.3. Risk Quadruplet Methodology (In Vivo) 
The proposed in vivo risk quadruplet methodology (Figure 3.3) consists of the same 
three phases (assessment of perception; assessments of threat, vulnerability, and 
consequence; and assessment integration) as previously defined (Figure 1.2). However, we 
have included additional details on the approach for deploying this methodology. For the 
first phase, we have already discussed the model selected, a simplified psychometric 
survey, which we determined would be deployed with a small group of subject matter 
experts and stakeholders. In order to conduct this survey, we chose Inquisite, a software 
package capable of deploying surveys online and collecting data. Once we had selected the 
survey software, we set out to design the questionnaire. This involved a number of steps, 
such as selecting a region, risk scenario, and a selection of CIKRKA assets to scope the 
survey. We chose the National Capital Region for our area of focus. We also decided to 
limit the survey (and thus the overall in vivo model) to three CIKRKA assets, and we chose 
an example for each of the assets. For the CI we selected The George Washington 
University Hospital in Washington, DC, for the KR we selected motor gasoline in the state 
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of VA, and for the KA we selected the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, DC. Information 
on these choices was included in the survey. Additionally, to further scope the survey and 
model, we selected a single risk scenario, a tornado, for which we provided pertinent data 
describing likelihood and consequences of that risk scenario in the selected region. We also 
chose a linguistic set for the survey responses (none, very low, low, medium, high, very 
high), which would be consistent with the ER model we developed. In order to provide data 
compatible with our ER model, we knew that we would need to collect the proportion of 
responses for each of the linguistic set choices for each of the CIKRKA assets, so the final 
step for this phase of the risk quadruplet model would be to analyze the survey results and 
determine those proportions. 
The proposed in vivo methodology continues with the second phase, where it is 
assumed that the data for threat, vulnerability, and consequence could be leveraged from 
previous assessments, or that those assessments could be conducted. The goal of the risk 
quadruplet is not to determine how to conduct these assessments, as they are already being 
conducted and many approaches already exist for doing so. Rather, the point of the risk 
quadruplet is to determine how to integrate these assessments with the perception 
assessment we proposed for the first phase of the methodology. 
Therefore, the final phase of the in vivo risk quadruplet methodology focuses on 
integrating these assessments. The ER model is defined with the three alternatives 
(CIKRKA assets) used in the Inquisite survey. The parent attribute and child attributes, 
weights, utilities, and belief degrees are also defined. And the final belief degrees would be 
input into the model based on the data collected from the perception, threat, vulnerability, 
and consequence assessments. 
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Finally, IDS was the software selected for implementing the ER model, so the 
alternatives, attributes, weights, utilities, and belief degrees would be input into IDS for 
analysis. With the choices for all three phases of the research defined, we have developed 
the in vivo risk quadruplet methodology which combines a simplified psychometric survey 
to collect perception data, leveraged or collected threat, vulnerability, and consequence 
data, along with an ER model to integrate all four assessments together. 
Respondents: 100 Simulated 
Respondents 
Data: Simulated 
Data Analysis: Proportions as 
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Figure 3.4. Risk Quadruplet Methodology (In Vitro) 
The in vitro risk quadruplet methodology (Figure 3.4) consists of the same three phases 
as the in vivo risk quadruplet methodology; however, there are some obvious differences. 
For the first phase of the in vitro approach, we simulated the perception assessment data 
using 100 simulated respondents. We chose the triangular distribution to simulate this 
information as we were looking for a range of possible linguistic set choices across 
multiple respondents. From this data, we were able to determine the number of responses 
for each of the linguistic set choices for each CIKRKA asset to be used in the assessment 
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integration phase. Rather than rely on leveraging or collecting data for threat, vulnerability, 
and consequence data in the second phase, we simulated this data, as well. We used the 
uniform distribution for this data simulation, as we are not seeking to simulate more than 
one response for each of the linguistic set choices for this data, we just need one choice for 
each asset as these assessments would only be conducted once in the real world. For 
example, we would not expect to conduct multiple threat assessments for each CIKRKA 
asset. Lastly, the assessment integration phase remains fairly similar to the in vivo 
approach. However, since we are not constrained to the limits of the survey respondents, 
we increase the number of alternatives to nine hypothetical assets (three CI, three KR, and 
three KA). The attributes remain the same, as do the grades, weights, utilities, and parent-
child belief degrees. The belief degrees relating the alternatives to the child attributes are 
input based on the simulated data from the first two phases (the proportions calculated from 
the simulated respondents for the perception data and the simulated data for the threat, 
vulnerability, and consequence data). The same software, IDS, would be used to analyze 
the results. 
The resulting analysis from both the in vivo methodology, as well as the in vitro 
viability testing, would provide a ranked output of CIKRKA assets (alternatives) based on 
their parent attribute scores (risk), which, incidentally, is the third purpose of this research. 
The first contribution defined for this research was to develop a risk quadruplet model to 
integrate threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception assessments, and this model 
was, indeed, developed, and further tested in vitro. The second contribution of this research 
was to develop a methodology for deploying the risk quadruplet model, and we have 
crafted an in vivo methodology which could be used as is, or easily adapted, to deploy the 
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risk quadruplet model. While the methodology was not actually deployed, aspects of the 
methodology along with the model, itself, were tested successfully in vitro .Sensitivity 
analyses and preliminary verification and validation of the risk quadruplet model 
demonstrates the viability of the risk quadruplet methodology. 
The generalized risk quadruplet methodology (whether in vivo or in vitro) is given in 
Figure 3.5. Further information on the perception and MCDA model selections, as well as 
the software selections, and research limitations can be found in 5.4APPENDLX B. The 
details of the in vivo methodology can be found in 5.4APPENDIX D. A text version of the 
Inquisite survey can be found in 5.4APPENDIX E and an Informed Consent Document, 
which would be provided to respondents participating in the survey, can be found in 
ment 
Ranked iuirastracturi 
Figure 3.5. Risk Quadruplet Methodology 
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5.4APPENDIX F. The details of the in vitro data simulation can be found in 
5.4APPENDIX G. Lastly, the details and results of the in vitro viability testing, along with 
sensitivity analyses and a preliminary verification and validation of the risk quadruplet 
model, can be found in CHAPTER 4. 
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CHAPTER4 
RISK QUADRUPLET VIABILITY TESTING (IN VITRO) 
"If we don't succeed, we run the risk of failure. " 
- Dan Quayle 
The goals of this research are to assess perceptions of CIKRKA, determine a 
methodology for integrating threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments with a 
CIKRKA perception assessment, and to ultimately rank those CIKRKA accordingly. The 
in vitro approach for testing the viability of the risk quadruplet methodology relies on 
simulated data. However, this research is still informative and allows us to explore how the 
model behaves prior to an in vivo deployment of the methodology. Even the way in which 
we simulate the data can be done to mimic our in vivo methodology. For example, the 
perception data is simulated as if 100 respondents were surveyed, a sample size that would 
not have been easily achievable during this research. Furthermore, we increase the 
complexity of the model by introducing additional CIKRKA assets (alternatives), which 
would have made the in vivo perception data collection much more tedious. Figure 3.4 
shows how the risk quadruplet methodology differs only slightly during the in vitro 
viability testing when compared to Figure 3.3 which shows our in vivo risk quadruplet 
methodology. 
With IDS we are able to build an ER model for the risk quadruplet using a combination 
of collected perception data and simulated threat, vulnerability, and consequence data. A 
model was described in IDS, consisting of nine alternatives (CIKRKA), and four child 
attributes (threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception) nested under an overall 
parent attribute (risk). The model also uses weighting (to determine the contribution of the 
child attributes to the parent attribute), utilities (to determine the relationship between the 
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grades and the child attributes), and two sets of belief degrees (one to relate the grades of 
child and parent attributes, the other to determine the beliefs held for the grades selected 
within each child attribute for each alternative). 
It is important to note that while this model is relatively simple, it is extensible and 
could easily handle additional layers of complexity from an increase in the number of 
alternatives under study, to a more complex description of the parent and child attributes 
(perhaps breaking the perception attribute into two sub-categories for public versus private 
risk perception assessments). However, as Albert Einstein is famous for saying, 
"Everything should be as simple as possible, but not simpler." His opinion is echoed in the 
world of modeling, as well, when Vamanu claims that "model complexity does not 
necessarily [...] contribute to model quality," (Vamanu, Gheorghe, Acasandrei, & 
Vamanu, 2011). The beauty of ER, and the IDS software for implementing ER, is its 
simple structure, which can be organized into countless combinations of attributes and 
alternatives making it easy to implement, but capable of handling complex problems 












Figure 4.1. Risk Quadruplet Model (In Vitro) 
An example of how this model appears in IDS is shown in Figure 4.1. In the IDS model 
display window, users can opt to select View > Dialog Box View to see a more visual 
version of the model (Figure 4.2). Each alternative is shown in yellow and has three boxes 
for displaying the alternative name at the top, its ranking in the bottom left, and its attribute 
score in the bottom right (depending on which attribute was selected at the time; in this 
case the parent attribute of risk was selected). Each attribute is shown in blue and also 
includes three boxes for displaying the attribute name at the top, its weight in the bottom 
left, and its average score in the bottom right. 
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Figure 4.2. Dialog Box View 
Each of the attributes (threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception) were defined 
in IDS as qualitative, so as to grade them using the same linguistic scale. Future research 
would be necessary to decide whether to define any of the attributes as quantitative, but ER 
can integrate both qualitative and quantitative data, and IDS provides that option when 
defining attributes. For example, if the attribute is defined as quantitative, then the user can 
also decide whether it is a certain or uncertain attribute. This is useful for defining 
stochastic quantitative attributes, which could be random variables with some underlying 
distribution, may be difficult to assess, or could suffer from missing data ("IDS 
Multicriteria Assessor Quick Guide," 2010). 
Utilities for the overall or parent attribute (risk) were assigned to these grades (from our 
linguistic set of none, very low, low, medium, high, and very high) as shown in Table 4.1. 
The utilities were chosen arbitrarily, but it may be worth exploring, during future research, 
how to assess and incorporate the utilities of those providing inputs for the ER model. 
These values could easily be revised in future iterations of the model. For our purposes, a 
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risk grade of none would be ideal and thus would receive a Utility of 1. The remaining 
grades were ranked accordingly. Utilities, unlike probabilities, need not sum to 1. 
Table 4.1. Grades and Utilities 
None 1 




Very High .1 
To relate parent and child attributes, the following belief degrees were used for each 
child (threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception). These values could also be 
adjusted easily in future iterations of the model. For example, if the child grade of threat is 
very low, that could relate to a parent grade of none, very low, and low risk with belief 
degrees of .25, .50, and .25, respectively. However, in the interest of keeping this model 
simple, belief degrees were assigned using the identity matrix (Table 4.2). These belief 
degrees that relate the parent and child grades are not the same belief degrees that are 
selected by respondents during data collection when they chose the grade they deem 
appropriate for a given combination of alternative and attribute. 
Table 4.2. Belief Degrees for Relating Parent and Child Grades 
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Weights are then used to relate the child attributes to the parent attribute. This can be 
done using visual scoring or using a pairwise comparison of attributes. Again, future 
versions of the model could work with respondents or subject matter experts to complete 
the pairwise comparison approach provided with the IDS software, which is basically an 
AHP approach for weighting the child attributes. For the in vitro viability testing, we used 
the visual scoring approach, selected normalized to ensure the weights added to 1, and 
while the weights initially started as equal (.25, .25, .25, and .25), it was realized that 
perception might not be considered equally important as the other attributes by 
stakeholders. Therefore, we will explore a version of the model for which the perception 
attribute weight was set to be approximately half as important as the other attributes (where 
the other attributes were weighted equally) as shown in Figure 4.3. Other versions of the 
model will be explored during the Sensitivity Analysis. 
028 
Ji 0 24 
CO 0 20 
® 0 16 




Figure 4.3. Attribute Weights Using Visual Scoring (Low Perception) 
The details of the simulations used to create perception, threat, vulnerability, and 
consequence data are provided in 5.4APPENDIX G. The following perception data set was 
the result of the perception assessment simulation (Table 4.3). The simulated data for 
Relative Weights of Attributes 
Threat Vulnerability Consequence Perception 
Attributes 
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threat, vulnerability, and consequence is provided in Table 4.4. This data was input into 
IDS using the data input dialog box (Figure D.8). 
Table 4.3. Perception Grades and Belief Degrees 
0.01 0.04 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.29 
0.06 0.20 0.33 0.41 0.35 0.06 0.14 0.37 0.28 
0.20 0.38 0.31 0.20 0.25 0.21 0.20 0.25 0.20 
0.32 0.25 0.18 0.13 0.21 0.27 0.40 0.19 0.17 
0.37 0.11 0.07 0.14 0.14 0.38 0.24 0.11 0.05 
0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Table 4.4. Threat, Vulnerability, and Consequence Grades and Belief Degrees 
Using the simulated data for threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception, the IDS 
model can now rank the nine alternatives (CIKRKA) based on the attributes, grades, and 
associated utilities, belief degrees, and weights. The user can select Report > Graph 
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Ranking within IDS to obtain the overall ranking of alternatives on risk, the parent 
attribute (Figure 4.4). The user can also select Report > Visual Comparison to see further 
breakdowns of the nine alternatives across the four attributes (Figure 4.10). Figure 4.5 
shows a comparison of the nine CIKRXA alternatives based on their respective overall risk 
scores. But Figure 4.8 shows this comparison broken down by the attributes of risk (threat, 
vulnerability, consequence, and perception). 
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Figure 4.4. Ranking of Alternatives on Risk Attribute (Low Perception) 
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Alternative Performances on Selected Attributes 
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Figure 4.5. Alternative Performances Across Child Attributes (Low Perception) 
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Figure 4.6. KR 1 Grades for Risk Attribute (Low Perception) 
Figure 4.6 can be obtained by highlighting the alternative of interest, then selecting 
Report > Graph Belief Degree > Att at Alt, where the last selection means, "Attribute at 
Alternative", so whichever combination of attribute and alternative are highlighted at the 
time this report is run, that is the combination that will be used to create the chart. This 
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charts show the breakdown of grades for KR 1 (with the lowest overall risk in the model 
for which perception was weighted lower than the other attributes) at the parent attribute 
level (risk). This gives an overall distribution of the calculated grades and belief degrees for 
risk, based on the grades and belief degrees for the child attributes (threat, vulnerability, 
consequence, and perception). Similar charts can also be created to explore the belief 
degrees input by respondents on the individual child attributes. 
Another interesting chart that is available in IDS is the radar plot. By plotting the values 
of all of the child attributes, alongside the parent attribute, it is easy to see which of the 
child attributes might be driving the overall risk score. In IDS, users can select Report > 
Visual Comparison, then select the Tool Bar button to obtain a menu of options. One of 
the options is an icon displaying the type of chart selected, and by clicking on it, users see a 
drop-down list of chart types, including the radar plot. The default view of this chart is 
three-dimensional, however, clicking the icon that looks like a set of three-dimensional 
glasses will recalibrate the view to two dimensions. Because we are exploring nine 
alternatives, it may be difficult to compare them all on the same radar plot. However, by 
highlighting alternatives and using the Select One, Select Group, Select All, Deselect, and 
Draw buttons we are able to explore alternatives individually (Figure 4.7). We can see, for 
example, that consequence shows some influence on KA 1, while perception affects KR 2 
for the low perception model. Even though this data is simulated, it is still interesting to 
explore the results as it is obvious how they could be invaluable to the in vivo risk 
quadruplet methodology. 
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Figure 4.7. Risk and Attributes Radar Plots by Alternative (Low Perception) 
4.1 Sensitivity Analysis 
Incidentally, two other versions of the IDS model were created which were identical to 
the low perception risk quadruplet model. One version of the model set the perception 
attribute weight to be approximately twice as important as the other attributes (where the 
other attributes were weighted equally) as shown in Figure 4.8. Another version removed 
the perception attribute completely. These alternate models were used strictly for 
comparative purposes. 
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Relative Weights of Attributes 
Threat VuheofaSty Consequence Perception 
Attributes 
Figure 4.8. Attribute Weights Using Visual Scoring (High Perception) 
Recalling our low perception model (Figure 4.4), we can now compare it to our high 
perception model (Figure 4.9). We see a comparison of the nine CIKRKA alternatives 
based on their respective overall risk scores. The model for which perception received a 
lower weight and the model for which perception received a higher weight are essentially 
identical, aside from the weights of the attributes. The simulated belief degrees input across 
the threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception attributes for each of the nine 
CIKRKA alternatives remain the same. Therefore these breakdown charts are identical for 
each model. 
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Figure 4.9. Ranking of Alternatives on Risk Attribute (High Perception) 
Figure 4.5 (low perception model) and Figure 4.10 (high perception model) show the 
nine CIKRKA alternatives broken down by the attributes of risk (threat, vulnerability, 
consequence, and perception). For example, in the high perception model, we see that 
threat was assessed highest for KA 1, vulnerability was assessed highest for CI 1, 
consequence was assessed highest for both KA 2 and KA 3, and perception was assessed 
highest for KA 3. Comparing the two models, we see that in the low perception model, KA 
3 did not receive the highest overall risk score even though it was assessed highest for both 
consequence and perception; it was ranked 4th. However, in the high perception model, KA 
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Figure 4.10. Alternative Performances Across Child Attributes (High Perception) 
In Table 4.5 we see the threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception attribute 
scores for each of the nine CIKRKA alternatives. These child scores remain the same 
across all versions of the model because they are based on the simulated belief degrees 
input into the model, which are then related to the parent attribute of risk through the 
selected belief degrees (based on the identity matrix) and the utilities provided (Table 
4.land Table 4.2). The highlighted values show the assets which received the highest child 
attribute score. So KA 1 received the highest threat score, CI 1 received the highest 
vulnerability score, and KA 2 and KA 3 jointly received the highest consequence score, 
whereas KA 3 received the highest perception score. 
In the full risk quadruplet model for which the perception attribute was weighted lower 
than the other attributes, the overall risk score for CI 1 was 63%. When perception is 
weighted higher than the other attributes, the overall risk score for CI 1 was 58%. But when 
perception is removed from the model completely, the overall risk score for CI 1 increases 
to 66%. Table 4.5 shows the overall risk scores for the reduced model and when compared 
49 
to the risk quadruplet model (whether perception was weighted low or high compared to 
the other attributes) all of the CIKRKA alternatives were impacted by the removal of the 
perception attribute. 
Table 4.5. Risk Quadruplet Model Output Comparison 
68% 54% 74% 58% 66% 46% 67% 62% 51% 
50% 62% 52% 55% 59% 58% 61% 49% 
[ 57% 56% 65% 55% 56% 71% 50% 64% 
48% 65% 73% 72% 69% 50% 55% 70% 
63% 54% 68% 57% 60% 57% 58% 63% 60% 
58% 58% 70% 63% 63% 54% 57% 66% 67% 
66% 53% 68% 55% 59% 59% 59% 62% 57% 
Another interesting comparison is to explore the rank order of the CIKRKA across the 
three different models. In Table 4.6 we see how the CIKRKA rank changes as the 
perception attribute is varied. This helps us to visualize how the scores are impacted by 
perception and why that attribute cannot be ignored in our overall assessment of risk, but 
should be included in such a way that we can determine how the overall score is impacted 
by perception and by how much. There are only three assets (KA 1, KR 2, and KR 3) 
whose risk remains ranked the same across all three models. Other assets swing wildly 
from a rank of 2 to a rank of 7, in the cases of CI 1 and KA 3. 
Table 4.6. Risk Quadruplet Model Ranking Comparison 
By incorporating perception into the overall risk score, we have influenced the risk 
score and risk rank for these CIKRKA, which, for the purposes of this methodology, is 
exactly what we want to see as the entire point of the risk quadruplet is to account for the 
discrepancy between reality and perception in a systematic, transparent, and reproducible 
manner. With this approach, we can see exactly how perception is affecting the overall risk 
score and we also know exactly how the perception attribute is being factored into the 
overall risk score (based on the visual scoring method for weighting the attributes). This 
cannot be said of any other risk analysis approach, and certainly none used for ranking 
assets in homeland security or homeland defense. Future research, might shed some light 
on how the selected weights, utilities, and parent-child belief degrees affect the influence of 
perception on the parent attribute of risk. 
IDS also offers some built-in sensitivity analyses. Figure 4.11 displays a trade-off 
analysis chart, found under Sensitivity > Trade-Off Analysis, which shows the overall 
risk scores for the nine CIKRKA alternatives, as well as the perceived scores for the low 
perception model. We see that the overall risk score for KA 3 was 60% even though it was 
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perceived to be 78%, whereas the overall risk score for CI 1 was approximately 63% while 
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Figure 4.11. Risk and Perception Trade-Off Analysis (Low Perception) 
More formally, IDS can produce sensitivity analyses based on the weighting of 
individual attributes, which look at the overall parent attribute ranking, or the rank change, 
of alternatives. Users can select the attribute for which they wish to perform sensitivity 
analyses (in our case, perception), then click Sensitivity > Change Weight. This brings up 
a dialog box where the user can select which alternatives to explore (we selected all of 
them). Initially, we are presented with the weights we input for the model as shown in 
Figure 4.12 (we conducted our sensitivity analysis from the model for which perception 
was weighted higher, but either of the models would be sufficient baseline models for the 
analyses). By clicking Ranking, users can manually adjust the weights of the child 
attributes to see how that affects the overall ranking of alternatives. Weights do not remain 
normalized automatically, so we manually selected weights for the child attributes that 
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summed to 1 (Figure 4.13). Adjusting the weights of the child attributes, we can see how 
that affects the overall risk scores for the parent attribute across each of the alternatives. 
s # # o* # 
Alternative Attribute 
Figure 4.12. Child Attributes on Ranking (Original) 
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Figure 4.13. Child Attributes on Ranking (Manually Adjusted) 
Alternately, and perhaps more efficiently, by clicking Rank Change, we can produce a 
more controlled sensitivity analysis on individual child attributes. The graphic given in 
Figure 4.14 displays the overall risk scores for each alternative as the weight of the 
perception attribute is varied from 0 through 1 (we adjusted the y-axis scale, used for the 
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overall risk score, in order to better see the relationship between the weight for perception 
and the risk rankings). Since we conducted this sensitivity analysis from the model for 
which perception received a higher weight, that value is displayed as a vertical line, 
denoted as "Given weight", on the chart so that users can compare their current alternative 
risk scores and rankings to those that would be produced by adjusting the weight for 
perception. It is interesting to note that the overall risk score for each asset varies with the 
weight of the perception attribute, but it is not a linear relationship. And while the majority 
of the alternative risk scores increase as the weight of perception increases, three of the 
assets show a negative correlation (CI 1, KA 2, and CI 3). 
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Figure 4.14. Sensitivity Analysis of Perception 
54 
IDS can also produce sensitivity analyses of belief degrees based on adjusting the child 
attribute weights. From the same dialog box, the user simply selects Belief Degree. We 
explored only two alternatives from the model for which perception received a higher 
weight: CI 1 and KA 3, ranked lowest and highest on their overall risk scores, respectively 
(Figure 4.15). This shows the belief degrees (our simulated data) for the perception 
attribute related to the grades (our linguistic set) based on the weights input for the child 
attributes of threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception. However, even as we adjust 
the child attribute weights, the belief degrees do not change, and with good reason. If we 
recall the belief degree values we chose for relating child attributes to parent attributes 
(Table 4.2), we used the identity matrix, therefore, the belief degrees input from our 
simulated data for the perception attribute would not be impacted by adjusting the child 
attribute weights. Obviously, future research could be conducted to better understand how 
the belief degrees would change if we used alternative methods for assigning the input 
values of our belief degrees to relate parent and child attributes. 
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Figure 4.15. Child Attributes on Belief Degrees (Original) 
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Figure 4.16. Child Attributes on Belief Degrees (Manually Adjusted) 
IDS can also produce sensitivity analyses based on the data, itself. Users can select 
Sensitivity > Change Input Data, which brings up a dialog box that produces two side-
by-side graphs (Figure 4.17). The first grapli displays the belief degrees input for each 
grade (from our simulated data) for a selected alternative. We selected KA 3, which 
received the highest perception score (in the model for which perception received a higher 
weight). The second graph displays the perception score for all of the alternatives (other 
attributes, such as threat, vulnerability, and consequence can also be explored as desired). 
The belief degrees do not remain normalized automatically, so we manually adjusted the 
belief degrees for KA 3, such that the belief degrees summed to 1. Although we did not 
drastically alter the belief degrees from the original values, we still see a marked change in 
the overall perception score for KA 3, which dropped from 78% to 68% (Figure 4.18). 
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Alternative 
Figure 4.17. Input Data (Original) 
Alternative 
Figure 4.18. Input Data (Adjusted) 
4.2 Verification, Validation, and Accreditation 
In addition to the data that must be collected, leveraged, or simulated for threat, 
vulnerability, consequence, and perception assessments, there is also data required for the 
MCDA model selected. For example, the IDS software used to implement ER requires 
values such as weights, utilities, and belief degrees in order to describe the model. These 
values have nothing to do with the actual assessment data, but rather are used to define the 
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way in which our assessment data will be integrated using the MCDA model. While future 
research may expand on the in vivo risk quadruplet methodology to include approaches for 
determining these values, we have assigned these values as necessary in order to complete 
the in vitro viability testing of the risk quadruplet methodology. Sensitivity analyses were 
conducted to determine the impact of some of these selected values on the ER model. 
Further, a preliminary verification and validation of the assessment integration model 
selected for the risk quadruplet was also performed and is presented below. However, a 
more thorough Modeling and Simulation (M&S) Verification, Validation, and 
Accreditation (W&A) will be necessary in the future. 
M&S W&A is crucial to the development and deployment of a model or simulation, 
especially if it is to be accepted and employed by stakeholders for decision making (Macal, 
2005). The Department of Defense released instructions for W&A of M&S {Department 
of Defense Standard Practice Documentation of Verification, Validation, and Accreditation 
for Models and Simulations, 2008) and many other agencies have followed suit. However, 
DHS does not appear to have a formal instruction for M&S W&A, even though most of 
the infrastructure analysis conducted by DHS is heavily reliant upon M&S, such as the 
work lead by the Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC) and 
the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC) ("About the 
Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center," 2012; "About the National 
Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center," 2012). 
In 2010, the "Review of the DHS Approach to Risk Analysis" was released (it is 
discussed further in 5.4APPENDIX C) and it was recommended that DHS improve its 
documentation, seek model validation, and leverage reviews by technical experts to 
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strengthen its risk M&S practices. Aside from risk analysis models for natural disasters, 
there are not "any DHS risk analysis capabilities or methods that are yet adequate for 
supporting DHS decision making, because their validity and reliability are untested," 
("Review of the DHS Approach to Risk Analysis," 2010). We do see that the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), a DHS organization, employs Hazus (a natural 
disaster model touted as a "nationally applicable standardized methodology that contains 
models for estimating potential losses from earthquakes, floods, and hurricanes"), which 
has undergone a series of model validation analyses ("FEMA Releases HAZUS-MH 
Hurricane Wind Model Validation Study," 2012; "Hazus," 2012; "HAZUS-MH Riverine 
Flood Model Validation Study," 2012; "Validation of HAZUS Hurricane Model during 
Ike," 2012). But the risk quadruplet is not specific to natural hazards, which could easily be 
compared to historical data. 
Interestingly, the USCG, another DHS agency, released two Commandant Instructions 
(CMDTINST) on the subject of M&S VV&A far in advance of the 2010 review of DHS 
risk analysis approaches. However, these instructions are brief and do not seem to be 
utilized by DHS for risk analysis models or simulations (COMDTINST 5200.38: Coast 
Guard Modeling and Simulation Management, 2006; COMDTINST 5200.40: Verification, 
Validation, and Accreditation of Models and Simulations, 2006). The USCG official 
definitions of M&S and W&A are provided in Figure 4.19 (COMDTINST 5200.38: Coast 
Guard Modeling and Simulation Management, 2006; COMDTINST 5200.40: Verification, 
Validation, and Accreditation of Models and Simulations, 2006). 
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a physical, mathematical, or otherwise logical 
representation of a system, entity, phenomenon, or 
process. 
a method for implementing a model over time; also, a 
technique for testing, analysis, or training in which real-
world systems are used, or where real-world and 
conceptual systems are reproduced by a model. 
the process of determining that a model or simulation 
implementation accurately represents the developer's 
conceptual description and specifications. 
the process of determining the degree to which the 
model or simulation is an accurate representation of the 
real world from the perspective of the intended uses. 
an official determination that a model or simulation is 
acceptable to use for a specific purpose. 
Figure 4.19. USCG Verification, Validation, and Accreditation Definitions 
4.2.1 Risk Quadruplet Model Verification 
Verification ensures that a model or simulation is programmed and implemented 
correctly. In other words, the model should be free from errors, bugs, accidental omissions, 
misapplications of the model or software, or invalid implementations of any algorithms 
(Macal, 2005). Verification is the process of determining whether a model is consistent 
from concept to requirements, including a review of the model's capabilities and the 
specifications associated with each capability. It is important to understand that no model 
can ever be completely verified, so the result of model verification is not a verified model, 
but rather a model that has passed all verification tests. For the purposes of the risk 
quadruplet, verifying the model relies upon verifying the MCDA assessment integration 
method selected for the third phase of the risk quadruplet methodology, so ideally we 
would verify the ER model deployed using IDS. Our verification plan, therefore, addresses 
the following three questions. 
1. Does the risk quadruplet model satisfy the intended use of ER? 
2. Does the software code provided by IDS correctly implement ER? 
3. Does the risk quadruplet model, implemented with ER via IDS, produce the 
required results in the desired format to meet the research purpose? 
Question 1 
Does the risk quadruplet model satisfy the intended use of ER? In an effort to deal with 
MCDA problems prone to uncertainties and subjectivity, ER was devised, developed, and 
implemented via IDS by Yang, along with his collaborators (Xu & Yang, 2001). ER and 
IDS are now used in many areas, such as supply chain management, design decision 
support, risk and safety analysis, quality management, and government policy consultations 
("IDS," 2010). ER uses a set of attributes, weights, utilities, and belief degrees to assess and 
rank a series of alternatives. This approach lends itself nicely to the complex problem of 
risk analysis in homeland security which consists of a number of attributes (threat, 
vulnerability, consequence, and the newly proposed attribute of perception), and also offers 
a series of alternatives in need of ranking (our CIKRKA assets). ER is used to support 
decision analyses, assessments, or evaluation activities. The risk quadruplet would also be 
used to support decision-making, specifically for risk assessments of CIKRKA. So the 
problem of ranking a number of CIKRKA assets based on a set of attributes (threat, 
vulnerability, consequence, and perception) is indeed an appropriate application of ER. 
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Question 2 
Does the software code provided by IDS correctly implement ER? Many MCDA 
problems inevitably deal with information under uncertainty, and that is especially true 
when dealing with risk. ER provides an alternative way of handling such information 
systematically and consistently. ER is a powerful MCDA approach based on a recursive 
algorithm that essentially aggregates information nonlinearly. ER has been compared to 
other MCDA approaches, such as MAUT, Saaty's left eigenvector method, Belton's 
normalized left eigenvector procedure, and Johnson's right eigenvector procedure (J.-B. 
Yang, 1999). The results of those comparisons produced comparable rankings of 
alternatives. IDS has also been compared to AHP, and while both use a hierarchical 
structure to model MCDA problems, there are some distinctions (Xu & Yang, 2001). For 
example, ER alternatives are not part of the hierarchy like they are in AHP. AHP uses a 
decision matrix whereas ER uses a generalized decision matrix that incorporates belief 
degrees (which are not employed in AHP); also, AHP uses average scores from pairwise 
comparisons to aggregate data, but ER aggregates the belief degrees in a progressive 
manner from lower level attributes to high level attributes. Because of these distinctions, 
IDS (the software implementation of ER) can: handle large and complex MCDA problems; 
assess new alternatives independently; produce consistent rakings of alternatives even after 
new ones are added; create a distributed assessment of alternatives in addition to a ranking 
of those alternatives; assess an alternative against standards or criteria (AHP can only 
compare the relative importance of alternatives between attributes); handle mixed data 
models (with both qualitative and quantitative data, as well as random and deterministic 
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data, under uncertainty); and lastly, IDS can actually use AHP as one of its weighting 
approaches for attributes (Xu & Yang, 2001). 
The detailed problem description, basic evaluation framework, algorithms, axioms, and 
theorems utilized by ER have been presented in detail (J.-B. Yang & Xu, 2002) and 
demonstrate that the ER approach and IDS have sound theoretical foundations. ER has 
undergone mathematical proofs (J.-B. Yang, 1999) and the mechanics of ER along with the 
results of ER deployed via IDS have been presented in a number of peer-reviewed journals 
and conferences (Sonmez, Yang, & Holt, 2001; Wang, Yang, & Sen, 1996; Xu, 2004; Xu 
& Yang, 1999,2003, 2005; Xu, Yang, & Wang, 2005; J.-B. Yang, 1999; J.-B. Yang & Xu, 
2002, 2004; J. B. Yang, Dale, & Siow, 2001). In fact, there is even one example for which 
ER, using IDS, was used in the fields of risk analysis and homeland security to produce a 
maritime security assessment (Z. L. Yang, Wang, Bonsall, & Fang, 2009). This example 
offers a degree of face validity for the methodology, the model, as well as the software 
code, all of which translates to our research as the risk quadruplet merely leverages IDS to 
implement an integrated risk assessment based on threat, vulnerability, consequence, and 
perception attributes used to rank CIKRKA alternatives, which is a valid application of ER. 
Additionally, as evidenced by the sensitivity analyses provided earlier, as well as the model 
validations which will be provided in the next section, we have demonstrated that the 
model behaves logically, which implies that the software code is free from mathematical 
errors. 
Question 3 
Does the risk quadruplet model, implemented with ER via IDS, produce the required 
results in the desired format to meet the research purpose? The research purpose requires 
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that the output of the risk quadruplet is a ranked assessment of CIKRKA (Figure 1.3). ER 
is an MCDA approach, which, like other MCDA approaches such as AHP, produces a 
ranked list of alternatives as its output. The IDS software implementation of ER thus also 
produces a ranked list of alternatives. We have designated the CIKRKA assets as 
alternatives in the risk quadruplet model. We have defined threat, vulnerability, 
consequence, and perception as attributes in the model, and assigned risk as the overall 
parent attribute. We have supplied the model with sufficient information (including 
attribute weights, utilities, and belief degrees) to relate parent and child attributes, as well 
as to relate our data (from the threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception 
assessments) to the attributes and alternatives. The output of our model is, indeed, a ranked 
list of CIKRKA based on an integrated risk assessment and thus adequately meets the 
needs of this research. 
4.2.2 Risk Quadruplet Model Validation 
Validation ensures that the model is useful (Macal, 2005). In other words, the model 
should address the correct problem and provide accurate information about the system or 
phenomenon being modeled. Validation could also consist of a series of challenges 
designed to purposefully address any doubts about the application of the model, in which 
case, similar to verification, the results of validation do not necessarily produce a validated 
model, but rather a model that has passed all validation tests (or perhaps a model that has 
failed some tests, but may be able to pass them in the future after additional model 
improvements have been made). Validation of complex models involves demonstrating 
that the model has the appropriate underlying relationships to permit an acceptable 
representation of the real world. Our validation plan addresses the following three 
questions. 
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1. Is the risk quadruplet model a valid construct of risk for homeland security? 
2. Are the results produced by the risk quadruplet close to the results of the real 
world? 
3. Under what range of inputs are the risk quadruplet results useful? 
Question 1 
Is the risk quadruplet model a valid construct of risk for homeland security? Typically, 
validation requires that a newly proposed model be compared to some existing "gold 
standard" model. However, there really is no such model for risk, so, let us instead explore 
whether the model constructed for risk makes sense in the context of homeland security. 
This validation depends on the purpose of the model and its intended use, so it is valuable 
to understand why we are using a model in the first place. In the case of the risk quadruplet, 
we are modeling risk as a function of threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception, in 
order to make qualitative or quantitative predictions about the fiiture, namely to rank 
CIKRKA assets based on their integrated risk assessment value (produced by the risk 
quadruplet model). But we are also using the model to gain insight into how perception 
affects threat, vulnerability, consequence, and risk, overall. The risk quadruplet model uses 
ER which allows us to explore all four attributes of risk (threat, vulnerability, consequence, 
and perception), as well as to explore how those attributes interact, depending on the 
weights, utilities, and belief degrees supplied for the model. We have already seen that the 
homeland security definition of risk includes threat, vulnerability, and consequence. The 
introduction of perception is now obvious after conducting this research, so the risk 
quadruplet model seems like a valid construct for homeland security. 
Face validation is another technique for validating a model or simulation. Essentially, 
face validation determines whether a model or simulation appears to measure a certain 
criterion. It is often conducted via peer reviews accompanied by surveys or interviews to 
seek the opinions of subject matter experts regarding the model or simulation. There are 
even examples of this type of validation being conducted in the fields of homeland security 
and homeland defense, once for a vulnerability assessment model (Ezell, Keating, & Old 
Dominion University. Dept. of Engineering Management and Systems Engineering., 2005), 
and again for a serious gaming approach to infrastructure analysis (Ancel, 2011). The 
specific risk quadruplet model proposed in this research has undergone some preliminary, 
informal face validation through conference presentations and papers (Norman Hill & 
Ezell, 2011; Norman Hill & Gheorghe, 2011), the feedback from which has resulted in 
improvements to the research presented in this dissertation. Further, ER and IDS have 
undergone extensive face validation by presenting the methodology, mathematics, and 
software implementation in numerous peer-reviewed journals and conference proceedings 
(Huynh, Nakamori, Ho, & Murai, 2006; Sonmez, et al., 2001; Wang, et al., 1996; Xu & 
Yang, 1999, 2003, 2005; Xu, et al., 2005; J.-B. Yang, 1999; J.-B. Yang & Xu, 2002, 2004; 
J. B. Yang, et al., 2001; Z. L. Yang, et al., 2009; Zhou, Liu, & Yang, 2010). Therefore, any 
model which correctly implements ER and IDS can claim some level of transitive face 
validation. 
Question 2 
Are the results produced by the risk quadruplet close to the results of the real world? 
We could validate new models by comparing model predictions to historical data, but how 
would we conduct controlled experiments on risk models when historical data is limited, 
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inconsistent, and deterministic? The maritime security assessment that leverages ER and 
IDS validates its model with benchmarking and sensitivity analysis (Z. L. Yang, et al., 
2009). While we have conducted sensitivity analyses of the risk quadruplet model, a 
benchmarking study is not possible within the scope of this research. Ideally, a 
benchmarking study would use an existing model supplied with existing data to generate 
results. These results would then be compared to the results achieved with the new model 
(our risk quadruplet), based on the same data. Therefore, benchmarking requires some 
current best practice or model to which we could compare the results of our risk quadruplet. 
However, the risk quadruplet actually proposes a shift in the paradigm of risk calculation. 
Risk is not currently calculated in homeland security by including perception alongside 
threat, vulnerability, and consequence, so there is no comparable model to compare and 
contrast against the risk quadruplet. Furthermore, even if a comparable model existed, we 
have already discussed the limitations of the data in this research. We were unable to access 
threat, vulnerability, or consequence data due to its sensitivity, and we were unable to 
collect that data due to the limitations of the scope and schedule of the research. Therefore, 
we tested the viability of the model using simulated data, but we have no actual data with 
which to compare our results. This is a limitation of the research, but it could (and should) 
be addressed in the future through a more formal M&S VV&A process. 
Question 3 
Under what range of inputs are the risk quadruplet results useful? We have already 
conducted sensitivity analyses to explore different versions of the risk quadruplet model. 
We have compared the risk quadruplet to the current homeland security risk triplet 
(consisting of only threat, vulnerability, and consequence). We have gained a better 
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understanding of the effects of weights for the perception attribute on the overall parent 
attribute of risk. We have determined the sensitivity of the belief degrees to the selected 
weights. And we even explored how changing the input data impacts the perception 
attribute score. However, we can conduct some other sensitivity analyses to further validate 
the risk quadruplet model. 
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Figure 4.20. Attribute Weights Using Visual Scoring (Equal Weights Model) 
The output of the risk quadruplet model (the ranked CIKRKA) should change 
depending on the weights selected for the child attributes, so we will explore some extreme 
weighting cases to test the validity of the model by ensuring that the results align with our 
intuitions. From Table 4.5, we know that KA 1 received the highest threat score, CI 1 
received the highest vulnerability score, and KA 2 and KA 3 jointly received the highest 
consequence score, whereas KA 3 received the highest perception score. In Figure 4.20 we 
create a baseline case version of the in vitro risk quadruplet model (Equal Weights Model) 
for which we have set all weights equal across the four attributes. The resulting rank of 
alternatives (from highest risk to lowest risk) is KA 1, CI 1, CI 3, KR 2, KR 3, CI 2, KR 1, 
KA 3, and KA 2. We will now systematically explore the four weighting schemes 
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presented below. We would expect the resulting CIKRKA ranks to adjust accordingly. For 
example, for the Max Threat Model, we would expect KA 1 (the asset which received the 
highest threat score) to be ranked highest with regards to the overall parent attribute of risk. 
1. Max Threat Model: threat weight=1.0, vulnerability weight=0.0, consequence 
weight=0.0, and perception weight=0.0 (Figure 4.21) 
2. Max Vulnerability Model: threat weight=0.0, vulnerability weight=1.0, 
consequence weight=0.0, and perception weight=0.0 (Figure 4.22) 
3. Max Consequence Model: threat weight=0.0, vulnerability weight=0.0, 
consequence weight= 1.0, and perception weight=0.0 (Figure 4.23) 
4. Max Perception Model: threat weight=0.0, vulnerability weight=0.0, 
consequence weight=0.0, and perception weight=1.0 (Figure 4.24) 
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Figure 4.21. Attribute Weights Using Visual Scoring (Max Threat Model) 
69 
<> # # c>" <>® #' #•' 
Alternative Attribute 
Figure 4.22. Attribute Weights Using Visual Scoring (Max Vulnerability Model) 
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Figure 4.23. Attribute Weights Using Visual Scoring (Max Consequence Model) 
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Figure 4.24. Attribute Weights Using Visual Scoring (Max Perception Model) 
We condense the results of these different models in Table 4.7 and the highlighted 
values were the assets which received the highest overall risk score for that model. For the 
baseline case (Equal Weights Model), KA 1 received the highest overall risk score. For the 
Max Threat Model, we would expect KA 1 to be ranked highest as it received the highest 
threat score, and that is exactly what we see. In fact, when compared to the Equal Weights 
Model, the overall risk score for KA 1 increases from 69% to 74% in the Max Threat 
Model. This shows that the emphasis of the weight on threat has a positive correlation with 
the overall parent attribute of risk. Since CI 1 received the highest vulnerability score, we 
expect to see it ranked the highest for risk in the Max Vulnerability Model and that is again 
what we see. Since KA 2 and KA 3 jointly received the highest consequence score, it is no 
surprise that we see both of them tied for the overall risk score in the Max Consequence 
Model. And because KA 3 received the highest perception score, it only makes sense that 
KA 3 received the highest overall risk score for the Max Perception Model. 
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Table 4.7. Model Validation Comparison of Weighting Schemes 
4.2.3 Risk Quadruplet Model Accreditation 
Accreditation is the final step in a full M&S W&A process. Accreditation is used to 
approve a model or simulation that has demonstrated that it can be employed successfully 
and that its results would be beneficial to the decision-making process. Obviously the entire 
VV&A process, but especially accreditation, would require close work with the 
stakeholders or agency which would be interested in employing the model or simulation. 
For the purposes of our research, we would initially look to market the risk quadruplet to 
DHS, and perhaps later share the approach with other EPR&R agencies. However, direct 
interaction with DHS regarding the risk quadruplet model has been extremely limited. A 
few DHS employees were introduced to the risk quadruplet during the 2011 Institute for 
Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) Annual Meeting, and 
responded favorably to the proposed model; however, the model has not yet been formally 
presented to DHS. 
While the data in these in vitro models were simulated, it is easy to see how the quick 
visual analyses, sensitivity analyses, and preliminary verification and validation of the 
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model would be valuable once the risk quadruplet is deployed in vivo with actual data and 
stakeholders reviewing the results to inform their decisions. As evidenced by this 
preliminary model testing, the risk quadruplet has the potential to assess perceptions of 
subject matter experts using an ER model. An integrated assessment methodology, based 
on ER, can be employed to integrate threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception 
assessments. And this methodology systematically integrates all four types of data in a 
meaningful, traceable, and reproducible approach, and provides a ranked CIKRKA list as 
its output. Future research would be necessary to better understand the sensitivity of the 
model to the selected weights, utilities, and belief degrees selected for the model, but it is 
easy to see how IDS could be useful in producing these analyses. Further, these sensitivity 
analyses would be invaluable for communicating with participants and stakeholders in the 
risk quadruplet integrated assessment. 
Many versions of the risk quadruplet model have been tested, in vitro, using simulated 
data to rank nine CIKRKA assets. This same risk quadruplet model could be used, in vivo, 
to assess the actual perceptions of subject matter experts. It could also incorporate threat, 
vulnerability, and consequence assessment data leveraged or collected during the second 
phase of the risk quadruplet methodology. The output of this in vivo approach would again 
be a ranking of assets, based on the proposed ER approach (using IDS), which could 
combine subjective and objective data, both quantitative and qualitative, to improve our 
understanding of the risks to CIKRKA. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
"This paper, by its very length, defends itself against the risk of being read" 
- Winston Churchill 
The three purposes of this research were to assess perceptions of CIKRKA, determine a 
risk quadruplet methodology for integrating threat, vulnerability, consequence, and 
perception assessments, and to rank CIKRKA based on an integrated risk quadruplet 
assessment methodology. Additionally, the two initial contributions of this research were to 
propose an MCDA risk quadruplet model for integrating assessments of threat, 
vulnerability, consequence, and perception, as well as a methodology for deploying the risk 
quadruplet model. The risk quadruplet methodology proposed is capable of integrating 
threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception assessments. While the risk quadruplet 
methodology was not deployed in vivo, it does detail the approach necessary for all three 
phases of the risk quadruplet methodology, from collecting perception data, leveraging or 
collecting threat, vulnerability, and consequence data, as well as systematically integrating 
those data in a meaningful, traceable, and reproducible model. Further, this methodology 
has been subjected to preliminary testing and analysis, in vitro, and has proven to be a 
viable approach for ranking CIKRKA in order to improve decision making for homeland 
security and homeland defense. 
And in fact, though not defined at the onset of the research, additional contributions 
have been made to the fields of risk perception, risk analysis, systems engineering, as well 
as homeland security and homeland defense. This research challenged the existing 
paradigm for risk, not just as it is defined in homeland security (as a function of threat, 
vulnerability, and consequence), but as it is typically defined in risk analysis, in general (as 
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a function of probability and consequence). This research asserts that risk is inherently 
related to our perceptions and that we construct risk methodologies and models based on 
those perceptions. 
This paradigm shift has a direct and corresponding impact on the practical application 
of risk analysis. If we agree that perception affects our assessments of risk, then it is only 
logical that we include those perceptions in our risk assessment approaches. This argues for 
more robust methods to incorporate perceptions into an integrated risk assessment 
approach, as has been proposed by the risk quadruplet. The practical, and potentially 
disturbing, implication of this new risk model is that if we change our perceptions, we then 
influence our calculated risk. However, this is already the case, although it has not been 
formalized. If we conducted an assessment on a given asset's risk in 2000, we might have 
produced very different results than if we had repeated that assessment in 2010 
(considering all of the risk scenarios that have impacted our psyche since 2000, including 
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the September 11 attacks and the Fukushima disaster). And in fact, this correlation 
between risk and our perceptions could be further exploited to improve risk communication 
and strategic risk planning. As perceptions of risk are incorporated into risk assessments, 
decision makers can better understand where gaps exist between our perceptions of risk and 
the actual threat, vulnerability, and consequence data known about those risks. This 
information can be developed into improved risk visualizations, such as risk maps, or even 
graphics like those produced by the WEF for their Global Risks reports. Improving the risk 
communication could have a positive effect on risk perceptions, which would, in turn, 
result in improved risk assessments. 
5.1 Methodology Improvements 
Obviously, future research should include an in vivo test of the risk quadruplet 
methodology since the risk quadruplet model has only been subjected to in vitro testing 
using simulated data. While the in vitro testing proved the viability of the risk quadruplet 
model, it did not ensure the entire research methodology was viable, since risk perception 
data was not collected from subject matter experts directly. However, had we implemented 
the in vivo methodology, we could have encountered a number of issues. For example, in 
the proposed in vivo methodology, respondents would have been given CIKRKA local to 
them (as volunteer participants would have lived or worked in the National Capitol Region 
at the time of perception data collection). It was noted that this might introduce some bias. 
Would their perceptions be influenced by their proximity to the region? What if we 
presented them with CIKRKA examples specific to Hampton Roads or another region with 
which they were less familiar? Further, respondents would only have been asked to 
consider Motor Gasoline for VA, as this information was unavailable for DC. However, 
these regional choices could introduce some bias to the perception data as respondents were 
asked to consider a CI in DC, a KA in DC, but a KR covering the entire state of VA. 
Future methodological improvements might also include the exploration of perceptions 
from the general public, instead of focusing on subject matter expert opinions. The model 
could even be expanded to accommodate a combination of perceptions from both experts 
and non-experts. For example, the perception attribute could branch into two sub-attributes: 
private and public, where private perception assessments would come from the owners and 
operators of the asset and public perception assessments could be split further into 
assessments collected from general citizens, regulatory committees, as well as federal, 
state, and local government agencies. All of these different entities provide valid 
perceptions which could affect decision-making. We have seen that risk is a construct, so it 
may be valuable to not only include perception in the assessment process, but to include 
multiple perceptions to ensure we are seeing all of the potential risk associated with an 
asset from numerous different perspectives. 
In addition to the approach presented for collecting perception data, the risk quadruplet 
methodology could also be expanded to include options for collecting threat, vulnerability, 
and consequence data. It would also be good to explore whether that data could or should 
be collected as qualitative or quantitative data, since ER can handle mixed data models. 
While it may be valid to continue collecting risk perception using a qualitative linguistic 
set, that might not be appropriate for all combinations of CIKRKA and risk scenarios with 
regards to the other three attributes of the risk quadruplet model. 
It was suggested that threat, vulnerability, and consequence data could be collected or 
leveraged from historical assessments for use during the in vivo risk quadruplet approach. 
One option would be to code the results (of either collected or leveraged data) to the ER 
linguistic set. However, this additional step could introduce some bias as someone would 
have to judge how the results align to the linguistic set, but it would treat all data in the risk 
quadruplet on a common qualitative scale. Threat, vulnerability, and consequence 
assessments are often ad hoc and typically produce inconsistent data, so coding the results 
to a single linguistic set would give them commonality. But due to the flexibility of the ER 
assessment integration phase of the risk quadruplet, we could collect or leverage threat, 
vulnerability, and consequence data however it is available (qualitative or quantitative, for 
example). ER can integrate both qualitative and quantitative data and IDS provides that 
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option when defining attributes, so we could explore the impact to the risk quadruplet 
model when using mixed data. For example, if the attribute is defined as quantitative, then 
the user can also decide whether it is a certain or uncertain attribute. This would be useful 
for defining uncertain quantitative attributes, which could be random numbers, may be 
difficult to assess, or could suffer from missing data ("IDS Multicriteria Assessor Quick 
Guide," 2010). We could revisit the in vitro model used to test the risk quadruplet, and 
replace some of the simulated qualitative data with simulated quantitative data by inputting 
threat and consequence as quantitative variables, using the tornado frequencies and 
property damage data presented in 5.4APPENDIX D. However, this research could require 
significant contributions to the methodological approach. 
The number and types of assets under study in the proposed in vivo methodology 
would have been limited to a single CI, KR, and KA, and would have only explored a 
single scenario. Even the in vitro viability testing of the risk quadruplet model limited the 
number of assets to three CI, three KR, and three KA, and again assumed a single risk 
scenario. Future iterations of the risk quadruplet model should explore an increased number 
of assets and scenarios (both natural and unnatural). Additionally, it has been shown that 
not all assets clearly align to a single type of asset (CI, KR, or KA); many assets are 
interrelated. For example, the Hoover Dam produces electricity and serves as a major 
transportation route (making it a CI), however it outputs electricity and maintains water 
supplies (which are both KRs), but it is also a thriving tourist attraction (making it a KA). 
There is no methodology for integrating multiple risk assessments for a single entity from 
different perspectives, such as when a CI is aligned to multiple sectors, or when it is also 
considered a KA, which is where perception could play a starring role. Future research 
could explore ways to handle interrelated CIKRKA. Expanding the risk quadruplet 
methodology to include additional (and potentially interrelated) assets and risk scenarios 
would drastically improve its value and applicability. 
Additionally, the methodology is also adaptable as more research on the model, itself, 
is conducted. For example, the risk quadruplet methodology could be expanded to include 
details for determining child attribute weighting, utility scoring, and the assignment of 
parent-child belief degrees. This could open up a number of areas of research to further 
improve the risk quadruplet methodology, such as comparing the child attribute weighting 
methods (visual scoring versus pairwise comparison), or the derivation of utility inputs. 
Perhaps this could be an opportunity to revisit the MCDA MAUT approach which was 
discarded as an improper approach for the assessment integration phase of the risk 
quadruplet, but might be a valuable approach for determining those utility values required 
by the ER model. This research could also benefit from the study of the selection of parent 
to child belief degrees (which were input using the identity matrix for the purposes of this 
research, but which could be further explored using sensitivity analyses). 
5.2 Model Improvements 
First and foremost, the risk quadruplet should undergo formal M&S W&A (a 
preliminary verification and validation of the model was discussed in CHAPTER 4). It was 
recommended that "DHS should have a well-funded research program to address social and 
economic impacts of natural disasters and terrorist attacks" ("Review of the DHS Approach 
to Risk Analysis," 2010). Existing risk analyses for infrastructure protection could be 
improved by verifying and validating models, improving documentation, or submitting 
models to external subject matter experts for peer review ("Review of the DHS Approach 
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to Risk Analysis," 2010). The risk quadruplet offers a unique proposal, to not only shift the 
paradigm for how risk is calculated by DHS, but to potentially be one of the first models 
accredited which formalizes the DHS approach to integrating threat, vulnerability, 
consequence, and perception assessments in a meaningful, traceable, and reproducible 
manner. Further, as DHS does not have a formal instruction for M&S VV&A, there is an 
opportunity for future research to ensure DHS creates such guidance and that it is tailored 
to the specific needs for models, simulations, and assessments used by DHS for strategic 
decision-making, risk mitigation plans, and budget allocation. 
The model could also be expanded to rank a much larger number of CIKRKA assets. 
Additionally, replicating the model would allow for the comparison of multiple risk 
scenarios. In other words, we would set up one instance of the model to analyze threat, 
vulnerability, consequence, and perception data based on a single risk scenario. Another 
instance of the model (identical in every way, except for the data) would be used to analyze 
a second scenario, and so on. This would allow for apples to apples comparisons of the 
same CIKRKA assets (alternatives) across the same attributes. Although it could be argued 
that the models should be adjusted to account for differences in utilities, belief degrees, and 
weighting depending on the risk scenario (in other words, does perception receive the same 
weight when exploring a flood risk scenario for which threat, vulnerability, and 
consequence data might be very reliable versus a terrorist attack risk scenario for which 
data is less reliable and perceptions tend to be driven by fear more than facts?). 
Prospective versions of the model could work with subject matter experts to complete 
the pairwise comparison approach for weighting attributes in the ER integration assessment 
phase. This tool is provided with the IDS software and is basically an AHP approach for 
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weighting the child attributes (threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception) as they 
relate to the parent attribute (risk). Additionally, utilities for the parent attribute (risk) were 
assigned to grades arbitrarily for this example, but it may be worth exploring how to assess 
and incorporate the utilities of those providing inputs for the ER model. These values could 
be easily revised in future iterations of the model. Similarly, to relate parent and child 
attributes, the belief degrees were assigned arbitrarily for each child (threat, vulnerability, 
consequence, and perception). These values could be adjusted in future iterations of the 
model. For example, if the child grade is very low, that could relate to a parent grade of 
none, very low, and low with belief degrees of .25, .50, and .25, respectively. Developing a 
methodology for determining how to define these weights, utilities, and belief degrees 
would improve the flexibility and robustness of the risk quadruplet model. Additionally, it 
would allow for sensitivity analyses, which might shed some light on how the selected 
weights, utilities, and belief degrees affect the influence of perception on all attributes, as 
well as the parent attribute of risk. 
Similarly, future research could be conducted to better understand how the belief 
degrees would change if we used alternative methods for assigning the input values of our 
belief degrees to relate parent and child attributes. More intense sensitivity analyses would 
be necessary to better understand how the model would behave as the utilities, weights, and 
belief degrees that relate child to parent attributes are adjusted. It is easy to see how IDS 
could be useful in producing these analyses and how these sensitivity analyses would be 
invaluable for communicating with participants and stakeholders in the risk quadruplet 
integrated assessment. 
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5.3 Generalizability of the Risk Quadruplet Model 
Determining how to generalize the risk quadruplet model would be worthwhile to 
demonstrate its applicability across a wider range of homeland security and homeland 
defense risk issues, as well as risk challenges in other fields. Conveniently, the risk 
quadruplet model is extensible and adaptable, mainly because ER is a flexible and robust 
assessment integration approach. 
A more complex model could also be explored to address multiple risk scenarios by 
introducing them as child attributes of the threat attribute, rather than just replicating the 
model. Additionally, the model could be expanded to address additional child attributes, 
such as sustainability or resilience (Figure 5.1). Expanding the risk quadruplet 
methodology to include additional (and potentially interrelated) assets and risk scenarios 
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Figure 5.1. Risk Quadruplet Model (Generalized Example) 
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Lastly, additional child attributes that relate to the overall parent attribute of risk could 
be explored in future iterations of the risk quadruplet. For example, sustainability and 
resilience have both become very popular terms in the homeland security and homeland 
defense literature. Resilience is defined by DHS as the "ability of systems, infrastructures, 
government, business, communities, and individuals to resist, tolerate, absorb, recover 
from, prepare for, or adapt to an adverse occurrence that causes harm, destruction, or loss" 
(.DHS Risk Lexicon, 2010). Sustainability is generally defined as the development of 
infrastructure that not only meet the needs of the present, but do not impact the ability of 
future generations to meet their evolving needs (for example, adapting existing 
infrastructure, or building new infrastructure, that is compatible with alternative energy 
sources). The term sustainability is mentioned in 15 homeland security and homeland 
defense documents, but was not specifically defined in any of them (.Agriculture and FooD 
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan, 2007; Communications: 
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan, 2007; Critical 
Foundations: Protecting America's Infrastructures, 1997; Defense Industrial BasE Critical 
Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan, 2007; Energy: Critical 
Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan, 2007; Information Technology: 
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan, 2007; Interim National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2005; National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2006; 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2009; National Response Framework, 2008; 
National Response Plan, 2004; NSHS, 2002; NSPPCIKA, 2003; Quadrennial Homeland 
Security Review Report, 2010; Transportation Systems: Critical Infrastructure and Key 
Resources Sector-Specific Plan, 2007). It is not too much of a stretch to see how DHS and 
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other agencies might wish to conduct sustainability or resilience assessments in the future, 
and the results of those assessments could be easily incorporated alongside threat, 
vulnerability, consequence, and perception assessments into a risk quintuplet or risk 
sextuplet. 
Further generalizing the risk quadruplet approach, we could use the risk quadruplet 
model to explore anything that would need to be ranked in an overall integrated assessment 
of risk for homeland security or homeland defense. For example, it is possible that an 
adaptation of the risk quadruplet approach could be useful in future Regional Resiliency 
Assessment Program (RRAP) and Strategic National Risk Assessment (SNRA) efforts to 
rank regions, cities, or areas, or to rank risk scenarios. Or the risk quadruplet could be used 
to rank countries, similar to the country risks reported by WEF ("Global Risks," 2006; 
"Global Risks," 2007; "Global Risks," 2008; "Global Risks," 2009; "Global Risks," 2010; 
"Global Risks," 2011; "Global Risks," 2012; "OECD Studies in Risk Management: 
Innovation in Country Risk Management," 2009). Or the risk quadruplet could be used to 
evaluate decisions and lessons learned from crises, to measure the effectiveness of risk 
mitigation efforts, to reevaluate risks once vulnerabilities have been addressed, or to ensure 
funds for mitigation efforts are allocated based on risk rankings. These areas are critical 
deficiencies in many countries' enterprise risk management processes, as identified in the 
OECD risk management report ("OECD Studies in Risk Management: Innovation in 
Country Risk Management," 2009). Additionally, the risk quadruplet could be used to 
explore risk mitigation. Pinto asserts that it is "essential that alternative (risk mitigation) 
actions be evaluated" and ranked based on the attributes of cost and benefits (Pinto, 2006). 
The risk quadruplet methodology could easily be reengineered for this particular problem 
by defining actions as alternatives in the ER model and by defining attributes in the ER 
model for cost and benefit, thus outputting a ranked list of mitigation actions. Most 
importantly, it is vital to recognize that the risk quadruplet model is not restricted to only 
analyzing risk to CIKRKA assets. 
And, in fact, the risk quadruplet model is also not limited to the homeland security or 
homeland defense markets. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 
conducted a survey of risk analysis in a number of government agencies, as well as 
throughout the international community (Murdock, Squeri, Jones, & Smith, 2011). CSIS 
found a number of key similarities and key differences in both the risk assessment phase 
("how risk is defined, identified, analyzed, and assessed") as well as the implementation 
phase (how risk assessment affects decision-making and how risk is communicated). 
Similar to our findings, the overall risk lexicon was deemed to be inconsistent and 
incomplete. Another lesson learned was the need for risk management techniques to 
acknowledge uncertainty and variance in risk assessment approaches. Interestingly, CSIS 
also notes that "simple models are almost always better than complicated ones" (Murdock, 
et al., 2011). A series of case study matrices are presented for DHS, National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA), EPA, Nuclear Regulatory Committee, Office of 
Management and Budget, Food and Drug Administration, as well as a number of countries 
such as Singapore, the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, and France, as well as a 
number of international organizations like the United Nations, World Bank, and OECD. 
The case studies explore how the agencies or countries define, identify, assess, and 
communicate risk, along with information about the organization's strategic environment 
and objectives, culture, leadership, and the overall effectiveness of the organization's risk 
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management approach (Murdock, et al., 2011). The risk quadruplet may be a good fit for 
some of the risk analysis approaches employed by these agencies and countries. 
Additionally, many other risk analysis research areas could benefit from this general 
model. For example, project management risk analysts are typically interested in technical 
risks and programmatic risks (Pennock & Haimes, 2002), where technical risks are those 
issues that would keep a project from meeting its performance criteria and programmatic 
risks are related to cost and schedule overruns. Often these attributes are assessed 
independently and attempts to provide an overall integrated assessment, so as to rank risk 
scenarios to the project for the purposes of risk mitigation, are often oversimplified; for 
example, some risk analysts might use a straight average of the attribute assessment scores. 
The risk quadruplet model could be applied here, where the risk scenarios become the 
alternatives and the child attributes underneath the parent attribute of risk would be cost, 
schedule, safety, and quality. 
5.4 Additional Research Areas 
There are also a number of additional research areas that could be explored which do 
not directly relate to the risk quadruplet methodology or the model itself, but are still 
related to the research presented here. For example, studying the regional component of 
risk and perception for homeland security, in and of itself, could open up an entire area of 
research, already being explored to some extent in conjunction with Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS). For example, are there regional differences in perceptions of 
risk to CIKRKA and could that impact risk assessments (if a region does not often 
experience flooding, would that risk scenario be overlooked, rendering them vulnerable 
should a flood occur)? And could differences in perceptions across different geographical 
86 
areas allow national, regional, or local policy-makers, or infrastructure planners and 
vendors, to determine where new CIKR would be best received by local residents (a sort of 
geomarketing of CIKR)? 
And although it did not make sense to propose a complete Psychometric Model for the 
in vivo risk quadruplet methodology presented in this research (given the constraints of the 
ER model selected for attribute integration), it would be worth exploring an expanded 
Psychometric Model in the future. A full psychometric study could analyze the perceptions 
of CIKRKA to see if there is a statistically significant difference between perceptions of 
those different assets, the results of which would be very interesting and worthwhile as 
DHS continues to refine its definitions and risk analysis approaches for CIKRKA. Further, 
surveying experts could result in perceptions different from those of the layperson. Future 
iterations of the model could explore perceptions from the general public, or even a 
combination of perceptions from both experts and non-experts. 
Lastly, it was suggested that KA do not have a traditional systemic purpose and are not 
seeking to produce, transform, or transport anything. Future research might shed some light 
on how this might impacts the inclusion of KA in the greater CIKR system of systems, 
especially for the purposes of ranking those assets based on risk. At the very least, it would 
be worthwhile for DHS to revisit and improve their definitions for assets, risk, and risk-
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RESEARCH LIMITATIONS (IN VIVO) 
Phase 1. Perception Assessment 
"The fear of death is the most unjustified of all fears, for there's no risk of accident for 
someone who's dead." 
- Albert Einstein 
Data Collection 
The first phase (the perception assessment) must consider a means for collecting 
perception data, the framework for obtaining that data, the selection of respondents who 
will voluntarily contribute their perceptions, as well as an approach for analyzing the 
perception data once it is collected. Expert elicitation is a way to gather the opinions of 
experts, often seeking a consensus, regarding a subject characterized by uncertainty, 
usually due to insufficient data ("Expert Elicitation," 2011). For that reason, it seems like a 
logical approach for gathering perceptions. 
Expert elicitation is often used when researching rare events, which typically lack 
adequate data to conduct more traditional probabilistic approaches ("Expert Elicitation," 
2011). Expert opinion is also used when observation, experimentation, or simulation is not 
possible due to limited resources. Subject matter experts are employed to estimate new, 
uncommon, or complicated issues and may also be utilized to forecast future outcomes. 
Multiple methods exist to elicit expert judgments, such as focus groups, surveys, 
interviews, or even interactive exercises like wargames (Ancel, 2011). 
A common goal of expert elicitation is to quantify uncertainty ("Expert Elicitation," 
2011), which lends the technique nicely to risk analysis. There is also a precedence for 
employing expert elicitation techniques to the research and design of next generation 
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infrastructure (Ancel, 2011), but it is not without its flaws and limitations. Research on risk 
judgments usually shows that expert judgments are more valid or accurate than those of the 
general public (Wright, Bolger, & Rowe, 2002). However, it has been shown that lay 
people are not completely irrational or inaccurate in their judgments of risk-related values 
(Baruch Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1982). The selection of respondents for the 
perception assessment will be important and it will be important to note whether 
participants are considered experts, non-experts, or a mix of both. 
It will also be important to determine how to aggregate perception assessment results. If 
perception data is to be collected via expert elicitation, then the number of perception 
values produced is dependent upon the number of survey respondents. And the number of 
values for the threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments would not depend on the 
number of respondents, so synthesizing those two different sized data sets could pose a 
problem during the assessment integration phase. 
Early work on perception models focused on the variation among means of perception 
ratings across multiple risk scenarios and did not examine the variation among the 
individual respondents (those rating the risks). This means that, for better or worse, higher 
levels of explanatory power can be achieved by stabilizing the means through large 
samples (Lennart Sjoberg, 1999). However, some perception models have been scrutinized 
for their use of aggregate data (versus disaggregate data), but it is generally recognized that 
using disaggregate data changes the focus of the analysis to an exploration of the 
distinctions among respondents, rather than an exploration of the distinctions among risk 
scenarios (Henry H. Willis, DeKay, Fischhoff, & Morgan, 2005). Since the purpose of this 
research is not to explore the differences between the perceptions of individual 
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respondents, but rather to explore the differences of their collective perceptions across a 
series of combinations of CIKRKA and risk scenarios, this should not have an impact on 
the research. 
Another challenge to overcome is bias as numerous studies have shown inherent biases 
in perception data. There is often a difference between perceived personal risk (risk to 
oneself) and perceived general risk (risk to others), where general risk is usually judged to 
be higher, especially those risks perceived as uncontrollable along the Controllable -
Uncontrollable risk scale (Lennart Sjoberg, 1999). Also, women tend to rate risks higher 
than men (Lennart Sjoberg, 1999). It is important to note that some studies have shown that 
demographic and other participant factors were very weakly related to perception (L. 
Sjoberg, 2000). 
And not only can bias be introduced in the perception data, but also in the expert 
elicitation tool, itself. Survey studies often display a bias, especially in terms of the 
respondents' educational levels, but that bias does not appear to be serious in studies of 
perception (L. Sjoberg, 2000). One alternative to a survey might be structured interviews 
although there is no evidence that suggests that interviews are more valid than surveys 
(Lennart Sjoberg, 1999). And while survey questions might introduce bias (Dillman, 2000), 
an interviewer could also introduce bias (Moser, 1951). Furthermore, there is always a risk 
of low response rates for any survey (Dillman, 2000), and sample sizes for focus groups or 
interviews are typically much smaller due to limited resources and time constraints (Moser, 
1951), so generalizability and interpolation to the rest of the population is limited, 
especially since the sample may not be representative of the entire population, given the 
respondents will primarily be subject matter experts. 
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Respondents would likely be volunteers, so response rates may be low. Requests for 
participation could be announced via email and websites to public organizations that share 
common interests in homeland security, homeland defense, Critical Infrastructure 
Protection (CIP), risk, threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments, risk 
management, risk mitigation, risk analysis, and Emergency Preparedness, Response, and 
Recovery (EPR&R). As a result, many of these potential respondents would be subject 
matter experts, so the perceptions gathered would be those of experts. 
We are then assuming some level of homogeneity across the respondents, which might 
not be the case if we selected non-experts to provide their perceptions. Future research 
might explore a comparison of the risk quadruplet eliciting subject matter expert 
perceptions versus common citizen perceptions. Or, perhaps both types of respondents 
should participate in the perception assessment phase in order to seek a more complete 
picture of the perceived risks to the assets under study. The in vivo risk quadruplet 
methodology is easily adaptable to exploring these alternatives in the future. 
Other concerns affecting the data collection methodology are the scope of the research. 
We will need perceptions within the context of CIKRKA, but how many types of CIKRKA 
can be explored in a survey? A reduced number of assets must be selected to the risk 
quadruplet research. Should the data be collected via survey or focus group, and would it 
make sense to use a blocked experimental design where a certain percentage of respondents 
explore CI, the next group provides data on KR, and so on? Furthermore, how many 
combinations of threats and assets should be studied? Will each respondent focus on one 
scenario, perhaps a power plant asset combined with a terrorist attack threat? Or will a list 
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of potential threats be used to gauge perceptions of the asset overall, like a power plant 
subjected to threats of flood, earthquake, tornado, insider threat, and terrorist attack? 
Perception Models 
The models typically used for collecting and analyzing perception data are the Social 
Amplification of Risk Framework, the Cultural Theory Model, and the Psychometric 
Model. There are pros and cons to each methodology, so they will be explored and the final 
perception model will be selected accordingly. This research will explore how a perception 
model performs when applied to CIKRKA, but also how the resulting data can be 
integrated with threat, vulnerability, and consequence data, so those constraints will affect 
our decision and determine which model is selected for the risk quadruplet. 
Social Amplification of Risk Framework 
The social amplification of risk framework is an interdisciplinary approach, combining 
psychology, sociology, anthropology, and communications ("Risk Perception," 2010). It 
assumes that communications of risk events travel from the sender to the receiver through 
intermediate stations (such as individuals, groups, and the media) and in that process, the 
receiver's perceptions are amplified or diminished. The framework attempts to ascertain 
why some risks are considered more important and thus receive public attention, and why 
other risks are considered less important and thus receive little to no public attention ("Risk 
Perception," 2010). While interesting, this framework seems inappropriate and overly 
complicated for this research, which is less interested in the impacts of risk communication 
and more interested in the perception of risks from certain risk scenarios to CIKRKA. 
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Cultural Theory Model 
The cultural theory model assumes that people choose to worry about certain risk 
scenarios based on their social engagements and the model tends to link world views 
(egalitarian, hierarchy, individualistic, and fatalistic) and perceptions using group and grid 
indices (Lennart Sjoberg, 1999). Group indices measure one's membership in certain 
groups and one's freedom of expressing opinions differing from the norm, whereas grid 
indices measure one's respect for others, specifically authority figures. This model usually 
only explains approximately 5%-10% of the variance of perceived risk (Lennart Sjoberg, 
1999), and again it does not appear to lend itself to easily gauging perceptions of CIKRKA. 
Psychometric Model 
Psychometrics is a field that studies the measurement of knowledge, perception, 
abilities, or personality characteristics. The psychometric model appears to be the preferred 
method for studying perceptions of risk. According to the traditional psychometric model 
approach, perception is a fiinction of risk scales, usually nine dimensions (Slovic, 
Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1979): 
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1. Voluntary - Involuntary 
2. Chronic - Catastrophic 
3. Common - Dread 
4. Certainly Not Fatal - Certainly Fatal 
5. Known to Exposed - Unknown to Exposed 
6. Immediate - Delayed 
7. Known to Science - Unknown to Science 
8. Uncontrollable - Controllable 
9. New - Old 
Using this approach up to approximately 85% of the (aggregate) variance in risk ratings 
can be explained (Henry H. Willis, et al., 2005). However, the psychometric model has 
been scrutinized for its use of aggregate data (versus disaggregate data). It is true that the 
psychometric method explains less variance when data are not averaged over participants 
prior to analysis. But, it is generally recognized that using the psychometric model for 
disaggregate data changes the focus of the analysis to an exploration of the distinctions 
among participants, rather than an exploration of the distinctions among risk scenarios 
(Henry H. Willis, et al., 2005). The traditional psychometric model is focused on 
aggregate-level risk scenario-focused analysis, which is the goal of this research. Should 
the psychometric model be selected, the data will be aggregated to emphasize the 
distinctions between risk scenarios (Henry H. Willis, et al., 2005). 
But are the nine traditional risk scales (Slovic, et al., 1979) still valid for homeland 
security and CIKRKA? In addition to the nine traditional risk scales previously mentioned, 
the psychometric model can be further improved by including another risk scale, described 
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as "Tampering with Nature" or "Immoral Risk" (Lennart Sjoberg, 1999). This risk scale 
might be explained as "Natural - Unnatural" where natural risk scenarios fall on one 
extreme and terrorism falls along the other, with manmade accidents perhaps falling 
somewhere near the unnatural end of the scale. This scale could be used to address the all-
hazards approach to homeland security and homeland defense that must deal with EPR&R 
to both natural hazards, as well as accidents and terrorist attacks. And for the purposes of 
our research, perhaps a new scale could be introduced, something along the lines of "CIKR 
- KA" where the extremes are used to determine whether the type of asset affects risk 
perceptions. 
For the past quarter century, research on perception has been dominated by Slovic, 
Fischhoff, and Liechtenstein's psychometric model. Traditionally, participants rank a large 
number of risk scenarios with regard to their perceived benefit to society, perceived risk 
(personal and/or social), the acceptability of the current risk, and their position along each 
of the nine risk scales (Bronfman & Cifiientes, 2003; B. Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, 
Read, & Combs, 1978; Slovic, et al., 1979). The ratings of the nine risk scales are averaged 
over participants and the resulting risk scenario versus dimension matrix is analyzed, often 
using principal component analysis since many of the risk scales tend to be inter-correlated. 
Principal component analysis is a mathematical procedure that converts a set of 
correlated variables to a set of uncorrected variables, or principal components, where the 
number of principal components is always less than or equal to the number of original 
variables ("Principal Component Analysis," 2010). The principal components are selected 
to account for as much of the variability in the data as possible, subject to the constraint 
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that they are uncorrelated with each other ("Principal Component Analysis," 2010). These 
principal components can then be used in regression analyses. 
Principal components analysis can be used to explain the variation in risk ratings 
(including variation unique to individual attributes) by factoring out the principal 
components (comprised of the correlated risk scales) which are often named for their 
shared characteristics, such as dread risk or unknown risk. Typically, a few components or 
factors account for a majority of the variation (Slovic, 1987). These principal components 
are then used as independent variables in regressions to predict the mean ratings of 
pertinent dependent variables, such as perceived benefit to society, perceived risk (personal 
and/or social), and the acceptability of the risk. Principal components analysis seems like 
an unnecessary step in the psychometric model, at least for the purposes of this research as 
this additional analysis would not likely be needed for the MCDA model selected for the 
assessment integration. 
The psychometric model is often used to explore perceptions, and an interesting 
example is given for Chile (Bronfman & Cifiientes, 2003). The study examined risk 
scenarios along 16 risk scales: Newness, Voluntariness, Catastrophic Potential, Dread, 
Immediacy, Severity, Social Knowledge, Social Control, Social Benefit, Number of 
Exposed People, Personal Knowledge, Personal Control, Personal Benefit, Personal Effect, 
Current Regulation Status, and Desired Regulation. These were defined and rated on 7 or 
10 point rating scales (psychometric scales often used with questionnaires). Three risk 
constructs were explored, including social risk, personal risk, and acceptability. Finally, 54 
risk scenarios were analyzed, grouped by type of risk scenario, and each risk scenario was 
scored along the risk scales and risk constructs in a survey. The design was blocked into 
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four surveys and administered to approximately 500 people, only 100 of which actually 
completed all four surveys (Bronfman & Cifuentes, 2003). 
Once the data was collected, principal components analysis was performed and three 
main factors were identified. Factor 1 (Dread Risk) included Catastrophic Potential, Dread, 
Severity, Voluntariness, and Social Control. Factor 2 (Unknown Risk) included Social 
Knowledge, Newness, and Immediacy. Factor 3 (Personal Effect) included Number of 
Exposed People, and Personal Effect. Additional analysis compared social versus personal 
results, using regression models with the three factors to model personal risk, social risk, 
and risk denial (the difference of the two). Analysts also conducted regressions using the 
three factors to model acceptability, desired regulation, and the difference between the 
desired regulation and the current regulation. 
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Figure B.l. Psychometric Model Example 
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Using this example as a guideline for the first phase of the risk quadruplet methodology 
might be the most appropriate application of a risk assessment methodology to the risk 
quadruplet. Participants could be asked to rate a number of risk scenarios, specific to 
CIKRKA along a series of risk scales. Mean ratings could be computed for each risk 
scenario along each scale. The resulting risk scenarios versus risk scales matrix could be 
analyzed using principal components analysis to determine which factors explain the most 
variance. The survey could be limited to social risk scales and risk constructs. It may not be 
possible to test so many risk scenarios, but it may be possible to test a small sample of 
natural and unnatural risk scenarios, perhaps using a taxonomy to randomly select risk 
scenarios. The survey design could be blocked into three surveys, one each for CI, KR, and 
KA, so that perceptions could be compared and contrasted across asset type. The CIKRKA 
could even be randomly selected from the DHS Infrastructure Data Taxonomy (IDT). 
However, given the many challenges discussed already, a full blown psychometric 
model may not be possible or even necessary. While the psychometric model is probably 
the best candidate for collecting and analyzing perception data for CIKRKA, that is not the 
only goal of this research. The other goal of this research is to determine a risk quadruplet 
methodology for integrating threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception 
assessments, ultimately ranking CIKRKA based on that integrated assessment. The 
outcomes of the traditional psychometric model may not be compatible with the assessment 
integration model selected for the third phase of the risk quadruplet. 
It is common to use questionnaire studies to consider the levels of acceptable risk or the 
perceived seriousness of a wide variety of natural and man-made hazards (B. Fischhoff, et 
al., 1978). And expert judgment-based risk methodologies might use descriptive words like 
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high, medium, or low to describe the characteristics that play a role in the risk scenario 
(Mallor, Garcia-Olaverri, Gomez-Elvira, & Mateo-Collazas, 2008). Therefore, a reduced 
psychometric model, based on a much simpler questionnaire that elicits qualitative expert 
judgments could still be a valid perception assessment approach for the purposes of this 
research. 
So, after reviewing the risk perception models available to us, the psychometric model 
seemed like the most appropriate candidate for the first phase of the in vivo risk quadruplet 
methodology. However, given the ER model and IDS software selected for the assessment 
integration phase, a full blown psychometric model seems unnecessary, especially as it 
would not provide data immediately compatible with ER, the selected assessment 
integration model. Therefore, a reduced psychometric model, based on a much simpler 
questionnaire that elicits qualitative expert judgments will be employed for the purposes of 
the risk quadruplet methodology. Inquisite provides a survey tool for designing and 
deploying the survey, as well as for collecting the perception data. IDS provides a data 
input tool and data warehouse for us to load the perception data after it has been collected. 
This risk quadruplet methodology will be discussed further in APPENDIX D. 
Technology 
Many of the research limitations discussed in the first phase of the risk quadruplet 
would drastically affect the collection of perceptions. Concerns such as respondent 
selection and participation, as well as the design of a survey (or other data collection tool) 
could greatly impact the type and amount of data able to be collected. The data collection 
tool and analysis could become unwieldy if multiple assets and risk scenarios are 
considered. And while blocking by CIKRKA may reduce respondent burden, it could pose 
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a technological challenge whether disseminating a survey or conducting a focus group. All 
of these matters will be intertwined with the perception model chosen, as well as the 
technology available at the time of the study. 
Regardless of the data collection methodology, or the model selected, the first phase of 
the risk quadruplet will require a means to assess perceptions. Technology can be used to 
assist with some of these challenges. Inquisite is software that can be used to design and 
deploy surveys, collect data, as well as analyze respondent data ("Inquisite," 2011). Using 
this software it would be possible to select a sample of experts and ask them a series of 
perception questions tailored to fit the models selected for the first and third phases of the 
risk quadruplet methodology. 
Phase 2. Threat, Vulnerability, and Consequence Assessments 
"The dangers of life are infinite, and among them is safety. " 
- Goethe 
Data Collection 
Understanding the different types of threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessment 
data, whether those data are available to be leveraged, collected, or simulated is extremely 
important to the risk quadruplet methodology. One option would be to leverage data from 
threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments. However, risk data are not often 
collected or displayed consistently. However, risk data are often not collected or displayed 
consistently. This data could still contain an element of subjectivity, depending on how the 
assessments were conducted, but it could also incorporate objective data. For example, if 
the risk scenario under study was flooding, there is historical data available on the impact 
of flooding to a particular region and its assets. There would be documented information on 
the consequences such as causalities or cost to repair damages. It might even be possible to 
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determine whether any recommended fortifications provided additional security against 
flood damage over the years to provide some insight on vulnerabilities. These assessments 
might provide scores, which could be used directly or which could be coded to a linguistic 
set, similar to one used for collecting perception data. Assessments that use risk scores are 
rarely normalized, so comparing a risk score from one study to that from another study is 
like comparing apples to oranges. For example, some may calculate risk where threat has 
an associated threat severity probability distribution, vulnerability is a conditional 
probability (the probability of a successful attack, given the attack is identified), and 
consequence is based on some loss function (McGill, Ayyub, & Kaminskiy, 2007). Other 
assessments use risk words like low, medium, or high, or color coding like red, yellow, or 
green to describe the severity of a risk. For example, expert judgment-based risk 
methodologies might use descriptive words like high, medium, or minimal to describe 
certain characteristics that play a role in the threat scenario (Mallor, et al., 2008). However, 
access to this type of information is obviously restricted due to its sensitivity. 
If the data are not available, it is possible that those assessments could be conducted to 
produce results, but this would have a significant impact on the time and scope of the 
research. We could attempt to collect that data during the perception assessment phase of 
the risk quadruplet methodology, but that would again impact the time and scope of the 
research. Additionally, it could make it more difficult to segregate perception data from 
threat, vulnerability, and consequence data. We would basically be forced to collect 
perception data on the impact of a risk scenario to CIKRA, as well as perception data on 
threat, vulnerability, and consequence to CIKRA. Actual threat, vulnerability, and 
consequence assessments might rely in part on subject matter expertise, but could also 
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contain quite a bit of objective data, as well, so relying solely on perceptions would defeat 
the purposes of integrating threat, vulnerability assessments with perception assessments. 
The goals of this research are to assess perceptions of CIKRKA, determine a 
methodology for integrating threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments with the 
CIKRKA perception assessment, and to ultimately rank those CIKRKA accordingly 
(Figure 1.3). Therefore, it is not within the scope of this research to determine a 
methodology to collect (or to translate leveraged) threat, vulnerability, or consequence data. 
These assessments are already being conducted by asset owners and operators, DHS, or 
DoD. We can assume that real-world data for threat, vulnerability, and consequence 
assessments exists and could be fit to our model, allowing us to focus on how to integrate 
that data with the perception data. 
Phase 3. Assessment Integration 
"Living at risk is jumping off the cliff and building your wings on the way down." 
- Ray Bradbury 
The final phase (assessment integration) is the most crucial. Many approaches exist that 
could integrate these disparate perception, threat, vulnerability, and consequence 
assessments. Based on the goals of this research, the result of this phase of the risk 
quadruplet methodology must be a ranking of CIKRA from highest risk to lowest risk 
(Figure 3.5). 
Multi Criteria Decision Analysis Models 
The research is dependent upon the MCDA model used to integrate the threat, 
vulnerability, consequence, and perception assessments. Options for an integrated risk 
quadruplet assessment methodology include AHP, ANP, ER, and MAUT. However, each 
of these approaches would require complex software. The research may be limited based 
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on the availability of software at the time of analysis. It is valuable to analyze these 
different alternatives in order to select the most appropriate MCDA model. 
Analytic Hierarchy Process 
There are benefits to using AHP and there is precedence for using it to assess risk 
(Millet & Wedley, 2002). The hierarchy provides a means for systematically evaluating the 
complex problem of ranking CIKRKA. It also provides a method for quantifying the 
relative weights of different criteria and factors making it easier to compare 
incommensurable items (such as CI versus KA; or loss of life versus loss of money). 
However, AHP is not without criticism. When ranking alternatives in terms of their 
attributes, some experts would argue that as new alternatives are added to a problem, the 
ranking of the old alternatives must not change, in other words, rank reversal should not be 
permitted. But, as we know all too well, especially in the realm of homeland security and 
homeland defense, new alternatives do (and should) cause rank reversal sometimes. For 
example, the September 11th terrorist attacks were considered a black swan event, 
unforeseeable, and forever changing the landscape of threat, vulnerability, and consequence 
assessments for CIKRKA. Most AHP software can handle both approaches, either allowing 
for rank reversal or not, depending on the preference of the user. 
Furthermore, AHP is sensitive to the hierarchical model proposed. If the model is 
incomplete, or otherwise inadequate, then all results of the AHP would be questionable. 
The AHP model would need to be vetted with stakeholders and experts, in the hopes of 
adequately reflecting the complex decision making problem of integrating threat, 
vulnerability, consequence, and perception assessments to rank CIKRKA. If AHP were 
selected for this research, Figure B.2 offers an example of our potential model. The goal 
130 
would be to rank CIKRKA using threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception 
assessments. 
/ . \ 
CIKRKA 
Figure B.2. Analytic Hierarchy Process Example 
Analytic Network Process 
While both AHP and ANP use pairwise comparisons to measure weights and rank 
alternatives, there are some fundamental differences between these two approaches (Figure 
B.3). AHP structures a decision problem as a hierarchy with a goal, decision criteria, and 
alternatives. It also requires independence of all elements in the hierarchy, so the decision 
criteria must be independent, and the alternatives to be considered must also be 
independent, not only from each other, but also from the decision criteria. ANP, on the 
other hand, does not require independence among elements. Often there is interdependence 
among alternatives and decision criteria, so this is an improvement over AHP. The way 
ANP handles this is to structure the decision problem as a network, which might be useful 
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for the purposes of our research as threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception are 
most likely interrelated, not independent. 
•Uses pairwise comparisons to rank 
alternatives 
•structures a decision problem as a 
hierarchy 
•requires independence of all elements in 
the hierarchy 
•Uses pairwise comparisons to rank 
alternatives 
•structures a decision problem as a 
network 
•does not require independence of all 
elements 
Figure B.3. Analytic Hierarchy Process versus Analytic Network Process 
Multi Attribute Utility Theory 
MAUT builds utility functions for multiple attributes, independently, then combines 
these utility functions using weighted multi attribute models (additive models are common, 
but more complicated models exist). Next, one must determine the indifference probability 
between a sure thing and a gamble. This requires strong assumptions of independence, 
including (mutual) preferential independence and (mutual) utility independence. 
Attribute Y is preferentially independent of X if preferences for specific outcomes of Y 
do not depend on the level of X. For example, say that Y is number of days to complete a 
job, maybe 5 or 10 days. And the cost to perform the job, X, is either $100 or $200. 
Assume that the cost is $100 no matter what, whether it takes 5 days or 10 days. If we 
prefer a 5 day time frame, then even if we raise the cost to $200 (again, for both 5 and 10 
days), then we would still prefer 5 days. In this case, Y is preferentially independent of X. 
For mutual preferential independence, we also need X to be preferentially independent of 
Y, so we need to prefer the lower cost, no matter how many days it takes to perform the 
job. 
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Utility independence is basically a stronger form of preferential independence. Y is 
utility independent of X if preferences for uncertain choices involving different levels of Y 
are independent of the value of X. In other words, if there is a 50% chance that Y is 5 days, 
and a 50% chance that Y is 10 days, then regardless of whether X is fixed at $100 or $200, 
we would still prefer 5 days. For mutual utility independence, then we just need to reverse 
X and Y and see if the independence still holds. 
If these assumptions are validated, then we would set up a reference gamble to 
determine the indifference probability. In our example, the sure thing would be that X is 
some cost between the best case (X+) and worse case (X-) scenarios ($100 < X < $200), 
and Y would be some duration for the job to be completed. In this case Y+ would be the 
lesser of the two values, assuming we wish the job to be completed in a shorter period of 
time, so Y+ < Y < Y- (or 5 < Y < 10). We are interested in the utility, U(X, Y) versus the 
utility of a gamble. The gamble would have two scenarios based on a chance outcome. 
There is a best case scenario, (X+, Y+) or ($100, 5), which has probability p. There is also 
a worst case scenario, (X-, Y-) or ($200, 10), which has probability 1-p. Then we find p 
such that we are indifferent between the sure thing and the gamble (Figure B.4). 
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Figure B.4. Multi Attribute Utility Theory Example 
However, these assumptions of independence do not always hold. Without the 
assumptions of independence, MAUT could become extremely challenging to implement. 
Furthermore, this model requires significantly more time in order to conduct these 
reference gambles and determine each respondent's utility. Due to lack of resources, 
MAUT is not a viable option for this research. In fact, regardless of resources, the model 
does not lend itself to integrating the types of data available for threat, vulnerability, 
consequence, and perception assessments. 
Evidential Reasoning 
An appealing option for a risk quadruplet integrated assessment methodology is ER, 
which deals with problems having both quantitative and qualitative criteria under 
uncertainty, such as ignorance or randomness (Huynh & Nakamori, 2005; Huynh, et al., 
2006). It is used to support decision analyses, assessments, or evaluation activities. It 
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addresses the decision problem using a belief structure to model an assessment with 
uncertainty, a belief decision matrix to represent a problem under uncertainty, ER 
algorithms to aggregate criteria for generating distributed assessments, and belief and 
plausibility functions to generate a utility interval which measures the degree of ignorance. 
It may be easier to understand ER by walking through an example (Figure B.5). 
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Figure B.5. Evidential Reasoning Example 
Assume that your company wants to upgrade their computers, so they hire a consulting 
company to choose between Macs, Vaios, ThinkPads, and Dells. The consulting company 
has four departments: cost analysis, system analysis, risk analysis, and technology analysis. 
Each department provides an evaluation vector, assessed in linguistic terms (none, very 
low, low, medium, high, very high, and perfect). A model is used to solve the problem 
consisting of two steps. First, obtain a collective performance value, Xj, for each option. 
Where P(X;>Xj) loosely translates as the "performance of a; is as at least as good as that of 
a/'. Then apply a selection process based on collective performance vector 
V(ai)=IP(Xi>Xj) where i^j and the best alternative would be the one for which V(aj) was 
maximized. 
We could use a similar approach for our integrated risk assessment. The alternatives 
would be different assets. The evaluation vectors would be threat, vulnerability, 
consequence, and perception. The linguistic set would be very similar (none, very low, low, 
medium, high, and very high) to describe the level of threat, vulnerability, consequence, or 
perception for that particular asset. IDS will ensure that the data is captured consistently for 
all four assessments. Then the ranked performance vectors would output an overall ranking 
of assets from highest (riskiest) to lowest. 
Both ER and AHP use a hierarchy to model a MCDA problem, however, ER differs 
from AHP in a number of ways. With AHP all of the alternatives comprise the lowest level 
of the hierarchy, but with ER the alternatives are not included in the hierarchy at all (Xu & 
Yang, 2001). Further, ER uses a generalized decision matrix where each element of the 
matrix is an assessment of a given attribute using belief degrees. The decision matrix in 
AHP merely describes the relative importance of one attribute over another, therefore, "ER 
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can be used to assess an alternative against a set of standards, while AHP can only compare 
the relative importance between attributes" (Xu & Yang, 2001). Finally, ER aggregates the 
belief degrees of lower level attributes to higher level attributes gradually, until it achieves 
and overall score, whereas AHP aggregates average scores based on pairwise comparison 
(Xu & Yang, 2001). One implication of these differences is that ER can tackle large-scale 
MCDA problems (without limits on the number of alternatives or attributes). Also, as new 
attributes are added, an ER model does not need to be re-evaluated since each attribute is 
scored for each alternative separately. ER also does not suffer from a common AHP 
problem known as rank reversal, which can occur when new attributes are added to an 
AHP model. Perhaps most importantly, ER can handle mixed data, including random and 
deterministic, qualitative and quantitative, as well as incomplete data for some attributes. 
And ER can even incorporate AHP procedures into certain aspects of a model, such as 
using pairwise comparisons to weight attributes against each other (Xu & Yang, 2001). 
Technology 
Technology will have a significant impact on the MCDA models, as the availability of 
software to conduct such analyses at the time of research could be limited. Software for 
AHP is widely available, but can be very expensive. Software for ANP and MAUT are not 
as common. ER appears to be the preferred MCDA approach for the risk quadruplet and 
conveniently, there is free ER software available. IDS uses a belief decision matrix to 
model MCDA problems under uncertainty, "including subjectivity, randomness, and 
incompleteness" ("IDS," 2010). It can communicate risk and decisions through graphical 




International Risks: Risk Management and Risk Perception in a Global Context 
Risk Management by Country 
The OECD is a collection of 30 democratic governments which work together to 
address the economic, societal, and environmental challenges of globalization. OECD 
members include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the 
Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the US 
("OECD Studies in Risk Management: Innovation in Country Risk Management," 2009). 
The OECD provides a neutral forum for governments to compare policy experiences, seek 
answers to shared concerns, and identify best practices. A recent OECD report commented 
on National Level Risk Assessments conducted by six countries, including the United 
Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands, Singapore, and Japan, as well as the US which 
conducted its SNRA with FEMA soon after the OECD report. The report focused on each 
country's risk management approach to large scale events such as natural disasters, terrorist 
attacks, and pandemic diseases, all of which pose serious consequences for the country's 
population and national assets. 
Risk Management Programs 
Each of the six countries have assigned at least one government agency to oversee an 
all-hazards risk management framework (DHS and FEMA are the main entities for the US, 
but they obviously work closely with many other agencies). All six countries have also 
adopted an all-hazards approach to risk management (for example, the US follows the DHS 
National Response Framework and National Preparedness Goal). Singapore's Whole-of-
Government Integrated Risk Management framework stood out as a best practice as it 
identifies cross-agency risks, not just the risks associated with disasters, themselves. 
Additionally, each country has a policy coordination body in place (the US equivalent is 
the Homeland Security Council), which conducts policy-planning for large-scale disasters, 
usually reporting to the highest levels of government (the Homeland Security Council 
consists of Secretaries from a number of related departments and agencies and reports 
directly to the president). The report also reviews each country's approach to mitigation 
planning, cost-wise risk mitigation, resilience and continuity of operations, risk financing, 
risk transference, but of particular interest to this research, OECD also explored protection 
of CI. Only four of the six countries maintain an infrastructure protection program ("OECD 
Studies in Risk Management: Innovation in Country Risk Management," 2009); in the US, 
this is covered by the NIPP. While it is recognized that there is not a unanimous view 
across countries about which infrastructure sectors are critical, each of the four countries 
understood the need to protect both physical and cyber systems "essential to the minimum 
operations of government and their individual economies". All six countries recognize the 
importance of risk concepts such as interdependent vulnerabilities which can lead to 
cascading effects. And even though only four of the six countries have a program in place 
to address infrastructure protection, each of the six countries has identified those assets it 
considers crucial ("OECD Studies in Risk Management: Innovation in Country Risk 
Management," 2009). 
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The OECD study identified 16 CI sectors (some of which we would classify as KR 
and/or KA sectors based on our definitions). Of these sectors, most of them map to those 
given in Table C.5, with a few exceptions. OECD listed Public Safety as a sector, and the 
US does not include that in its 18 CIKR sectors. Furthermore, the US identifies three 
additional categories not included in the OECD report (Information Technology, Postal and 
Shipping, and Critical Manufacturing). OECD also noted that approximately 80% of CI in 
the four countries listed above were privately owned and operated, making public-private 
coordination extremely important. 
Risk Management Tools 
Also of interest to this research is the OECD review of the risk management tools 
leveraged by the six participating countries. The United Kingdom uses a National Risk 
Assessment, which is basically a traditional risk matrix used for visually scoring risks along 
a scale of likelihood and impact (Figure C.l). The descriptions of likelihood, impact, and 
risk are given qualitatively using terms like "negligible" to describe an estimated likelihood 
of less than 0.005%, which is also given as a ratio of less than a 1 in 20,000 chance. 
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Figure C. 1. United Kingdom National Risk Assessment 
Three of the countries in the study conduct short-, medium-, and long-term risk 
assessments. In Singapore, risk scenarios are identified and reviewed every three years 
("OECD Studies in Risk Management: Innovation in Country Risk Management," 2009). 
Many of the countries are also looking at multidisciplinary risk assessment approaches, 
combining GIS and probabilistic risk assessment models to produce hazard maps, a 
valuable tool for communicating risk. Other disciplines are being leveraged, as well, 
including economics, sociology, and of special note for our research (as it relates to risk 
perception), the field of psychology. 
Global Risks 
In 2006, the WEF began to release an annual series of reports in an effort to work 
"towards a more sophisticated understanding of global risks" ("Global Risks," 2006). The 
original purpose of these reports was to identify and assess current and emerging global 
risks, study their interdependencies, determine the potential consequences for different 
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markets, and to improve the mitigation of these global risks. WEF consistently categorized 
global risks into five classes in their annual Global Risks Reports from 2006 to 2012 
(Figure C.2). 
Figure C.2. Global Risks: Risk Categories 
In 2006, economic risks included oil prices and energy supply, asset prices and 
indebtedness, the current account deficit and state of the dollar in the US, impending fiscal 
crises, China, and critical infrastructures. Societal risks included regulation, corporate 
governance, intellectual property rights, organized crime, global pandemics, chronic 
diseases in the industrialized world, epidemic diseases in the developing world, and 
liability regimes. Environmental risks included tropical cyclones, earthquakes, climate 
change, and the loss of ecosystem services. Technological risks included convergence of 
technologies, nanotechnology, electromagnetic fields, and pervasive computing. 
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Geopolitical risks included terrorism, European dislocation, as well as current and future 
hotspots. 
While the five main global risk categories remain the same from 2006 through 2012, 
the number and categorization of risk events within those categories evolves over time 
(Table C.l). For example, retrenchment from globalization was considered a Geopolitical 
risk in 2007, but from 2008 through 2011 it was considered an economic risk. Interestingly, 
at least for the purposes of this research, we see that critical infrastructures (to include 
underinvestment in infrastructures, infrastructure fragility, and infrastructure neglect) are 
considered economic risks in 2006, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012. But critical information 
infrastructures (and specifically, the breakdown of those infrastructures) appear under 
technological risks from 2007 through 2012. A more detailed comparison of the risks cited 
over the years by the WEF Global Risk Reports can be found in Table A. 1. 









The risk assessment process in 2006 was basically a risk matrix approach, where the 
likelihood (Table C.2) and consequence severity (Table C.3) of different risk scenarios 
(events) for each risk category, were predominantly estimated by subject matter experts on 
a scale of 1 to 4 ("Global Risks," 2006). When sufficient data existed, WEF employed 
statistical and actuarial methods to analyze data, but most of the estimates were qualitative. 
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Risks were estimated along two timelines (short-term and long-term), and across two cases 
(base-cases, or the likely trend for the risk given current information, and worst-cases, 
representing the most severe outcome). Consequences were broken down into three 
dimensions: asset damage, human impact, and financial impact as measured by the percent 
growth of the aggregate global Gross Domestic Product. 
Table C.2. Global Risks 2006: Likelihood Key 
1 Below 1% Low 
2 1-10% Moderate 
3 10-20% High 
4 Above 20% Very High 
Table C.3. Global Risks 2006: Severity Key 
Asset Damage 
1 USS 10-50 Billion 
2 USS 50-250 Billion 
3 US$ 250 Billion - USS 1 Trillion 
4 > USS 1 Trillion 
Human Impact 
1 < 100 
2 100-10,000 
3 10,000-1 Million 





4 > 1.5 
So, for example, in the Economic global risks category, four impending fiscal crisis 
scenarios were explored: a short-term base-case where fiscal deficits decline modestly, a 
short-term worst-case where fiscal positions become unsustainable, a long-term base-case 
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where fiscal positions come under demographic pressure, and a long-term worst-case 
where fiscal deficits are seriously challenged by demographic pressure ("Global Risks," 
2006). The likelihood and severity estimates collected and aggregated by WEF for these 
four scenarios are given by (3,1), (1,1), (2,2), and (3, 3), respectively. 
In 2007, the WEF seems to maintain a similar risk assessment methodology to the one 
described for 2006. While the 2007 Global Risks Report alludes to a more detailed 
description of their methodology ("Global Risks," 2007), the link to the extended version of 
the report is broken and an online search proved fruitless. However, the number of 
dimensions of consequences is obviously reduced (asset damage is eliminated), as there are 
two graphics alluding to severity, one for economic loss, another for number of deaths. 
Additionally, an examination of the core global risks analyzed in each year of the WEF 
Global Risks Report (Table A.l) shows that the number of risks decreased slightly from 
2006 to 2007 (Table C.l). 
In 2008, the number of core risks increases slightly, but aside from the addition of a 
completely new risk, food security, the risk assessment process is comparable to previous 
years. We see that the likelihood and severity scales evolved (Table C.4) from those 
displayed in 2006. One anomaly in the methodology appears when reviewing the 2008 
report appendices, one of which includes a detailed taxonomy of global risks, comprising 
31 risks even though only 26 core global risks were explored in the report. 
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Table C.4. Global Risks 2008: Likelihood and Severity Tables 
1 below 1% 2-10 billion below 1% 1,600-8,000 
2 1-5% 10-50 billion 1-5% 8,000-40,000 
3 5-10% 50-250 billion 5-10% 40,000-200,000 
4 10-20% 250 billion-1 trillion 10-20% 200,000-1 million 
5 above 20% >1 trillion above 20% > 1 million 
In 2009, the number of core global risks jumps from 26 to 36. The risk assessment 
methodology appears to remain comparable to that of previous years; however, the Global 
Risk Network conducted a series of additional workshops and meetings, focusing on 
regional risk and released three regional risk reports for Africa, Europe, and India, as well 
as one topical report on global growth which looked at emerging markets and high-growth 
companies ("Global Risks," 2009). 
The 2009 Global Risks Report also discusses its general methodology for a number of 
the tables and graphics presented. The Risk Interconnection Map is derived from results of 
the WEF Global Risks Perceptions Survey, which was a web-based survey completed by 
approximately 120 risk experts in 2009. The 2009 regional risk maps were created using a 
methodology similar to statistical cluster analysis. Most interestingly, in 2009 what 
constitutes a global risk is defined and, in general, the criteria includE global scope, cross-
industry relevance, uncertainty, economic impact, public impact, and a multi-stakeholder 
approach ("Global Risks," 2009). 
In 2010, the core global risks remained identical to the 36 reviewed in 2009. The 
methodology for the Risk Interconnection Map and the Global Risks Perception Survey 
remains the same in 2010, although the number of experts which completed the survey 
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increases to 200. The 2010 regional risk maps were again created using a methodology 
similar to statistical cluster analysis. And the criteria for what constitutes a global risk also 
remain the same ("Global Risks," 2010). 
In 2011, the number of core global risks increases by one to 37, however, it is not a 
simple addition of one new risk. Rather, a number of core global risks from previous years 
are dropped from the assessment, while many others are introduced, such as extreme 
energy price volatility, ocean governance, space security, demographic challenges, or 
threats from new technologies. The number of experts that responded to the Global Risk 
Perceptions Survey increases to 580. The criteria for what constitutes a global risk also 
remain the same ("Global Risks," 2011). 
In 2012, the number of core global risks shot from 37 to 50, which included the 
introduction of a number of new risks, such as severe income disparity, antibiotic-resistant 
bacteria, failure of diplomatic conflict resolution, rising religious fanaticism, and 
proliferation of orbital debris. While only 489 experts participated in the 2012 survey, the 
details of the survey, including the questions, demographics, and detailed results, are 
included in appendices of the Global Risks Report ("Global Risks," 2012). Interestingly, 
there is no breakdown of risks comparing severity by economic loss or number of deaths, 
rather impact is measured on a scale of 1 to 5, as is likelihood. However, it is implied in the 
appendix detailing the Global Risks Perception Survey that impact is "to be interpreted in a 
broad sense, beyond just economic consequences" ("Global Risks," 2012), so impact in this 
case could include economic loss, number of deaths, and even other types of consequences. 
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Risk Communication 
Similarly, the WEF worked to stay at the cutting edge of risk communication and risk 
visualization techniques. In 2006, the WEF Global Risks Report only a few graphics were 
used to display and communicate risk ("Global Risks," 2006). There was a summary table 
of the likelihood and severity of the core global risks, displayed by the five risk categories 
(economic, environmental, societal, technological, and geopolitical) and four cases (short-
term base-case, short-term worst-case, long-term base-case, and long-term worst-case). 
There was also a set of graphics to display the top short-term risks with the highest 
severity, the top long-term risks with the highest severity, and similar graphics were broken 
down by the 5 risk categories (Figure C.3). 
The Top Short-term Risks With the Highest Severity Ranking 
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Figure C.3. Global Risks 2006: Top Risks 
The 2007 WEF Global Risks Report displayed 23 core global risks in three dimensions 
(Figure C.4): likelihood, severity (in terms of economic loss), as well as a dimension 
described as "increasing consensus around risk" ("Global Risks," 2007). Each risk was 
displayed along its coordinates for likelihood and severity, but its marker was displayed as 
varying hues of blue to denote the level of consensus around the risk. A similar graphic was 
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displayed for the 23 core global risks, only severity was displayed in terms of the number 
of deaths associated with the risk. WEF also introduced a global risk barometer, a table that 
showed the 23 core global risks and whether their overall risks had increased, stabilized, 
decreased, or caused expert disagreement. The barometer was used to compare these risks 
not to the past, but to the future, looking at whether the significance of the risk for the next 
ten years has become more or less critical ("Global Risks," 2007). Additionally, the report 
included a correlation matrix graphic, which helped to visualize, through the use of a 
network diagram (Figure C.5), the fact that risks do not manifest independently, but are 
often interrelated with other risks ("Global Risks," 2007). The correlation matrix helps us 
visualize the strength of the high-level correlations between risks, as they are perceived by 
experts to exist. The strength of the correlation is represented by the thickness of the lines 
connecting the risks ("Global Risks," 2007). 
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Figure C.4. Global Risks 2007: 23 Core Global Risks 
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Figure C.5. Global Risks 2007: Correlation Matrix 
The 2008 Global Risks Report used a graphic very similar to the 2007 one to display 
likelihood and severity (by economic loss, as well as number of deaths), but abandoned the 
additional dimension regarding the consensus around the risk. It also display a network 
graphic to depict the interrelationships amongst the core global risks, however the graphic 
is reimagined and includes additional risk information ("Global Risks," 2008). Though 
originally called a correlation matrix, in 2008 the graphic is referred to as a social 
networking diagram (Figure C.6). Again, the thickness of the lines represents the strength 
of the correlation between the risks connected, but now the size of the nodes indicates the 
assessment of the risk and the proximity of the nodes relates to the similarity of the 
correlations. 
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Figure C.6. Global Risks 2008: Social Network Diagram of Global Risks 
In 2009, the 36 core global risks were visualized by likelihood and severity, both 
economic loss and number of deaths (Figure C.7), however, this time around they used 
color coding to show whether that risk was a new risk, or if it had increased, decreased, or 
remained stable since the 2008 Global Risks Report ("Global Risks," 2009). Additionally, 
some nodes were split to show that the likelihood had increased, but the severity had 
decreased (or vice versa). It appears that this is merely a way of communicating the 
information from the risk barometer alongside all of the other global risk information. The 
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Figure C.7. Global Risks 2009: 36 Core Global Risks 
The Risks Interconnection Map (Figure C.8) evolved slightly. Node size continued to 
denote severity, line thickness continued to refer to the strength of the interconnection 
between nodes. And the proximity of the nodes indicates that those risks are closely 
interlinked. Additionally, the node colors which indicate to which category the risk is 
aligned (red - economic; dark green - geopolitical; light green - environmental; purple -
technological; blue - societal). And the direction of a thicker line segment demonstrates 
that of the two interconnected risks, one risk has a stronger dependence or interdependence 
("Global Risks," 2009). 
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Figure C.8. Global Risks 2009: Risks Interconnection Map 
A new graphic was introduced in 2009, which shows a country's exposure to risks 
(Figure C.9). Interestingly, four of the risk categories displayed in the graphic align to the 
global risk categories, but one (health) seems to be a substitute for the societal global risk 
category. The graphic aligns the country's exposure to risk along two scales: economic 
risks versus a combined scale of geopolitical, environmental, health, and technical risks 
("Global Risks," 2009). Similar graphics were included in the report to display a country's 
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Figure C.9. Global Risks 2009: Exposure of 160 Countries to Global Risks 
Also new in this report, the Risks Interconnection Map is spliced and reorganized in 
later sections of the report to highlight certain risks and their relationships, such as water, 
which is described as being at the "nexus of many risks", including infectious disease, 
infrastructure, food prices, amongst others ("Global Risks," 2009). An example pertinent to 
this research is given in Figure C.10, which shows the infrastructure risk and all of its many 
interconnected risks, noting that an investment in risk mitigation for infrastructure is 
extremely important as it could impact so many related risks ("Global Risks," 2009). 
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Figure C.10. Global Risks 2009: Infrastructure 
The 2010 Global Risks Report again displayed 36 core global risks (Figure C.ll), but 
this time it only displays those risks by severity of economic loss; there is not a separate 
graphic showing the severity by number of deaths ("Global Risks," 2010). Additionally, the 
graphic did not include the barometer information (whether the risk had increased or 
decreased), although the barometer was again included in an appendix. Instead, the color 
coding only shows the categories to which each risk aligns (economic, geopolitical, 
environmental, societal, and technological). 
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Figure C.l 1. Global Risks 2010: 36 Core Global Risks 
An example of a breakdown of the 2010 Risk Interconnected Map is given in Figure 
C.l 2 for the risk of underinvestment in infrastructure. The severity of the risk is denoted by 
the width of the line around the node, the likelihood of the risk is given by the size of the 
node, the category of the risk is shown in the color of the node, the proximity of the risks 
indicate they are highly interconnected, and the degree of interconnectedness is displayed 
in the width and darkness of the line between nodes ("Global Risks," 2010). A country risk 
map, similar to Figure C.9 is given in the 2010 report, but only to compare the global 
retrenchment risk versus the global governance gap risk. A Risks Interconnection Map 
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similar to Figure C.8 is also displayed, though it is much more complex and dense given 
the increase in the number of core global risks. 
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Figure C.12. Global Risks 2010: Infrastructure Interconnect Risks 
The 2011 report again displayed the core global risks by likelihood and (economic) 
severity (Figure C.13), where the size of the node related to an increased perceived 
likelihood, the darkness of the node related to an increased perceived severity, and the color 
of the node related to the category of the risk ("Global Risks," 2011). The Risks 
Interconnection Map received a comparable face-lift (Figure C.14), where the nodes 
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provide the same information as the core global risks chart, and again the thickness and 
darkness of the line indicate a strong, perceived interrelationship between the nodes. 
tOOG k Kreal cttoM 
pftef COfl^NMt 
500 tdP Qkotmi mimmtum and 
RMItfMkUCtlQn ftWBflfKrtrtRjf 
Qaopottcat conftct Ckmrt* Chang* 
Ej^wtw wwfly pBos vofwtoly 
• 
Economic dteparily 




cradH crunch • « 





Iwe rily^ • A. 








I MM / 
I 












P*rc*iv«d likelihood SO occur « th* nmt tw years 
vwy Miaty 
• • • • • 
Figure C. 13. Global Risks 2011: 37 Core Global Risks 
In 2011, the fact that the estimates of risk likelihood, severity, and connectedness are 
based on perceptions is really highlighted in the 2011 report. It was always described in 
previous reports that these charts and graphs were based on data collected in the Global 
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Risks Perception Survey, but now the charts and graphs actually include the word 
perceived in their keys. The report breaks down the Risks Interconnection Map to examine 
a subset of risks, dubbed "risks in focus" (Figure C.15), to include the macroeconomic 
imbalances nexus, the illegal economy nexus, and the water-food-energy nexus ("Global 
Risks," 2011). 
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Figure C.14. Global Risks 2011: Risks Interconnection Map 
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Figure C.15. Global Risks 2011: Risks in Focus 
In the 2011 report appendices, we see a breakdown of the survey results, to include a 
top ten list of risks by combined likelihood and impact, the highest ranking of which was 
global climate change. Further analysis of the Risks Interconnection Map also results in a 
top ten list of risks based on the average strength of their interconnections, the highest 
ranking of which was economic disparity. Very interestingly, the survey results also 
include a comparison of the risk perceptions amongst respondents given basic demographic 
information (Figure C.16), such as whether they were representatives of government, 
business, academia, or international organizations, and whether they are from North 
America, Europe, or Asia ("Global Risks," 2011). The categories of risk about which each 
group was most concerned seems pretty logical. For example, government representatives 
were concerned mostly with societal risks, whereas business representatives were 
concerned with economic risks. This was the first Global Risks Report to explore how our 
unique perspectives affect our risk perceptions. The global risks barometer is mentioned in 
an appendix, but it is relocated to the web as an online resource. 
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Figure C.16. Global Risks 2011: Differences in Risk Perception Among Respondents 
In 2012, the graph of the 50 core global risks displays likelihood and impact, instead of 
severity (Figure C.17), where impact is shown along a generic scale from 1 to 5, which is 
also the scale used for likelihood ("Global Risks," 2012). The color of the node relates to 
the category of risk to which it is aligned. It appears that the size of the node relates to its 
combined increase in likelihood and severity, but there is no key to confirm this. There are 
also 5 charts which break down the core global risks by each category of risk (economic, 
environmental, geopolitical, societal, and technological). 
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Figure C.17. Global Risks 2012: 50 Core Global Risks 
Again, the 2012 report included information on the participants in the Global Risk 
Perception Survey, as well as additional graphics detailing the risk landscape broken down 
by respondent regions (Figure C.18). Similar charts were shown to compare the risk 
landscape broken down by respondent affiliation (business, academia, government, etc.). A 
new, and interesting visual comparison was presented in this report, which showed how 
risk perceptions differed between experts in different areas. For example, a risk landscape 
164 
is shown in Figure C.19 for respondents who claimed to be experts on issues related to one 
of the risk categories (economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal, or technological) 
versus all other respondents (also considered experts, but perhaps not in that particular 
area). Interestingly, the only risk landscapes that appear to differ is the one for 
environmental issues, otherwise, subject matter area experts and other respondents seem to 
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Figure C.18. Global Risks 2012: Risk Landscapes by Region 
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Figure C.19. Global Risks 2012: Risk Perception Comparison of Experts 
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Figure C.20. Homeland Security Timeline 
In Figure C.20, a timeline of homeland security and CIP in the United States (US) is 
provided, consisting of government directives, acts, and plans. In 1996, Executive Order 
13010 (EO 13010) introduced the concept of cyber threats and their potential impact to CI 
(Executive Order 13010: Critical Infrastructure Protection, 1996). In 1998, Presidential 
Decision Directive NSC-63 (PDD-63) set up a national program of CIP (Presidential 
Decision Directive (PDD-63/NSC-63), 1998). After the September 11th attacks, the 
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) authorized additional measures to 
prevent terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act, 2001). By 2002, the Homeland Security Act (HSA) 
created DHS, whose mission was to protect the US from terrorists and natural disasters. It 
also included the Critical Infrastructure Information Act (CILA), which allows for the 
voluntary submission of sensitive information regarding CIKR to DHS with the assurance 
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that the information will be protected from public disclosure (Homeland Security Act of 
2002,2002). 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 3 (HSPD-3) created a Homeland Security 
Advisory System (HSAS) with color-coded threats to inform government and public of the 
current risk of terrorist acts (HSPD-3, 2002). The National Strategy for Homeland Security 
(NSHS) outlined the strategic considerations for cooperation between federal, state, and 
local government, as well as the private sector, in order to anticipate future terrorist attacks, 
natural disasters, or other incidents of national significance. It included the National 
Response Framework (NRF) which acts as a comprehensive emergency management 
guideline for implementing EPR&R (NSHS, 2002). HSPD-5 established the National 
Incident Management System (NIMS) to cover the prevention of, preparation for, response 
to, and recovery from terrorist attacks, disasters, and emergencies (HSPD-5, 2003). The 
National Strategy of the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets 
(NSPPCIKA) established a national policy to protect CI and KA from terrorist attacks 
(NSPPC1KA, 2003). In 2003, HSPD-7 added cybersecurity and additional risk management 
functions to the DHS mission and established the National Infrastructure Protection Plan 
(NIPP), a framework for CI identification, prioritization, and protection (HSPD-7, 2003). 
HSPD-8 mandated the development of a National Preparedness Goal and the National 
Preparedness Guidelines, aimed at helping entities at all levels of government build and 
maintain the capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from major 
events "to minimize the impact on lives, property, and the economy," (HSPD-8, 2003). 
HSPD-9 merely added agriculture to the list of industries for CIP (HSPD-9, 2004). 
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The 2006 NIPP established a partnership structure for coordination across 18 CIKR 
sectors, as well as a Risk Management Framework (RMF) to identify assets, systems, 
networks, and functions whose loss or compromise would pose the greatest risk {National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2006). In 2007, the National Preparedness Guidelines were 
released and were considered to be a call to action for an all-hazards, risk-based, umbrella 
for a range of readiness activities (.National Preparedness Guidelines, 2007). In 2008, DHS 
introduced the DHS Risk Lexicon, which attempted to establish a comprehensive list of 
terms and meanings relevant to the practice of homeland security risk management and 
analysis (DHS Risk Lexicon, 2008). The NIPP was updated in 2009 (National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2009) and the DHS Risk Lexicon was updated in 2010 
(DHS Risk Lexicon, 2010). In 2011, the National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) 
replaced the color-coded threat alert system HSAS ("National Terrorism Advisory 
System," 2011). 
Even more recently, DHS released the National Preparedness Goal, the National 
Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF), as well as the National Preparedness System 
(NPS) (.National Disaster Recovery Framework, 2011; National Preparedness Goal, 2011; 
National Preparedness System, 2011). The National Preparedness Goal defines its mission 
areas as prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery {National Preparedness 
Goal, 2011). The NDRF provides guidance that enables effective recovery support to 
disaster-impacted state and local areas, allowing disaster recovery managers at all levels of 
government to operate in a collaborative effort. It emphasizes restoration, redevelopment, 
and revitalization, specifically in the areas of health, social, economic, natural, and 
environmental aspects of the community, making the nation more resilient to disasters or 
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attacks (National Disaster Recovery Framework, 2011). The NPS relates directly to the 
National Preparedness Goal and the National Preparedness Guidelines. It has six mission 
area components which repeat cyclically: identifying and assessing risk, estimating 
capability requirements, building and sustaining capabilities, planning to deliver 
capabilities, validating capabilities, and reviewing and updating {National Preparedness 
System, 2011). 
Risk in Homeland Security 
Figure C.21. Theorems on Communication 
"Not infrequently confusion arises when experts from different fields attempt to 
communicate with one another or with laymen about risks," (Becker, et al., 1993). This can 
probably be attributed to Kaplan's two theorems of communication (Kaplan, 1997) 
presented in Figure C.21. Kaplan also defined his risk triplet as the set of a scenario, a 
likelihood, and consequences (Kaplan, 1997), which is still a very common definition 
throughout the risk literature today. 
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R = f (Threat, Vulnerability, Consequence) 
Equation C.l. Homeland Security Risk Function 
However, risk, at least in the context of homeland security (Equation C.l), is 
considered to be quite a different triplet, a function of threat, vulnerability, and 
consequence (National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2009). It is challenging to integrate 
these disparate assessments to establish an overall picture of risk and exploring their 
definitions helps us to understand why (Figure C.22). Threat is defined as a likelihood of 
accident or attack (DHS Risk Lexicon, 2010). This may be hard to measure, but at least we 
know what to measure: a probability. However, risk analysis literature sometimes refers to 
threat as a scenario and not a probability at all. And the probabilities of certain events (like 
low probability high consequence events, such as terrorist attacks) are unknown and 
difficult to estimate due to their infrequency. Vulnerability is more loosely defined and the 
actual measurement is not defined at all, making it difficult to know what kind of data we 
would need to collect and analyze (DHS Risk Lexicon, 2010). Is vulnerability also a 
probability? Is it a state of the system where either you are, or are not, vulnerable? Or is it a 
conditional probability, where the likelihood of vulnerability is contingent upon a 
successful risk scenario? 
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Figure C.22.Threat, Vulnerability, and Consequence (DHS Risk Lexicon) 
It is acknowledged that consequences could include loss of life (measured in number of 
deaths or injuries) or loss of money (measured in loss of profit or cost of repairs), but the 
other types of consequences are more abstract (DHS Risk Lexicon, 2010). How would we 
measure mission or psychological impacts? For example, what were the psychological 
impacts of 9/11 or of the combined disasters in Japan? Since natural disasters or attacks 
will almost certainly have psychological impacts, this seems like a pretty important aspect 
of risk, however, no means of measuring psychological impacts is given. And, perhaps 
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more importantly, how do these psychological impacts affect our future perceptions of 
risk? Furthermore, how do we integrate different types of consequences, let alone all three 
components of risk? 
potential for an unwanted outcome resting from an incident, event, or 
occurrence, as determined by its likelihood and the associated 
consequences; 
potential for an adverse outcome assessed as a function of threats, 
vulnerabilities, and consequences associated with an incident, event, or 
occurrence the potential for an unwanted outcome is often measured and 
used to compare different future situations; 
may manifest at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels; for terrorist 
attacks or criminal activities, the likelihood of an incident, event, or 
occurrence can be estimated by considering threats and vulnerabilities 
systematic examination of the components and characteristics 01 ns 
product or process which collects information and assigns values to risks for 
the purpose of informing priorities, developing or comparing courses of 
action, and informing decision making; 
resulting product created through analysis of the component parts of risk 
M) 
subjective judgment about the characteristics and/or severity 
driven by sense, emotion, or personal experience 
MliiplHa K. 
of risk; may be 
Figure C.23. Risk and Related Terms (DHS Risk Lexicon) 
In Figure C.23, we see definitions of risk and other related terms (DHS Risk Lexicon, 
2010). By its very definition, risk analysis is the process by which the components of risk 
are studied. And risk assessment is the process of collecting data and calculating risk 
values. But perception, which seems to be a significant component of risk, is segregated, 
almost ignored, as mere opinion. 
Additional definitions from the literature add to the confusion. Ezell reviewed the many 
definitions of vulnerability, which ranged from the ability to resist and recover from 
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adversity, the actual susceptibility to a threat or risk scenario, or the resilience or 
survivability of a system to a hazard (Ezell, et al., 2005). He further expands on this by 
saying that, "vulnerability is a term that is often confused with risk," (Ezell, 2007). While 
he concludes that vulnerability is a condition of a system, as understood within the context 
of a risk scenario, others see vulnerability as a probability, or even a conditional 
probability. For example, risk might be calculated where threat is a scenario with an 
associated threat severity probability distribution, vulnerability is a conditional probability 
(the probability of a successful attack, given the attack is identified), and consequence is 
based on a loss function (McGill, et al., 2007). Other expert judgment-based risk 
methodologies might simply use descriptive words like high, medium, or low to describe 
the characteristics of risk (Mallor, Garcia-Olaverri, Gomez-Elvira, & Mateo-Collazas, 
2008). Many risk keywords have numerous, and sometimes conflicting, definitions, such as 
threat which might be considered the description of a scenario or the likelihood of a 
scenario. And there are also many words which have similar definitions, such as threat, 
hazard, and scenario, all of which refer to an event, but not necessarily its probability. In 
order to be consistent throughout this research, we will redefine a number of pertinent 
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Figure C.24. Threat, Vulnerability, Consequence, and Perception (Revised) 
Similar to Kaplan, we will also use the term risk scenario. Basically, risk scenarios are 
the answers we provide when we are asked, "What can go wrong?" (Kaplan, Haimes, & 
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Garrick, 2001). More formally, a risk scenario is a natural or man-made occurrence, 
hazard, individual, entity, or action that has or indicates the potential to damage an asset. So 
this distinguishes the term risk scenario from threat, and when we refer to threat, we speak 
of the likelihood of a risk scenario. Vulnerability is considered the ability of an asset to 
endure a risk scenario (Gheorghe, et al., 2008). And consequence is a measure of the 
impacts resulting from a successful risk scenario. Risk perception is a subjective judgment 
about the severity of a risk scenario to an asset, and will be referred to as perception 
throughout this research. For the purposes of this research it is considered possible to 
estimate threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception quantitatively or qualitatively. 
Finally, we define risk as the potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from a risk 
scenario, as determined by the threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception of that 
risk scenario to an asset. 
• agree 
•' document risk 
* ens ure that 
•are 
on common assess 
• incorporate 
Recommendations 
Figure C.25. Review of the DHS Approach to Risk Analysis Recommendations 
In 2010, based on a request from congress, the National Research Council (NRC) 
established a committee which issued the "Review of the DHS Approach to Risk Analysis" 
("Review of the DHS Approach to Risk Analysis," 2010). The committee examined how 
DHS was building its capabilities in risk analysis for decision making. It evaluated the 
quality of the current DHS approach to estimating risk and applying those estimates in its 
management, planning, and resource allocation (including grant-making) activities, through 
the review of a committee-selected sample of models and methods. It assessed the 
capability of DHS risk analysis methods to appropriately represent and analyze risks from 
across the spectrum of activities and responsibilities, including both terrorist threats and 
natural disasters and how well they support DHS decision making. The committee 
reviewed the feasibility of creating integrated risk analyses covering the entire DHS 
program areas, including both terrorist threats and natural disasters, and made 
recommendations for best practices, including outreach and communications. And finally, 
the committee made recommendations for how DHS could improve its risk analyses and 
how those analyses could be validated to provide improved decision support. The 
committee uncovered many of the problems already discussed, including a 
recommendation to "incorporate diverse perceptions of risk impacts", a key element of the 
proposed risk quadruplet. Some highlighted recommendations are given Figure C.25. 
DHS maintains the Regional Resiliency Assessment Program (RRAP) to assess CIKR, 
including interdependencies, along with a regional analysis of the surrounding area 
("Regional Resiliency Assessment Program," 2012). Similarly, DHS conducts a Strategic 
National Risk Assessment (SNRA) to support FEMA with respect to the National 
Preparedness Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-8) and the DHS National Preparedness 
Goal (National Preparedness Goal, 2011; Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-8): National 
Preparedness, 2011; "Strategic National Risk Assessment," 2012). PPD-8 states that, "The 
national preparedness goal shall be informed by the risk of specific threats and 
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vulnerabilities..." (Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-8): National Preparedness, 2011). 
The National Preparedness Goal states that, "All levels of government and the whole 
community should present and assess risk in a similar manner to provide a common 
understanding of the threats and hazards confronting our Nation..." (National 
Preparedness Goal, 2011), noting that the information gathered during a risk assessment 
also allows for the prioritization of preparedness efforts. While the specific results of the 
SNRA are classified, it affirmed the need for an all-hazards, capability-based approach to 
preparedness planning. The analytic approach to the SNRA leveraged "data and 
information from a variety of sources, including existing Government models and 
assessments, historical records, structured analysis, and judgments of experts from different 
disciplines" (The Strategic National Risk Assessment in Support of PPD 8: A 
Comprehensive Risk-Based Approach toward a Secure and Resilient Nation, 2011). The 
SNRA assessed the risk of identified risk scenarios (which were broken down into three 
categories: natural, technological or accidental, and adversarial or human-caused). 
Interestingly, risk for the SNRA was assessed as a function of frequency (that a risk 
scenario would occur) and consequence (the impacts should the risk scenario occur); 
vulnerability was not assessed. Additionally, six categories of consequence were explored 
including, "loss of life, injuries and illnesses, direct economic costs, social displacement, 
psychological distress, and environmental impact" (The Strategic National Risk Assessment 
in Support of PPD 8: A Comprehensive Risk-Based Approach toward a Secure and 
Resilient Nation, 2011). 
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Critical Infrastructure, Key Resources, and Key Assets 
The definitions of CIKRKA have evolved over time (Critical Infrastructure and Key 
Assets: Definition and Identification, 2004). After a review of the authoritative literature 
which addresses CIKRKA, it is clear that there exists some confusion over these terms, 
which provide the foundation of, and context for, CIP in the realm of homeland security 
and homeland defense. Most federal documents now refer to the combined term CIKR. KA 
is now an outdated term after being officially replaced by DHS in a footnote of the NIPP 
(National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2006). However, it is recommended that we 
resurrect the defunct definition because these items are unique and deserve to be explored 
independently. 
The official definitions are given below: 
• Critical infrastructure: assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or 
virtual, so vital to the US that their incapacitation or destruction would have a 
debilitating effect on security, national economic security, public health or 
safety, or any combination thereof (DHS Risk Lexicon, 2010) 
• Key resources: publicly or privately controlled resources essential to the 
minimal operations of the economy and government (DHS Risk Lexicon, 2010) 
• Key assets: individual targets whose attack—in the worst-case scenarios— 
could result in not only large-scale human casualties and property destruction, 
but also profound damage to our national prestige, morale, and confidence 
(NSPPCIKA, 2003) 
But even these definitions are not ideal; they are self-referential and they are not 
mutually exclusive. Of course, given the inherent overlap between CIKRKA, such as the 
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Hoover Dam, it may be impossible to craft mutually exclusive definitions. Revised 
definitions are proposed below (Figure C.26). Additionally, we will define the term assets, 
the collective, generalized term used to represent the combination of all CIKRKA. 
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Figure C.26. Critical Infrastructure, Key Resources, and Key Assets (Revised) 
In a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, the definitions of CIKRKA were 
explored. A table was presented that illustrated the introduction of CIKR sectors over time, 
based on their mention throughout different government documents (Critical Infrastructure 
and Key Assets: Definition and Identification, 2004). This table has been updated (Table 
C.5) and is presented below to show how the list of sectors has evolved over time, even 
since the table was first presented in 2004. 
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Table C.5. History of Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sectors 
Banking and Finance X X X X X X 
Communications X X X X X X 
Emergency Services X X X X X X 
Energy X X X X X X 
Government Facilities X X X X X X 
Transportation Systems X X X X X X 
Water X X X X X X 
Healthcare and Public Health X X X X X 
Information Technology X X X X X 
Agriculture and Food X X X X 
Chemical X X X X 
Defense Industrial Base X X X X 
Commercial Facilities X X X 
National Monuments and Icons X X X 
Postal and Shipping X X X 
Dams X X 
Nuclear Reactors, Materials and 
Waste X X 
Critical Manufacturing X 
There are greater system of systems comprised of multiple CI, which in conjunction 
with the KR (the inputs and outputs from these system of systems), aim to meet the daily 
essential operating needs of our nation. For example, a water treatment plant (CI) requires 
electricity (KR) to operate and that electricity reaches the plant through an electric power 
grid connected to a power plant. But that power plant requires fuel in order to generate 
electricity, and in most cases, that fuel must be transported to the power plant via train or 
truck, and so on. So that water treatment facility might be directly compromised by any 
number of CI failures, such as a delayed delivery of fuel to a power plant, which leads to a 
power outage. But, that same water treatment plant not only requires power, but it also 
requires water (KR), so if water pipelines (a CI system necessary for delivering a KR) are 
compromised, or if there is a drought, then a similar problem exits: there would be no clean 
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drinking water. Furthermore, this domino-effect could continue, because the lack of clean 
drinking water could cause a local health epidemic, which could create a strain on 
hospitals, which may lack the capacity to treat the influx of patients or which may also be 
suffering from the power loss. Examining individual CI is not sufficient if the goal is the 
protection of the greater system of systems of CIKR. 
Below is a list of the latest DHS CIKR sectors (Table C.6). Using the new definitions 
of CIKRKA given above, the National Monuments and Icons, Commercial Facilities, and 
Government Facilities sectors are comprised mostly of KA, not CI or KR. The remaining 
sectors typically consist of both CI and KR. For example, the Energy sector consists of not 
only power plants and power lines, but also of the coal or gas used to generate that power, 
and the Critical Manufacturing sector consists of the iron and steel which it produces and 
processes in mills or plants. There are also many obvious dependencies and 
interdependencies which add to the complexity of CIKRKA protection. For example, the 
Energy sector is dependent upon the Communications sector to provide the information 
technology infrastructure required to operate power plants or natural gas pipelines, such as 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, while the Communications 
sector would be nearly paralyzed if there were a power failure. 
Table C.6. Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource Sectors 
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Agriculture and Food Energy 
Banking and Finance Government Facilities 
Chemical Healthcare and Public Health 
Commercial Facilities Information Technology 
Communications National Monuments and Icons 
Critical Manufacturing Nuclear Reactors, Materials and Waste 
Dams Postal and Shipping 
Defense Industrial Base Transportation Systems 
Emergency Services Water 
Furthermore, there is also an obvious overlap between some CI and KA (Figure C.27). 
In these situations, if the KA has a primary function as a CI, then it is aligned to that sector, 
although the secondary sector, for which the CI is a KA, may also collaborate with the 
primary sector, at least for the purposes of risk assessment. For example, the Hoover Dam, 
while iconic, is aligned to the Dam sector (National Monuments and Icons: Critical 
Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan, 2007). 
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Figure C.27. Intersection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets 
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Systems and System of Systems 
According to general systems theory, there are a number of attributes that define 
systems. Systems are comprised of interrelated or interdependent objects. Systems exhibit 
holistic properties not necessarily evident at the level of individual objects or subsystems. 
Systems seek to achieve some final goal or state, and in order to reach this goal they 
transform inputs into outputs. Systems tend to devolve into entropy without regulation and 
are typically organized in a hierarchical system of nested subsystems where the subsystems 
are specialized with different functions within the system. Finally, a system either diverges, 
in which case it has many ways of achieving a single goal, or it converges, where, from an 
initial state, it could achieve many different goals (Skyttner, 2005). 
Quite simply, many of these same attributes hold true for a system of systems, just on a 
much larger scale (Figure C.28). Skyttner describes the system of systems phenomenon as 
a "hierarchy of systems" in which systems are components of, or rather, subsystems of, 
other systems (Skyttner, 2005). A system would be considered a "system of systems" when 
its component systems each have a purpose of their own and would continue to operate 
even if separated from the overall system, and if those component systems are managed 
individually, rather than being managed within the context of the entire system of systems 
(Maier, 1998). However, this does not address the issue of scale. By this definition, a single 
condominium unit could be a system of systems, having many subsystems such as heating 
and running water, each of which are managed separately by the different utility 
companies, or, examined from a different perspective, the entire condominium complex 
could be a system of systems where each condo is managed separately by its owner, and so 
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on. Often, the concepts of complexity and geographic distribution are also introduced when 
referring to system of systems (Maier, 1998). 
It is obvious that system of systems face different issues from traditional systems 
(Sheard & Mostashari, 2009). Typically, system of systems seek to integrate many 
independent systems which were built for other, albeit related, purposes. These system of 
systems must often develop quickly in order to continue to meet the demands of the user, as 
well as the demands of the overall system of systems, such as policy demands or 
technological demands. As with complex systems problems, there are many different 
stakeholders, each with different perspectives and requirements, some of whom do not 
wish to participate in, or simply do not understand that they are a part of, a greater system 
of systems. System of systems also usually depend on integrated computing infrastructure. 
Further complicating things, there is distributed development for these systems, not just 
geographically, but managerially, and technologically. For example, the individual 
management of one system in California could require its computing infrastructure to be 
upgraded, but the upgrade then renders the individual system incapable of communicating 
with its related systems in New York (Sheard & Mostashari, 2009). 
•comprised of interrelated or 
interdependent objects 
•exhibit holistic properties not evident in 
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•seek to achieve some final state by 
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hierarchically organized 
•diverge or converge 
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systems are subsystems of other systems 
and those component systems each 
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operate separately from the overall 
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•are managed individually 
•often display complexity and widespread 
geographic distribution 
Figure C.28. General Systems Theory and System of Systems 
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Traditional systems engineering can solve system problems and even some complex 
system problems. However, systems are increasingly complex, and systems engineers are 
inundated with systems information, some of which may be conflicting without clear 
authoritative sources, they are overwhelmed by the seemingly infinite interdependencies of 
systems, and they struggle to keep up with the constantly changing missions and policies 
governing different systems (Keating, Sousa-Poza, & Mun, 2004). Systems engineers 
typically focus on a single complex problem and engineer (or modify) a single complex 
system to address that problem. System of Systems engineers must focus on "integrating 
multiple complex systems," which could be achieved by integrating existing systems into a 
larger system of systems, or by engineering new systems in order to integrate existing 
systems, or by replacing existing subsystems so that the larger system of systems is more 
interoperable, or by replacing the entire system of systems all together (Keating, et al., 
2003). 
The risk management approach to system of systems also presents its own list of issues. 
For example, differences in the perspectives and goals of multiple stakeholders could lead 
to problems with funding or scheduling; differences in risk management practices across 
different subsystems could lead to risk oversights; and risk integration, or 
interdependencies, are often not evaluated, rather subsystems focus on their individual risks 
(Conrow, 2005). All of these concerns may ultimately increase risk for system of systems. 
The 2009 NIPP mentions system of systems once, and only in reference to the 
international dimension of homeland security and CIP (National Infrastructure Protection 
Plan, 2009). The Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 makes reference to a 
protected system, which is defined as "any service, physical or computer-based system, 
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process, or procedure that directly or indirectly affects the viability of a facility of CI or 
KR; and includes any physical or computer-based system, including a computer, computer 
system, computer or communications network, or any component hardware or element 
thereof, software program, processing instructions, or information or data in transmission 
or storage therein, irrespective of the medium of transmission or storage" (Critical 
Infrastructure Information Act, 2002). It could be argued that the more appropriate term 
here would be a protected system of systems as the viability of a single CIKRKA could be 
compromised by its interaction with, and interdependence upon, multiple systems. 
System of Systems: Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources 
It can be easily argued that CI are not only systems, but system of systems. It is also 
quite simple to extend the definition of system of systems to include the systems 
responsible for KR as they relate directly to CI. In fact, infrastructure (not just CI, but all 
infrastructure) has already been defined as a system of systems which transfers 
fundamental goods or services from one point in the system to another point in the system 
(Gheorghe, et al., 2008). 
Maier suggests that each component system must have a purpose of its own such that it 
would continue to operate even if disconnected from the overall system of systems and he 
also argues that the component systems must be primarily managed individually, rather 
than managed from within the context of the entire system of systems (Maier, 1998). There 
are a number of ways of disaggregating system of systems and there are many more models 
for managing systems, but the Transportation Systems sector has actually generated an 
elegant approach for disconnecting and reconfiguring its unwieldy system of systems 
(Figure C.29). They propose four different risk views, used for the purposes of analyzing 
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risk, which offer a systematic way of disaggregating or reorganizing system of systems into 
more manageable components, and one of those views even teases out the system owners 
and operators (the individual system managers). These four views include modal, 
geographic, functional, and ownership and are depicted in Figure C.29 (Transportation 
Systems: Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan, 2007). Looking 
at the Transportation Systems infrastructure from different perspectives also allows for the 
observation of emergent system of systems properties which might not be apparent across 
all perspectives. 
Figure C.29. Transportation Systems Sector Risk Views 
The modal view consists of six modes: aviation, maritime, mass transit, highway, 
freight rail, and pipeline. Delineating the sector along its different modes of transportation 
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is the most common way of viewing the sector and it allows all assets from a given mode to 
be collectively evaluated as a single system. The functional view disaggregates the 
Transportation Systems sector by function, which is described as "the service, process, 
capability, or operation performed by specific infrastructure assets, systems, or networks". 
In this view, all assets that share a specific function or service, usually supply chain-
focused, are grouped together. The geographic view looks at the system of all 
transportation assets in a particular region, state, or city. The ownership view groups all 
assets that are owned and operated by the same company or agency. Together, these four 
views capture different ways of looking at transportation systems and their dependencies 
and interdependencies, allowing for a robust assessment of the sector. 
From a system of systems perspective, these different views offer a very interesting 
approach, which in and of itself, almost perfectly addresses Maier's two components for 
defining a system of systems. Each of these component systems would function 
independently, regardless of whether they comprise a greater system of systems. For 
example, the aviation system operates independently from the highway system or, 
geographically speaking, the Seattle system operates independently from the Miami 
system. Furthermore, many of these systems (or groups of systems) are managed 
individually, so while highways might be managed by their respective state's department of 
transportation, marine ports might be managed by the navy or the state's port authority. 
The complicated integration of these systems through necessity (transportation is a vital 
service for any nations' citizens) or through overarching policies (like those of the National 
Transportation Safety Board, in this case) creates a massive system of systems, which, 
itself is only one system within the even greater and even more complex system of systems 
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which includes all of the nation's CIKR (for example, the Transportation Systems sector is 
extremely dependent upon the Energy sector for fuel). 
Interestingly, Gheorghe's definition of a system of systems refers directly to CI 
(Gheorghe, et al., 2008). A system of systems is defined by Gheorghe as the combination 
of several interdependent CI showing the characteristics of a single system, but lacking on 
overarching management entity. In the latter part of the definition, he and Maier seem to 
agree that the greater system of systems lack centralized command and control, so to speak. 
However, with the advent of DHS and its CIKR protection initiatives, do these CIKR 
system of systems now possess central management? 
Another attribute often ascribed to system of systems is the notion of geography; 
typically a system of systems is spread over a much larger geographic region than a single 
system. Gheorghe notes that the "ever-accelerated geographical expansion of the energy, 
transportation, and telecommunications infrastructure has resulted in the emergence of 
enormous networks that transcend national borders and even continental shores" 
(Gheorghe, et al., 2008). Again, the Transportation Systems sector offers itself as a 
wonderful example of how a large system of systems can quickly span a major 
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metropolitan area through highways and mass transit, then suddenly expand to include the 
air above the region, the water along its coastlines, even the pipelines beneath the ground. 
A geographically widespread system composed of independent and individually 
managed CIKR systems, which, when integrated, exhibit dependent, or even 
interdependent, component systems, should most definitely be considered a system of 
systems. However, describing such a system of systems is sort of like describing a fractal; 
every time you get to one node in the complex system of systems, there are multiple nodes 
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which split and regenerate in similar or slightly altered ways, some even turning back in on 
themselves. Starting at what might be considered an initial system node in the Energy 
sector, we can pinpoint the CI, such as oil rigs, which are designed specifically for the 
production of KR, such as oil and gas. Then there are CI designed to distribute that crude 
oil and gas to nearby refineries or processing plants. Refineries and processing plants 
transform KR, as they are designed to input crude oil and gas, and output refined oil and 
gas fit for end users. Additionally, there are CI systems which further distribute these KR, 
such as pipelines which transport natural gas to homes for cooking or heating. Sometimes 
the fuel is further transformed by a system, like when natural gas is used in a power plant to 
generate electricity. And speaking of electricity, there are even more CI to distribute the 
KR of electricity, which powers countless other assets, including the very oil and gas 
production facilities described at the beginning of this example. 
System of Systems: Key Assets 
The National Monuments and Icons sector is composed of assets, systems, networks, 
and functions throughout the US, many of which are listed in the National Register of 
Historic Places or the List of National Historic Landmarks {National Monuments and 
Icons: Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan, 2007). In general, 
these assets do not have a purpose or function which aligns to one of the other CIKR 
sectors. This sector includes KA which may be physical structures like monuments, 
operational staff (and visitors), historical or significant documents and objects, as well as 
geographic areas, like parks or historical areas. 
The Commercial Facilities sector is similar to the National Monuments and Icons sector 
in that it is also comprised of KA, such as arenas, stadiums, museums, casinos, amusement 
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parks, and malls ("Commercial Facilities Sector: Critical Infrastructure and Key 
Resources," 2010). The Government Facilities sector consists of buildings such as 
embassies and courthouses, which could also be considered KA ("Government Facilities 
Sector: Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources," 2010). Further distinguishing these 
sectors, is their lack of extreme interdependencies with other sectors, which is so apparent 
when examining other CIKR system of systems. These KA usually depend on other sectors 
for the operation of the physical structures (power, water, communications, etc.), but the 
relationship is one way; there is no case where a CI or a KR would be directly dependent 
on a KA, unless that KA overlapped with another sector, in which case it would be 
classified as a CI. For example, the Hoover Dam, while iconic, is aligned to the Dam 
sector, and considered primarily a CI, and similarly the Golden Gate Bridge is aligned to 
the Transportation Systems sector. 
Maier's definition for system of systems seems to apply when first examining KA. KA 
are individually managed and would, indeed, operate for their own purpose if separated 
from a greater system of systems. For example, the Statue of Liberty would continue to 
operate even if the Mall of America in Minneapolis was closed, and KA are not typically 
managed by the same agency or company, although some groups of monuments are 
managed collectively such as the Lincoln Memorial and the Washington Monument 
(among others), which are all part of the National Mall and Memorial Parks, operated by 
the National Park Service with the US Department of the Interior (DOI) ("Lincoln 
Memorial," 2011b). However, Maier's definition requires KA to first be considered a 
system, before being considered components of a greater system of systems (Maier, 1998). 
And, according to Skyttner, KA may not be considered systems because they do not seek to 
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achieve some final goal or state by transforming inputs into outputs (Skyttner, 2005). KA 
do not have a traditional systemic purpose and are not seeking to produce, transform, or 
transport anything. Future research might shed some light on how this distinction impacts 
the inclusion of KA in the greater CIKR system of systems, especially for the purposes of 
ranking those assets based on risk. 
Risk Analysis 
Defining risk and risk management is no easy feat. However, it is a necessary step 
before we can explore how we calculate risk, or how we perceive risk. Linguistically, risk 
suffers from risk-archipelago syndrome (Althaus, 2005), in other words, a number of 
distinct specializations have evolved due to the wide range of definitions for risk (such as 
risk perception, risk analysis, risk mitigation, and so on). The origin of the term is disputed, 
but reviewing the possible etymology of the word may explain why we still struggle to 
define this word today. Risk could be derived from the Arabic word risq which basically 
translates as something you received from which you can profit; or from the Latin word 
risicum which refers to the challenge posed to sailors by a barrier reef (Althaus, 2005). 
More recently, different professional organizations describe risk as "the potential for 
realization of unwanted, adverse consequences", the "(perceived) feeling of insecurity and 
fear due to undesirable consequences", the "probability of the occurrence of (the risky) 
event multiplied by the consequence of the event, given that it has occurred", or even as 
"events that if they occur can jeopardize the successful completion of the projects" (Pinto, 
2008). 
Further complicating risk analysis, systems now consist of many separate parts which, 
together, provide an overarching capability not achievable at the level of the individual 
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subsystems (Garvey & Pinto, 2009). These system of systems do not have clear boundaries, 
requirements, or specifications, so managing these risks is much more challenging (Garvey 
& Pinto, 2009). Additionally, the analysis of risk is typically considered to be scenario-
driven, in other words, we cannot analyze a risk unless we can conceive of such a risk 
(Pinto, 2008), and obviously that brings us back to our perceptions of risk. 
Risk Calculation 
Risk is often calculated as the product of the probability that a risk event will occur and 
the magnitude of the consequences should the risk event occur (Kasperson, et al., 1988). 
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) and Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) are direct 
applications of this definition, in which both assessments typically aim to answer the same 
three questions: 1) what can go wrong? 2) how likely is it? and 3) what are the 
consequences? (Apostolakis, 2004). Later, the concept of vulnerability was introduced to 
form the current risk triplet often shown in a deceivingly straightforward equation given in 
Equation C. 1 where Risk is a function of threat, vulnerability, and consequence. Threat is 
usually the probability of an attack (or accident) occurring, vulnerability is often considered 
to be the probability of a successful attack, and consequence is the magnitude of the impact 
given that the attack occurs and that it was successful (based on the level of vulnerability at 
the time of the attack). Others have argued that this equation is inadequate and misleading 
(Cox, 2008), citing a multitude of reasons. Just one example would be the arithmetic 
distortions which could reverse the proper risk ranking of two risks if one has high 
vulnerability and low consequence while the other has high consequence and low 
vulnerability. Algebraically reorganizing Equation C.l produces an alternate equation 
(Equation C.2) that, when examined, would lead to some interesting results. 
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Vulnerability = Risk/(Threat * Consequence) 
Equation C.2. Homeland Security Risk Function (Rearranged) 
Ignoring for the moment that threat and vulnerability are probabilities, and simply 
examining the relationships implied by Equation C.2, we see that vulnerability is inversely 
proportional to threat, so as threat increases, vulnerability would decrease, but that does not 
make sense. Vulnerability, intuitively, cannot decrease unless measures are taken to either 
reduce the likelihood of an attack (if that is possible to control), or to reduce the potential 
for success of an attack. This might be akin to a soccer team which wants to have a good 
offense, and failing that, a good defense. Vulnerability is also inversely proportional to 
consequence, so as consequence increases, vulnerability would decrease. Again, 
vulnerability can only be altered by the measures taken to reduce the probability of success 
of an attack, and increasing the potential consequences of an attack would not be a good 
way of reducing the vulnerability of an attack. 
More interesting relationships are uncovered when we account for the fact that threat 
and vulnerability are often both considered probabilities and while the product of positive 
integers results in a larger integer, the product of probabilities results in smaller 
probabilities. Table C.7 shows the variables from Equation C.2 and assigns random 
numbers between 0 and 1 to represent the probabilities and random numbers between 0 and 
100 to represent the consequences. We also include a baseline which we will use to 
compare different scenarios. 
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Table C.7. Risk Equation 
Threat 0.233234094 0.5 
Vulnerability 0.601075973 0.5 
Consequence 86 50 
Risk 12.05646128 12.5 
Because there are four variables and there are two possible deviation options from their 
baseline values (up or down), we have 4 , or 16, possible scenarios, given in Table C.8. 
There was a randomly generated instance for each of the following scenarios, except for the 
completely illogical ones (down-down-down-up and up-up-up-down). The down-down-
down-down and up-up-up-up scenarios make sense, intuitively. However the remaining 
scenarios are not intuitive and could greatly misrepresent risk. Even if we hold 
consequence constant, we see similar results in Table C.9. 
Table C.8. Risk Equation Simulation Scenarios 
Tlireat Down Up Down Down Down Down Down Down 
Vulnerability Down Down Up Down Down Up Up Down 
Consequence Down Down Down Up Down Up Down Up 
Risk Down Down Down Down Up Down Up Up 
- V * * * * X. 
Threat Up Down Up Up Up Up Up Up 
Vulnerability Up Up Down Up Up Down Down Up 
Consequence Up Up Up Down Up Down Up Down 
Risk Up Up Up Up Down Up Down Down 
Table C.9. Risk Equation Simulation Scenarios (Constant Consequence) 
'.J3 
Threat Down Up Down Down Down Up Up Up Up 
Vulnerability Down Down Up Down Up Up Down Up Down 
Consequence Same Same Same Same Same Same Same Same Same 
Risk Down Down Down Up Up Up Up Down Down 
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These results do not necessarily jive with our feelings about risk, in general. For 
example, if threat is reduced from a probability of 0.50 to 0.10, but vulnerability increases 
from 0.50 to 0.99 and consequence increases from 50 to 99, Risk actually decreases from 
12.5 to 9.8. While the probability of a successful threat has been reduced, there is still some 
level of threat, and now, if that threat were to occur, there is such a dramatic increase in the 
probability of success of that attack, coupled with an increase in the potential consequence 
of that impact, the attack would be devastating. These low-probability, high-consequence 
events really throw a wrench into the mix when trying to calculate risk. 
The type of consequence and the order of magnitude of the consequence can also cause 
problems. For example, if threat and vulnerability are both increased to 0.70, but 
consequence is reduced to 20 instead of 50, then Risk decreases from 12.5 to 9.8. If 
consequence is defined by billions of dollars, then reducing the Risk from 12.5 to 9.8 
billion dollars does not seem all that significant. But if consequence is defined by 
thousands of fatalities, then the difference between 13,000 deaths and 10,000 deaths does 
seem significant. But is death even acceptable for the risk under discussion? And how do 
we integrate multiple consequences? We could determine a risk value based on monetary 
consequences, then another risk value based on fatalities, and somehow try to integrate 
them. Or we could assign death a monetary value, based on life insurance policies, perhaps. 
Or we maybe could perform a weighted linear model, where the weight for consequence of 
fatalities is significantly higher than that of money, then we could integrate the 
consequences and try to calculate an overall risk. But with either approach, we are still 
adding apples and oranges in the hopes of producing pears. 
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Furthermore, how do we integrate multiple assessments into a single, meaningful 
assessment, score, or report? Data from multiple assessments could be drastically different 
depending on data collection methods or data sources. And what about risk assessments for 
CI that are also considered KA? Or what if the asset falls into multiple CI sectors, as well 
as KA sectors? How do we integrate risk assessments from all of these different 
perspectives? While traditional probabilistic risk assessments might be applicable to CIKR, 
are they applicable to KA? The current risk assessment methodology for handling KA is 
basically a semi-quantitative risk prioritization approach (.National Monuments and Icons: 
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan, 2007). But the Hoover 
Dam can be aligned to the Dam, Water, Transportation, and Energy sectors, not to mention 
the National Monuments and Icon sector since it is also a KA, so which sector produces the 
right risk assessment? Are all of the different risk assessments incorporated into a single 
estimate of risk for the Hoover Dam? Can that overall score be compared against the risk 
scores of other CIKRKA? 
Risk Perception 
Risk has been described as a construct. In other words, "risk is all in the mind"; it is not 
just something that we can observe, rather it is something which affects everything that we 
observe (Becker, et al., 1993). Depending on the filter affecting our perceptions, we may 
see risks differently. A policeperson might see a busy intersection and see the risk of car 
accidents, where as an environmentalist might see the risk of pollution from all of the car 
exhaust, yet the driver of a car whizzing through the intersection sees only the risk of a 
speeding ticket as he notices the police car in his rear view mirror. The way we attempt to 
define, assess, and model risk, is thus, a construct, as well. 
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Early risk perception research focused on the cognitive aspects of the acceptability of 
risk, such as how and why we make the decisions we do, how we factor risk into those 
decisions, what we consider to be acceptable risk, whether or not we are capable of 
estimating risk accurately, and why we underestimate or overestimate some risks. The 
question we are seeking to answer through risk analysis and risk assessments is whether or 
not a given product (action, technology, asset, resource, or infrastructure) is safe. But risk 
perception asks, "How safe is safe enough?" (B. Fischhoff, et al., 1978). 
In more recent years, risk perception has been introduced to the field of homeland 
defense and homeland security, or, rather, the pressing issues of homeland defense and 
homeland security have unfolded before our very eyes, no doubt affecting our collective 
risk perceptions. During the September 11th attacks, we became aware of our own 
vulnerability in an instant (Small, Lerner, & Fischhoff, 2006). Risk perceptions after a 
tragic event are bound to be shaped by emotions (Small, et al., 2006), but reacting based on 
those risk perceptions, rather than based on unbiased evidence, could lead to further 
tragedy. Risk perceptions changed so drastically after this pivotal event that the US went to 
war (to reduce threat likelihood) and simultaneously created a new department, DHS with 
its mission to protect our nation's borders, CIKRKA, and citizens (to reduce vulnerability 
likelihood). 
Fischhoff was one of the first to realize the implications for the field of risk perception 
and subsequently contributed a handful of articles dealing with terrorism. He even 
supported the proposal to allow the public to rank (some of the) risks for regulatory policy 
(Fischbeck, 2001). This approach was intended to be expanded to "ecological, social, and 
other quality-of-life risks" (Fischbeck, 2001), but it could definitely be extended to 
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CIKRKA risks. Soon after the September 11th attack, "Effects of Fear and Anger on 
Perceived Risks of Terrorism: A National Field Experiment" was published and it explored 
the effects of anger or fear on risk perceptions and policy partiality, determining that fear 
increased risk estimates of terrorism and the desire for protective measures, whereas anger 
had the opposite effect (Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003). 
Fischhoff also noted the importance of September 11th in our quotidian risk perception, 
remarking that the attack "has thrown many everyday choices into sharp relief' (B. 
Fischhoff, De Bruin, Perrin, & Downs, 2004). Deciding where and when to travel is no 
longer just a matter of personal preference or price, but could require consulting the current 
HSAS to determine the threat level (B. Fischhoff, et al., 2004). Of course, the threat level is 
almost always yellow, which is described as "Significant Risk of Terrorist Attack" 
("Homeland Security Advisory System," 2010), so how does that play into our risk 
perceptions of terrorism? When the threat level is truly elevated, does anyone even notice? 
Are we the nation who cried terrorist? 
Slovic also offered some unique post-September 11th opinions on risk perception, 
beginning with an emphasis on a persistent problem with the risk quantification of large-
scale terrorist attacks such as September 11th; they are extreme events, black swans, high-
consequence low-probability events (Slovic, 2002). Slovic actually called these events "a 
new species of trouble" (Slovic, 2002). Slovic stated that people "respond to the hazards 
they perceive" (Slovic, et al., 1979). And if the risk perceptions of those risk scenarios are 
not in sync with reality, decision makers cannot make adequate judgments in order to 
mitigate those risks. 
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Slovic was aware that risk management had become political and controversial in 1999, 
but it undoubtedly became more so after September 11th (Slovic, 1999). He argues that 
"danger is real, but risk is socially constructed" and since the government controls the 
definition of risk, it also controls the risk response and risk mitigation plans, which can 
cause the public to mistrust the government if the public disagrees with the definition of 
risk or the proposed response to, or mitigation of, that risk (Slovic, 1999). Judgments about 
risk are influenced by emotion and this is the only common denominator amongst the 
public, policy makers, and even risk analysts who supposedly look at risk as a science; 
none of us are immune to the effects that our emotions have on risk determination. For 
example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) spent the majority of its budget for 
years on hazardous waste because the public perceived that to be the most serious 
environmental priority for the nation, even though indoor air pollution is actually 
considered to be a more serious health risk by experts (Slovic, 1999). Slovic proposes that 
public participation in both the risk assessment and risk decision making process would 
improve the scientific assessments of risk, as well as increase the public's acceptance of the 
resulting decisions (Slovic, 1999). 
The supposed laws of acceptable risk (Table C.10) were first developed by Starr early 
in the history of risk perception (B. Fischhoff, et al., 1978). They were derived from an 
analysis of risk versus benefit based on historical data of fatalities per hours, an approach 
that is very similar to a failure rate analysis in reliability engineering. Risk was defined as 
the expected value of the number of fatalities for every hour that one was exposed to the 
risk event. Benefit was defined as the average amount of money spent on the risk activity 
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or the average amount of money the risk activity would contribute to one's annual income 
(Starr, 1969). 
Table C.10. Laws of Acceptable Risk 
Risk Acceptability (RA) is proportional to the cube of the Risk Rewards (RR) (RA a RR3) 
The public generally accepts risks from voluntary activities that are about 1,000 




RA is inversely related to the size of the population exposed to that risk (RA a (l/nE)) 
The level of risk tolerated for voluntarily accepted hazards is approximately 
equal to the level of Risk from Disease (RD) (RAV = RD) 
Do Starr's laws of acceptable risk still hold true? Are they applicable to CIKRKA 
risks? If RA is still proportional to the cube of RR, then what constitutes a RR in risk 
assessments of CIKRKA? Does the public still tend to accept risks from voluntary 
activities more than involuntary activities? If RA is inversely related to the size of the 
population exposed to that risk, how does RA relate to the region of the risk, or the time of 
the risk, both of which could affect the size of the population exposed to the risk? Is RD 
still a good measuring stick for voluntarily accepted risk scenarios, or has the 
communication of information about RD (an involuntary risk, after all) over the past 30 
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Figure C.30. Perceived Risk Scales 
Many talk about risk as a function of threat, vulnerability, and consequence (H. H. 
Willis, 2007), but it seems obvious that the risk triplet is inadequate. Risk is also a function 
of our risk perceptions, and through risk perception, other factors influencing our risk 
perception of risk can be explored, such as those given in Figure C.30. And other factors 
may influence our risk perceptions, such as the location of an asset, the time of day, month, 
or year of an attack on that asset, or even the type of asset at risk (CI, KR, or KA). 
It has long been a challenge to evaluate multiple assessments of risk. Multiple risk 
assessments, even those which all seek to assess the same risk event or facility, etc., could 
vary widely. Risk assessments could be based on risk data or risk perceptions. The data 
from one assessment could be drastically different from the data of another assessment if 
the data collection methods or data sources differ significantly; furthermore, one 
assessment could incorporate factors such as whether the risk was voluntary or involuntary, 
while another might attempt to calculate risk using traditional risk equations (Turner, 
203 
1994). Even the definition of consequences can drastically affect the risk calculations, and 
there are many types of consequences (economic, environmental, or in some cases loss of 
life) which must all be assessed in order to give the best possible overall risk picture. 
A great example here would be the integration of risk assessments for CI which are also 
considered KA. Traditional probabilistic risk assessments, which might be applicable to 
CIKR, are probably not applicable to KA such as the Washington Monument or the St. 
Louis Arch. Still, an attack on such assets would have significant repercussions on our 
nation's morale and would, in turn, affect our risk perceptions. Haimes remarks that it may 
not matter whether the threat to CIKRKA is a natural risk scenario or an unnatural risk 
scenario, as the consequences may be similar, however "the psychological and political 
impacts are likely to be significantly different" (Haimes, 1999) and an attack on a KA is 
most likely to be a manmade attack, aiming to affect our national psyche. 
The current risk assessment methodology for handling KA is basically a semi­
quantitative risk prioritization approach {National Monuments and Icons: Critical 
Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan, 2007). Could risk perceptions be 
incorporated into an overall risk assessment methodology for KA? Could risk perceptions 
be used to integrate multiple risk assessments of the same asset? For example, the Hoover 
Dam would have a traditional risk assessment viewing the facility from the perspective of 
CIKR (the structure itself, as well as the water it controls), but it could also have a risk 
assessment which views the facility from the perspective of a KA (in addition to its primary 
function as a dam, the structure is also a national icon and tourist site). But how are these 
two risk values aggregated to provide an overall risk profile? 
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Perhaps risk perception could learn from the field of CIP in this case. The 
Transportation Systems sector introduced the concept of risk views. These risk views 
describe the types of transportation systems in terms of four views: mode, geography, 
function, and ownership (Transportation Systems: Critical Infrastructure and Key 
Resources Sector-Specific Plan, 2007). Together, these four views capture different ways 
of viewing transportation systems, allowing for a robust assessment of the sector. From a 
systems analysis perspective, this is a very interesting systematic risk management 
approach incorporating risk perception. Furthermore this approach could be expanded to all 
other sectors and subsectors. In addition to the Transportation Systems views, there could 
be Energy risk views for Oil, Gas, as well as Electricity. 
Even if we calculate risks accurately, we may not be able to subjectively estimate those 
risks independently. We might not be able to accurately recall the frequency of risk events, 
which would influence our estimates of risk. Or we might give weight to other factors in 
our subjective estimates of risk, such as whether the risk is voluntary or not (Kasperson, et 
al., 1988). We are often called upon to factor risk into our everyday decisions, but we are 
not likely to refer to calculated risks, or any other data for that matter, in order to make 
common decisions, like whether to go for a run after dark, or whether it is safer to take a 
plane or a ship to reach our vacation destinations. 
Risk biases can even be introduced by our vernacular. For example, when asked the 
chances of a rainy day next Saturday, a person might respond, "fifty-fifty". It is possible 
that the speaker places equal probability on both hypotheses (either it will rain, or it will not 
rain), but it is probably more likely that the speaker is not sure which probabilities to use in 
order express her belief, because quite frankly she does not know whether it will rain or not 
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and has no information to make a more educated guess, so rather than researching data to 
inform her response, ignoring the question all together, or saying, "I don't know," she 
offers a pseudo-probability (B. Fischhoff & Bruine De Bruin, 1999). Incidentally, when 
attempting to incorporate perceived risks into risk calculation, the misuse of this "I don't 
know" probability of 0.50 could artificially inflate the average response for events which 
might typically be assigned smaller probabilities or vice versa (B. Fischhoff & Bruine De 
Bruin, 1999). 
We can also introduce bias through the availability heuristic (Slovic, et al., 1979), the 
result of which makes us more likely to focus on frequently occurring risk events, or events 
with a vivid impact (such as the September 11th attack). Slovic is quick to point out that 
even the mere "discussion of any low-probability hazard may increase the judged 
probability of that hazard" regardless of whether the evidence contradicts that conclusion 
(Slovic, et al., 1979). Well, the future is ripe with unforeseen low-probability risk scenarios, 
and if the availability heuristic, or any other bias, precludes us from imagining potential 
threats, or inadvertently ignoring threats which are infrequent, then we cannot prepare for 
those threats, rendering us vulnerable. 
206 
UNKNOWN TO THOSE EXPOSGD. EFFECT OOAYEQ. PS»: JttSKS UMOOMfc *0 SCENGE 
wn OMBAO. MprguxM. 
*fcTOauo*wno»u wcawwi* wants• MKVEROIUMMftTXM • WrVj^t 
OMLGQKMOPm^* «OMMOfTC 
WULM« MATS 
• UOS AKT*0?1CS» 
JHSftLfOS}* 
*U4C*«rr 
NOT FATAL. MUTT***. LOW 









• PtSTCCCS • LfUMUNIMMG 
*£2*^21, mKK MUCJEM«»PQM$ • 
•wAATlOii »AuiW 
*m*nm • *-%+!* c*AS*S 
• co4.-suw»e»cuA.^ 





OPSAQ QLCmtL. CATASIBOPHC. 
aaNseoueess F*t*L NOT CQUTAaUE. HWM MSR TO 
PUMie «NBIATIONS. WT basly reoucsx mm 
•CWaiNa NVOUJKTAmr 
*fcJQJEMt WCAKMS <*»#>• 





MKMM TO 1MOCC CMPOSB). VWT IHMeDMTE. 010 N». 
Figure C.31. Observed Risk Versus Controllable Risk 
Our estimates of risks are affected by extraneous factors which can cloud our 
quantitative judgments. Figure C.31 introduces two scales or dimensions of risk: 
observability and controllability (Morgan, 1993). Observable risks are described here as old 
risks. These are risks for which the consequences are immediate and noticeable and 
because of this, there exist rich data sets which have been studied extensively. Furthermore, 
those exposed to these kinds of risks are aware of the potential consequences; automobile 
accidents are plotted here as observable risks because we are all aware that we could end up 
in an accident any time we drive or ride in a vehicle (Morgan, 1993). Unobservable risks 
are those risks for which those exposed to the risks are unaware of the consequences 
because the consequences might remain unknown or could be delayed, therefore data and 
research on these risks may be limited or unavailable (Morgan, 1993). The controllability 
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scale basically boils down to two factors, whether the risk is voluntary or involuntary, and 
whether the consequences incite dread or not (Morgan, 1993). 
Unknown risk 








Figure C.32. Unknown Risk Versus Dread Risk 
Slovic also mentions voluntariness, knowledge (or observability), and dread when 
discussing risk perception (Slovic, 2002). However, as opposed to only two scales, he 
proposes nine risk scales. We see in Figure C.30 that nuclear power has a more negative 
risk profile (looking across the nine risk characteristics), than that of x-rays. These risk 
scales influence our risk perceptions, and as a result, the public required a greater reduction 
in nuclear power risk before that risk would be tolerated by society. In Figure C.32, we see 
that risk perception can also be visualized in three dimensions with powerful results. Risk 
events are shown on the known/unknown and dread/non-dread risk scales, but for each risk 
event, the size of the point increases as the public's desire for risk regulation increases 
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(Slovic, 1987). We see points where the risk is known and there is no dread associated with 
the risk, and yet the public still demands increased risk regulation, because other factors are 
influencing their risk perceptions. 
The tools for capturing risk perceptions can even introduce bias in our responses. For 
example, people are generally not as comfortable with decimals, leading them to 
overestimate very small risks if a survey asks for answers in the form of percentages, rather 
than asking for answers in the form of odds (B. Fischhoff, 2010). Thankfully, a well-
designed survey can be crafted to reduce most of these biases, and surveys are still an 
extremely useful method for determining the levels of socially acceptable risk, as well as 
other risk perceptions (B. Fischhoff, et al., 1978). 
For some risk scenarios, we can temper our risk perceptions with objective statistical 
data and robust risk assessments. For other, more nebulous risk scenarios, such as terrorist 
attacks, we lack reliable data and must depend on our risk perceptions. This is analogous to 
going with our gut and sometimes our gut is wrong. This bias can ripple through the risk-
based decision making process and result in disproportionately allocated budgets. For 
example, DHS allocated $675 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 2004 to 50 metropolitan regions, 
all of which were perceived to be most vulnerable to terrorist attacks, based on a formula 
that supposedly accounts for a number of factors, including the presence of CIKRKA, 
vulnerability, population size and density, as well as law enforcement activity (H. H. 
Willis, 2007). Based on a new approach which focused on regional risk, $765 million was 
allocated in FY 2006, but only 35 metropolitan areas were eligible (H. H. Willis, 2007). 
Someone thought that looking at risk regionally was a better approach, and it may be, but 
as a result of the discrepancies in budget allocation, DHS was criticized for its inability to 
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adequately calculate risk, especially risk as abstract as that of a terrorist attack, for which 
there is insufficient data to use traditional probabilistic risk analysis methods. Risk 
perception is most certainly playing a role here, both in the ability of DHS to calculate 
these risks and allocate resources appropriately, but also in the public's criticism of DHS. A 
better understanding of risk perception, calculated risk, along with the communication of 
that valuable risk information, could pave the way for mutual understanding between the 
public and DHS. 
If the risk of a terrorist attack is perceived to be significant, regardless of the actual risk, 
then policy makers may decide to allocate the majority of available funds to protecting 
assets against terrorist attacks, when perhaps the true risk to an asset is deterioration due to 
age and lack of repairs. We have all seen examples of overlooked infrastructure failing with 
disastrous results, such as the incapacitation of the levies during Hurricane Katrina. Risk 
assessments are supposed to protect us from this bias by omission, but in fact, a risk 
assessment, itself, could introduce bias by drawing the decision maker's attention to all of 
the potential risks, some of which might not have been obvious and could cause the 
decision maker to emphasize those new risks over other more significant risks. 
We ask our policy makers to "weigh the benefits against the risks" (B. Fischhoff, et al., 
1978), but there are few tools for them to determine societal RA. Fischhoff proposes 
expressed preferences, a method using surveys to measure the public's attitudes towards the 
risks and benefits from various activities (B. Fischhoff, et al., 1978). An approach like this 
could be extended with the significant advancements in survey methodology (which could 
reduce risk biases), along with online survey applications or even online tools for 
performing MCDA. 
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The vision statement of DHS is "a secure America, a confident public, and a strong and 
resilient society and economy" (One Team, One Mission, Securing Our HomelanD US 
Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2008-2013,2008). One way 
to ensure the public is confident in its nation's CIKRKA is for them to actively participate 
in determining the acceptable risks of those assets. Risk perception models could be used to 
gauge the public's risk perceptions regarding risk to CIKRKA, similar to the public risk 
ranking methods proposed for environmental, health, and safety policies (Fischbeck, 2001). 
Now let us examine how perception might affect risk calculation. Often in order to 
estimate threat, vulnerability, and consequence, we rely on subject matter expertise because 
actual data is unavailable or difficult to collect. So, perception is inadvertently and 
haphazardly incorporated into Risk (Equation C.3). In other words, we are already 
integrating perception into the risk equation, but we are doing it in such a way that we 
cannot tease apart what is fact and what is opinion. 
Risk f (Th.Te(ltperceptioni VulTieVClbilityperception' COnSeCJUetlCeperception) 
Equation C.3. Current Risk Calculation Revisited 
We need a way to systematically incorporate subject matter expertise, or even public 
opinion, alongside actual data (no matter how limited that data may be). With the risk 
quadruplet, we propose separating perception from threat, vulnerability, and consequence, 
as its own component of Risk (Equation C.4). We would collect actual data for threat, 
vulnerability, and consequence in a consistent and systematic approach, and then integrate 
that data with perception data in a transparent and reproducible manner. 
Risk = /(Threat, Vulnerability, Consequence, Perception) 
Equation C.4. Proposed Risk Calculation 
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APPENDIX D 
RISK QUADRUPLET METHODOLOGY (IN VIVO) 
The in vivo risk quadruplet methodology describes the data collection and model 
building efforts that must be accomplished to complete this research. This is not the 
methodology which will be used to test the viability of the risk quadruplet; the in vitro 
methodology was discussed in CHAPTER 3 and CHAPTER 4. Rather, this is the 
methodology that would be used in vivo, vice in vitro, to actually deploy the methodology 
in the real world. The first phase is the perception assessment. The second phase consists of 
threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments. The final phase of the research is the 
assessment integration phase, where the assessments of threat, vulnerability, consequence, 
and perception are all assimilated. The three-phased methodology for the risk quadruplet 
consists of three sub-methodologies, one for each phase (Figure 3.3). 
To deploy the risk quadruplet in vivo, a perception survey, crafted with Inquisite, 
would be used to capture perception scores along a six level scale (the linguistic set of 
none, very low, low, medium, high, and very high). The survey results would be 
aggregated across all respondents to determine the frequencies with which respondents 
selected different grades of the perceived risk to a CI, KR, or KA given a risk scenario. ER, 
via IDS, would be used to integrate the survey results for the perception attribute with the 
data leveraged or collected for the remaining attributes (threat, vulnerability, and 
consequence). The output of the ER model would be a ranking of the CIKRKA in order of 
most to least risk, where risk is defined in the model as a systematic, traceable, and 
reproducible function of threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception. 
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The main driver of the in vivo methodology was the MCDA model selected for the 
final phase. ER was an ideal choice for integrating the four disparate types of CIKRKA 
assessments as it can cope with relationships between parent and child attributes, as well as 
across all child attributes, through the use of weighting, utilities, and belief degrees. It can 
also handle both quantitative and qualitative data. And lastly, it can output a ranked series 
of assets based on all attributes. Once this ER model was selected and the free IDS 
software was identified as the tool which could be used to implement this model, it was 
soon realized that IDS could be leveraged throughout all three phases of the risk 
quadruplet. 
In order to implement the risk quadruplet model in vivo, we would need to provide 
consistent definitions and examples for the CIKRKA, as well as an overall risk scenario. 
The risk quadruplet model can be adapted and expanded to handle more complex and 
lengthy lists of CIKRKA alternatives, multiple risk scenarios, improved threat, 
vulnerability, and consequence assessment data, and could even be used to integrate 
perception data from experts and non-experts. However, for the purposes of demonstrating 
how the risk quadruplet approach would be implemented in the real world, a simple model 
is proposed consisting of a CI, a KR, a KA, and one risk scenario. Threat, vulnerability, and 
consequence data would be leveraged from existing assessments or collected anew, and 
perception data would be gathered via survey from volunteer experts. 
The risk scenario would describe the hazard which poses a danger to the CIKRKA. 
Providing a single risk scenario would allow respondents to consider their perception of 
risk across the different CIKRKA. Once those common elements have been defined, the 
respondent would select their perception (based on the risk scenario) for the three separate 
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CIKRKA selected. That perception data would be used, in conjunction with the leveraged 
or collected threat, vulnerability, and consequence data in order to provide an overall 
integrated assessment of the CIKRKA. 
To demonstrate how the in vivo methodology might look, it was assumed that this 
methodology might first be deployed in a small setting with subject matter experts as the 
survey participants. It was assumed that those experts would live and work in the 
Washington, DC metropolitan area, so that region was chosen to set the stage for the 
examples of CIKRKA, as well as the risk scenario. This means that we could be 
introducing some bias, as we would not only be eliciting the perceptions of homeland 
security experts, but we would also be seeking their opinions based on familiar assets and 
regions. In practice, this methodology could be expanded to include a much larger and 
more diverse list of assets, as well as an increased sample of respondents, which might 
eliminate this regional bias. However, for the purposes of explaining how to deploy the risk 
quadruplet in vivo, it makes sense to scope the model. The National Capital Region (as it is 
often called by DHS) includes the cities, counties, and districts shown in Table D.l 
("Washington Metropolitan Area," 2012). 
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Table D.l. National Capitol Region 
DC Washington 
MD Calvert County 
MD Charles County 
MD Frederick County 
MD Montgomery County 
MD Prince George's County 
VA Arlington County 
VA Clarke County 
VA Fairfax County 
VA Fauquier County 
VA Frederick County 
VA Loudoun County 
VA Prince William County 
VA Spotsylvania County 
VA Stafford County 
VA Warren County 
VA City of Alexandria 
VA City of Fairfax 
VA City of Falls Church 
VA City of Fredericksburg 
VA City of Manassas 
VA City of Manassas Park 
WV Jefferson County 
We chose a representative example for each CIKRKA in the National Capitol Region 
(Table D.2). The CIKRKA were chosen such that they were mutually exclusive. In other 
words, there was no ambiguity as to whether the CI could also be categorized as a KA or if 
it could have a direct impact on KR. Obviously these overlaps and interactions exist, as 
discussed in the Literature Review (APPENDIX C), and future research of the risk 
quadruplet model could explore ways to handle these interrelated CIKRKA, but for the 
current exercise, we wanted the CIKRKA to be unique and unambiguous. 
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Table D.2. Definitions and Examples for Alternatives 
government and private systems essential 
to the operation of our nation in any or all 
CI aspects of the lives of its citizens (health, 
safety, economy, etc.), such as utilities, 









Facts and Figure s (2010 
Statistics) 
371 beds 
17,016 inpatient admissions 
86,414 outpatient visits a year 
Over 810 physicians on the 
hospital medical staff 
Nursing staff of over 713 
The emergency department is a 
Level I Trauma Center seeing 
71,242 patients a year. 
Additional Information 
Street parking is limited and 
metered. 
Access via Metro is 
recommended, if possible. 
public or private resources essential to the 
KR operation of our nation's government and 






Reserves & Supply (September 
2011) 
Motor Gasoline Stocks (Excludes 
Pipelines): 266K barrels (US 
Share: 0.7 %) 
Distribution & Marketing 
(2008) 
Fueling Stations: 4,140 (US Share: 
2.6%) 
Consumption (2009) 
Motor Gasoline Consumed: 94.5M 
barrels (US Share: 2.9 %) 
Environment (2008/2009) 
Alternative-Fueled Vehicles in 
Use: 21,505 (US Share: 2.8 %) 
Ethanol Plants: 0 
Ethanol Consumed: 8,616K 
barrels (US Share: 3.3 %) 
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those buildings, geographic regions, 
monuments, or icons, whose destruction 
would cause a crushing blow to our 
KA nation's ego, morale, and identity, but 
which are not essential to the operation of 
our nation, such as the Washington 
Monument or the Statue of Liberty. 
Lincoln 
Memorial 
Located on the National Mall in 
Washington, DC 
Surrounded on three sides by 
water 
Approximately 6M people visit 
annually 
Open to the public 24 hours a day 
Free to visit 
The memorial was built to honor 
Abraham Lincoln, but it has 
become a symbol of the American 
Civil Rights movement as it is also 
the site of Martin Luther King, 
Jr.'s famous "I Have a Dream" 
speech. 
The CI selected for testing the risk quadruplet model was The George Washington 
University (GWU) Hospital, located at 900 23rd St., NW, Washington, DC 20037. From 
their website, a list of quick facts and figures was available to provide additional context 
for the facility. The hospital (according to 2010 statistics) has 371 beds, 17,016 inpatient 
admissions, 86,414 outpatient visits a year, over 810 physicians on the hospital medical 
staff, a nursing staff of over 713, and its emergency department is a Level I Trauma Center 
seeing 71,242 patients a year (GWU, 2011). Additional information available on their 
website noted that street parking is limited and metered, so accessing the hospital via Metro 
is recommended, if possible (GWU, 2011). 
The KR selected for this exercise was motor gasoline for the state of VA. The Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) publishes state energy profiles including economic, 
price, reserves and supply, distribution and marketing, consumption, as well as 
environmental data (EIA, 2011). In the month of September 2011, VA had 266 thousand 
barrels of motor gasoline in stocks (excluding pipelines). This represents 0.7% of the US 
share. In 2008, VA had 4,140 fueling stations for motor gasoline, a 2.6% share of the US. 
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VA consumed 94.5 million barrels of motor gasoline (a 2.9% share of the US) in 2009. 
Additionally, some related information was also provided on this KR for context. VA had 
21,505 alternative-fueled vehicles in use (a 2.8% share of the US) in 2008, and while there 
were no plants to produce ethanol (as of 2008), VA consumed 8,616 thousand barrels of 
ethanol in 2009, which is a 3.3% share of the US totals for ethanol consumption (ELA, 
2011). 
The KA selected for research was the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, DC, which is 
operated as part of the National Mall and Memorial Parks by the National Park Service 
with the US DOI ("Lincoln Memorial," 201 lb). It was a memorial built to honor Abraham 
Lincoln, the 16th President of the US, although it has also become a symbol of the 
American Civil Rights movement as it is the site of Martin Luther King, Jr.'s famous "I 
Have a Dream" speech ("Lincoln Memorial," 2011a). It is located on the National Mall, 
approximately 6 million people visit the memorial annually, it is open to the public 24 
hours a day, and it is free to visit ("Lincoln Memorial," 201 la). The location is surrounded 
on three sides by water, meaning, from an EPR&R perspective, that incidents could be 
easily contained ("Lincoln Memorial," 201 la). 
Scenarios are one of the main elements of models, simulations or serious games, 
(Ancel, 2011). It would be possible to choose any type of risk scenario and use all sorts of 
resources for describing and exploring those scenarios with stakeholders. For example, a 
recently developed website, NukeMap, went viral amongst social media sites. The 
website's author was interested in visualizing the impacts of nuclear detonations in 
different cities and regions (Figure D.l). Using Google's interactive base map, NukeMap 
allows users to select a location and type of bomb, then detonate it to see the impacts, 
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represented visually as concentric color coded circles ranging out from the impact site 
which describe the consequences most likely to be experienced in those regions 
(Wellerstein, 2012). 
$ i.se.js*y nukemap 
Figure D.l. NukeMap 
Google has announced the release of Public Alerts, a new emergency alert system 
developed by their Crisis Response division ("Google Public Alerts," 2012). It is designed 
to display alerts issued by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 
the National Weather Service, and the US Geological Survey right on Google Maps, 
offering an instantaneous visualization of risk (Figure D.2). Google is encouraging 
authorized local public safety officials to post alerts at no cost. These visualizations could 
make consequence and perception assessments much more informative and interactive. 
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Figure D.2. Google Public Alerts 
The risk scenario selected for the risk quadruplet in vivo methodology was a tornado. 
Table D.3 below gives descriptions of the Fujita Tornado Damage Scale, used by the 
NOAA National Climatic Data Center (NCDC) to determine the magnitude of tornadoes 
(NOAA, 2012a). In February of 2007, this scale was revised (NOAA, 2012a) and the 
Enhanced Fujita Tornado Damage Scale is now based on 28 damage indicators from which 
a degree of damage is calculated and then translated to the magnitude scale, however, the 
definitions and damage descriptions for the original scale are sufficient for the purposes of 
this research, especially considering the majority of the dataset provided by NOAA NCDC 
was data collected prior to the implementation of the Enhanced Fujita Tornado Damage 
Scale. 
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Table D.3. Fujita Tornado Damage Scale 
<73 Some damage to chimneys; branches broken off trees; shallow-rooted trees pushed 
over; sign boards damaged. 
74-
112 
Peels surface off roofs; mobile homes pushed off foundations or overturned; moving 
autos blown off roads. 
113-
157 
Roofs torn off frame houses; mobile homes demolished; boxcars overturned; large 
trees snapped or uprooted; light-object missiles generated; cars lifted off ground. 
158-
206 
Roofs and some walls torn off well-constructed houses; trains overturned; most trees in 
forest uprooted; heavy cars lifted off the ground and thrown. 
207-
260 
Well-constructed houses leveled; structures with weak foundations blown away some 
distance; cars thrown and large missiles generated. 
261-
318 
Strong frame houses leveled off foundations and swept away; automobile-sized 
missiles fly through the air in excess of 100 meters (109 yds); trees debarked; 
incredible phenomena will occur. 
We examined NCDC historical records from April 30, 1950 (the start date of the 
NOAA storm events data set) through September 30, 2011 (the most recent data published 
at the time of this research) and recorded all tornadoes to hit the National Capitol Region, 
as it was defined earlier (NOAA, 2012b). We also collected data about the magnitude of 
the tornadoes, the number of deaths and injuries, as well as the cost of property damage. 
Table D.4 shows the summary of these results. It is interesting to note that out of 83 
tornadoes to hit the National Capitol Region, only one touched down in Washington, DC, 
an F0 at the Lincoln Memorial, resulting in $2,000 worth of damage. 
Table D.4. National Capitol Region Tornadoes 
, Location or .County 
Lincoln Memorial 9/24/2001 F0 0 0 $2,000 
Frederick 4/5/1952 Fl 0 0 $25,000 
Frederick 4/5/1952 Fl 0 1 $25,000 
Montgomery 8/31/1952 Fl 0 0 $25,000 
Prince George's 5/26/1953 Fl 0 0 $3,000 
Frederick 5/3/1954 F0 0 0 -
Montgomery 7/1/1959 Fl 0 0 $3,000 
Frederick 11/19/1960 Fl 0 0 $3,000 
Frederick 4/16/1961 Fl 0 0 $3,000 
Frederick 7/19/1963 Fl 0 0 $25,000 
Prince George's 7/19/1963 Fl 0 0 $25,000 
Frederick 2/13/1966 Fl 0 0 $25,000 
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Frederick 6/28/1966 F1 0 0 $25,000 
Montgomery 8/26/1967 F1 0 0 $25,000 
Prince George's 9/12/1971 F2 0 0 $250,000 
Frederick 3/3/1972 F1 0 0 $250,000 
Charles 4/1/1973 F1 0 0 $25,000 
Charles 1/28/1974 F1 0 0 $3,000 
Montgomery 5/12/1974 F1 0 0 $3,000 
Charles 6/5/1975 F0 0 0 $3,000 
Charles 7/13/1975 F1 0 0 $250,000 
Calvert 6/27/1978 F2 0 0 $250,000 
Charles 6/20/1978 F2 0 0 $25,000 
Frederick 7/31/1978 F2 0 0 $25,000 
Frederick 8/28/1978 F2 0 0 -
Calvert 9/5/1979 F1 0 1 $250,000 
Charles 9/5/1979 FO 0 0 $25,000 
Frederick 5/30/1982 F1 0 0 $3,000 
Calvert 10/13/1983 F2 0 0 $25,000 
Frederick 5/22/1983 F3 0 0 $25,000 
Calvert 5/8/1984 F0 0 0 $25,000 
Frederick 5/13/1990 F1 0 0 $250,000 
Montgomery 10/18/1990 F1 0 1 $2,500,000 
Montgomery 8/20/1991 F1 0 0 $25,000 
Prince George's 8/4/1992 F1 0 0 -
Prince George's 8/4/1992 F0 0 0 $25,000 
Prince George's 11/23/1992 F1 0 0 $2,500,000 
Calvert 8/17/1994 F0 0 0 $1,000 
Frederick 6/16/1998 F0 0 0 $10,000 
Frederick 8/14/1999 F1 0 0 $800,000 
Frederick 6/6/2002 F0 0 0 $15,000 
Fairfax 8/31/1952 F1 0 0 $25,000 
Fauquier 5/17/1953 F1 0 0 $3,000 
Fauquier 9/7/1954 F1 0 0 $25,000 
Loudoun 5/3/1954 F0 0 0 $3,000 
Stafford 2/18/1960 F1 0 0 -
Frederick 7/13/1961 F2 0 1 $3,000 
Frederick 6/2/1962 F1 0 0 $25,000 
Fairfax 8/9/1969 F2 0 0 $250,000 
Warren 7/9/1970 F0 0 0 $3,000 
Fairfax 4/1/1973 F3 0 37 $25,000,000 
Fauquier 4/1/1973 F3 0 0 $25,000 
Clarke 8/4/1975 F2 0 0 $250,000 
Clarke 3/21/1976 F0 0 0 $25,000 
Prince William 1/26/1978 F3 1 10 $250,000 
Fairfax 9/5/1979 F3 1 6 $2,500,000 
Loudoun 9/5/1979 F2 0 2 $250,000 
Loudoun 9/5/1979 F2 0 0 $250,000 
Stafford 9/5/1979 F1 0 0 $25,000 
Loudoun 6/3/1980 F2 0 0 $25,000 
Fairfax 7/28/1981 F2 0 0 $25,000 
Fairfax 10/13/1983 F0 0 0 -
Falls Church 10/13/1983 F2 0 0 $2,500,000 
Fauquier 10/13/1983 F0 0 0 $3,000 
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Clarke 8/2/1986 F1 0 0 
Clarke 8/2/1986 F1 0 0 -
Fairfax 7/12/1987 F1 0 0 $3,000 
Loudoun 7/12/1987 F1 0 0 $3,000 
Prince William 7/21/1987 F0 0 0 $2,500,000 
Fairfax 10/18/1990 F0 0 0 -
Fauquier 7/12/1990 F0 0 0 -
Fauquier 10/18/1990 F1 0 0 $250,000 
Fairfax 8/4/1992 F1 0 0 $3,000 
Fauquier 4/16/1993 F0 0 0 $5,000 
Fauquier 4/16/1993 F1 0 0 $500,000 
Loudoun 4/16/1993 F1 0 0 $500,000 
Fredericksburg 7/24/1999 F1 0 0 $20,000 
Alexandria 9/24/2001 F0 0 0 $8,000 
Arlington 9/24/2001 F1 0 2 $1,000,000 
Fredericksburg 9/17/2004 F0 0 0 -
Manassas 9/17/2004 F1 0 0 -
Manassas Park 9/17/2004 F1 0 0 -
Jefferson 4/28/2008 F1 0 0 $15,000 
Over the 61 years reviewed, the National Capitol Region suffered 83 tornadoes, none of 
which were F4 or F5 tornadoes. The counts of tornadoes by magnitude, as well as the sums 
of deaths, injuries, and property damage are provided in Table D.5. Percentages are also 
provided to show the percentage contribution by tornado magnitude (based on the total sum 
of counts, deaths, injuries, and property damage, respectively). The total property damage 
for all years was $8,049,000, approximately 75% of which was the result of FO and F1 
tornadoes. Only 2 lives were lost in the National Capitol Region as a result of tornadoes, 
both of which were caused by F3 tornadoes, however 61 injuries were caused by tornadoes. 
Table D.5. Percentages of National Capitol Region Tornadoes, Casualties, and Costs 
1950-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 
Figure D.3. Count of Tornadoes by Decade 
Tornadoes were also counted by decade and the distribution is shown in Figure D.3. 
Table D.6 below shows the average number of casualties (deaths and injuries combined), as 
well as costs over the period from which the data was collected. F3 tornadoes were 
responsible for the highest average number of casualties over the 61 years; however, F0 
tornadoes had the highest average property damages. 
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Table D.6. Average Casualties and Property Damages 
0.113636364 
0.214285714 
With IDS we are able to build an ER model for the risk quadruplet using a combination 
of collected perception data and simulated threat, vulnerability, and consequence data. A 
simple model was described in IDS to demonstrate the in vivo methodology, consisting of 
three alternatives (CI, KR, and KA), and four child attributes (threat, vulnerability, 
consequence, and perception) nested under an overall parent attribute (risk). The model 
also uses weighting (to determine the contribution of the child attributes to the parent 
attribute), utilities (to determine the relationship between the grades and the child 
attributes), and belief degrees (to determine the beliefs held for the grades selected). 
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Figure D.4. Risk Quadruplet Model (In Vivo) 
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Figure D.5. Dialog Box for Description of Attributes 
An example of how this model appears in IDS is shown in Figure D.4. The definitions 
for each attribute (threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception) were input into IDS, 
based on the definitions provided in CHAPTER 1 (Figure D.5). The attributes were then 
assigned six possible grades, mapped from the following linguistic set: none, very low, 
low, medium, high, and very high. A threat of none was defined as, "This risk scenario 
poses no risk to this CI, KR, or KA," and similar definitions were used across all 
combinations of grades and attributes (Table D.7). 
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Table D.7. Definitions and Examples for Attributes and Grades 
1 H 
the threat of a risk scenario to an asset; 
the threat of an intentional risk scenario 
is generally estimated as the likelihood 
of an attack (that accounts for both the 
intent and capability of the adversary) 
being attempted by an adversary; for 
other risk scenarios, threat is generally 
estimated as the likelihood that the risk 
scenario will manifest; however, threat 
can also be estimated qualitatively. 
None 
This risk scenario poses no risk to 
this CI, KR, or KA. 
Very Low 
This risk scenario poses very low risk 
to this CI, KR, or KA. 
Low This risk scenario poses low risk to 
this CI, KR, or KA. 
Medium This risk scenario poses medium risk 
to this CI, KR, or KA. 
High 
This risk scenario poses high risk to 
this CI, KR, or KA. 
Very High 
This risk scenario poses very high 








ability of an asset to endure a risk 
scenario despite physical features, 
operational attributes, characteristics of 
design, location, security posture, 
operation, or any combination thereof 
that renders an asset open to exploitation 
or susceptible to a given risk scenario; 
can be estimated qualitatively, or 
quantitatively as the likelihood of a 
successful risk scenario given the risk 
scenario is identified, which implies that 
vulnerability is also related to resilience. 
None This CI, KR, or KA has no 








Very Low This CI, KR, or KA has very low 









This CI, KR, or KA has low 









This CI, KR, or KA has medium 








This CI, KR, or KA has high 








Very High This CI, KR, or KA has very high 








effect of a successful risk scenario on an 
asset; consequence is commonly 
assessed along four scales: human, 
economic, mission, and psychological, 
but may also include other factors such 
as impact on the environment; 
consequence can also be measured 
qualitatively either along a set of scales 
or along a single integrated consequence 
scale for which all consequence scales 
are considered as a whole. 
None This CI, KR, or KA would have no 









This CI, KR, or KA would have very 










This CI, KR, or KA would have low 









This CI, KR, or KA would have 








High This CI, KR, or KA would have high 









This CI, KR, or KA would have very 







subjective judgment about the severity of 
a risk scenario to an asset; may be driven 
by sense, emotion, or personal 
experience; generally measured 
qualitatively; referred to merely as 
perception throughout this research. 
None I perceive this CI, KR, or KA to have 






Very Low I perceive this CI, KR, or KA to have 






Low I perceive this CI, KR, or KA to have 






Medium I perceive this CI, KR, or KA to have 






High I perceive this CI, KR, or KA to have 






Very High I perceive this CI, KR, or KA to have 
very high risk from this risk scenario. 
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Phase 1. Perception Assessment Methodology 
The survey proposed for the in vivo methodology also provides the definitions and 
examples for the CIKRKA, definitions of the attributes, as well as the overall risk scenario 
which poses a danger to the CIKRKA. Providing a consistent risk scenario is necessary in 
order for respondents to consider their perception of risk across the different CIKRKA. 
After reviewing those common elements, the respondent would select a grade to qualify the 
perceived risk (based on the risk scenario) to the three separate CIKRKA selected. 
In IDS the perception data would be captured as qualitative data, aligned to the 
linguistic set defined above. This same linguistic set would be used for the grades across all 
of the different attributes (threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception). IDS could be 
used to collect perception data for a single respondent, however there is not an immediate 
and obvious way to incorporate the perceptions of multiple respondents into an ER model. 
Upon further examination, one way this could be done is to use the distribution of the 
frequencies of respondents' selections from the linguistic set as the belief degrees for the 
grades. For example, we would create a simple survey that would collect the data required 
for the IDS data entry dialog box. The linguistic set would be used as the perception 
options in the survey. If that survey had ten respondents and for the CI alternative, one of 
them choose a grade of very low for the perception attribute, one of them chose low, and 
eight of them choose medium, then the belief degrees could be assigned to those grades as 
.1, .1, and .8, respectively. 
Inquisite is software that can be used to design and deploy surveys, collect data, as well 
as analyze respondent data ("Inquisite," 2011). Using this software, it would be possible to 
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select a sample of experts, ask them a series of perception questions tailored to fit the ER 
model selected for the third phase of the risk quadruplet. The definitions for each attribute 
were input into Inquisite and each CIKRKA alternative definition and example as 
discussed above was populated in Inquisite (Figure D.6). The attributes were then assigned 
six possible grades, mapped from the same linguistic set as the one used in IDS: none, very 
low, low, medium, high, and very high. 
Alternatives 
Critical Infrastructure 
Definition: government and private systems essential to the operation of our nation in anyoraH aspects of 
flie lives of its citizens (health, safety, economy.etc), such as utilities, facilities, pipelines, etc. 
Example: 
The George Washington University Hospital 
900 23rd St., NW 
Washington, DC 20037 
http://www gwhospital com 
Facts and Figures (2010 Statistics) 
371 beds 
17,016 inpatient admissions 
86,414 outpatient visits a year 
Over 810 physicians on the hospital medical staff 
Nursing staff of over 713 
The emergency department is a Level I Trauma Center seeing 71,242 patients a year. 
Additional Information 
Street parking is limited and metered 
Access via Metro is recommended, if possible. 




Example: "I perceive this CI, KR, or KA to have no risk from this scenario." 
Very Low 
Example: "I perceive this CI, KR, or KA to have very low risk from this scenario." 
Low 
Example: "I perceive this CI, KR, or KA to have low risk from this scenario." 
Medium 
Example: "I perceive this CI, KR, or KA to have medium risk from this scenario " 
High 
Example: "I perceive this CI, I®, or KA to have high risk from this scenario." 
Very High 
Example: "I perceive this CI, KR, or KA to have very high risk from this scenario." 
Figure D.7. Grade Examples 
The threat, vulnerability and consequence attributes will not be explored in the survey 
as they would be leveraged or collected and then entered into IDS separately, so they are 
not defined nor described in the survey. However, the grades, along with their definitions 
from above, were populated for the perception attribute in the Inquisite survey, as well as 
for the threat, vulnerability, and consequence attributes in IDS (Figure D.7 and Figure D.8). 
If one user was providing perception input into IDS, that user could select very low with a 
belief degree of .5 and low with a belief degree of .5, so long as a belief degree between 0 
and 1 was entered for each grade selected, and so long as the sum of all belief degrees was 
less than or equal to 1 (similar to the example we see in Figure D.8). 
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Figure D.8. Dialog Box for Data Input 
Unlike ER, respondents to the survey are only able to make one selection for each 
alternative. Since we will be surveying multiple respondents, we intend to use the 
frequencies of their responses as the belief degrees. If we were to allow users to choose 
more than one grade, we would end up with inflated frequencies for each grade, meaning 
that when those frequencies are entered as belief degrees, we could potentially have belief 
degrees that sum to greater than 1 for each alternative within the perception attribute. To 
avoid this, we are normalizing the perception data by restricting the survey respondents to 
only one grade for each alternative within the perception attribute (Figure D.9). 
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Instructions 
Please select your perception of the risk to CI given the information described on the previous pages You 
may only select one option. 
Risk Perception Grades none very low km medium high very high 
Cnfcal Infrastructure © © . © 6 - ••• V© 
Key Resource © © © © © © 
Key Asset e o ' .6 © 0 \ 
Figure D.9. Grade Selections 
This survey was crafted using Inquisite and a version which was converted to plain text 
is given in APPENDIX E. It would give respondents all of the pertinent background 
information such as the CIKRKA definitions and examples, the risk scenario, and a means 
for providing their perceptions. However, upon review, it is easy to see why deploying this 
survey online might not be advisable. The survey is eight pages and only the last page is the 
actual questionnaire, the other seven pages include details necessary for respondents to 
determine their perceptions. In a traditional online deployment of such a survey, the user 
would not be able to easily refer to the background information, having to navigate back 
and forth throughout the survey in order to review the information provided. 
Therefore, the perception assessment should probably be conducted in the form of a 
stakeholder meeting. We would be relying on expert elicitation and providing all 
respondents with a common context is necessary prior to seeking perception data, so it 
would be prudent to engage the stakeholders in person. This would allow each respondent 
to review a packet of information and to have that information at their fingertips throughout 
the perception elicitation process. After reviewing the materials with respondents, the 
survey could still be provided online for ease of completion and data collection. The data 
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would be collected and the frequencies of the grades selected for the perceptions of 
CIKRKA would be input into IDS as belief degrees. 
The survey would be deployed with a small set of respondents in an informal meeting 
with volunteer stakeholders. An Informed Consent Document is also provided in 
APPENDIX F to ensure respondents anonymity, absolving them from any concerns about 
providing their perceptions of risk to CIKRKA outside the context of their formal, 
professional risk analysis careers. All respondents would likely have a strong background 
in homeland defense, homeland security, infrastructure analysis, and risk analysis. While 
surveying experts would obviously result in perceptions different from those of the 
layperson, the risk quadruplet model is extensible and adaptable, so future iterations of the 
model could explore using perceptions from the general public, or even a combination of 
perceptions from both experts and non-experts. 
Phase 2. Threat, Vulnerability, and Consequence Assessments Methodology 
Complicating the in vivo methodology for the risk quadruplet is the means for 
leveraging or collecting threat, vulnerability, and consequence data to integrate with the 
perception data we would collect via survey. These data are not typically collected 
consistently. Some assessments use risk scores and these are rarely normalized, so 
comparing a risk score from one study to that from another study could be like comparing 
apples to oranges. Some assessments may calculate risk where threat is a scenario with an 
associated threat severity probability distribution, vulnerability is a conditional probability 
(the probability of a successful attack, given the attack is identified), and consequence is 
based on some loss function (McGill, et al., 2007). Other assessments use risk words like 
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low, medium, or high, or color coding like red, yellow, or green to describe the severity of 
a risk (Mallor, et al., 2008). 
However, IDS can handle mixed data types all within the same ER model, such as 
stochastic versus deterministic, qualitative versus quantitative, or even incomplete data or 
data with uncertainties (Xu & Yang, 2001). One option for our in vivo methodology would 
be to leverage data from threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments. For example, 
if the threat under study was flooding, there is historical data available on the impact of 
flooding to a particular region and its assets. There would be documented information on 
the consequences such as causalities or cost to repair damages. It might even be possible to 
determine whether any recommended fortifications provided additional security against 
flood damage over the years to provide some insight on vulnerabilities. 
A taxonomy could be used to identify scenarios specific to CIKRKA (Luiijf & 
Nieuwenhuijs, 2008). Similarly, the results of an existing vulnerability assessment on a 
given CIKRKA, such as the Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessment Model (I-VAM) 
which employs MAUT for its assessment approach (Ezell, 2007), could be incorporated 
into the overall risk quadruplet model. Or for another example, we could look at a 
methodology proposed for identifying and ranking infrastructure vulnerabilities due to 
terrorism (should a terrorist attack be the scenario chosen) (Apostolakis & Lemon, 2005). 
In order to leverage these assessments, it might make sense to code the results to our 
common linguistic set (none, very low, low, medium, high, and very high), in order for this 
data to be normalized across all attributes (threat, vulnerability, and consequence), and thus 
to be integrated consistently with our perception data. However, the ER model does not 
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require this consistency as it can handle mixed data models, so assessment inputs could be 
entered independently, or coded to a common and consistent format, if desired. 
Another in vivo option would be to conduct new and independent threat, vulnerability, 
and consequence assessments. With this approach, we could have more control over the 
type of data we collect. We could opt to remain consistent with the common linguistic set, 
or thanks to the flexibility of ER and IDS, we could opt to collect these data distinctly. For 
example, we may wish to collect threat data as a probability based on historical reports 
related to the risk scenario. But vulnerability data may not be available quantitatively, so 
we could collect it qualitatively based on vulnerability reports conducted by the owners and 
operators of an asset. Consequence data may again be quantitative, but instead of a 
probability, it could be the number of deaths related to the risk scenario. IDS would also 
allow us to load the leveraged or collected threat, vulnerability, and consequence data in 
advance of the perception assessment, such that we could provide overall ranked, 
integrated assessments of CIKRKA immediately following the perception assessment, 
which might be valuable if we are already conducting a live stakeholder meeting to assess 
perceptions, as we could provide feedback instantaneously. If those stakeholders were also 
decision-makers, this quick turnaround could be very valuable. 
Phase 3. Assessment Integration Methodology 
The assessment integration approach selected for our in vivo (and in vitro) risk 
quadruplet methodology was ER, a MCDA approach, and IDS was the software selected to 
implement ER. Prior to deploying this risk quadruplet model in vivo, it is important to 
understand the data required for the model. It is also important to understand the ER 
software available and ensure that it is implemented correctly. 
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Describe the following alternative: 
a 
Definition: Critical Infrastructure (CI): government and private systems essential to 
the operation of our nation in any or all aspects of the lives of its citizens (health, 
safety, economy, etc.), such as utilities, facilities, pipelines, etc. 
Example: (The George Washington University Hospital 
900 23rd St NW 
Washington. DC 20037 
http://www.gwhospital.com 
Facts and Figures (Statistics are based on 2010) 
371 beds 
17,016 inpatient admissions 
86.41 4 outpatient visits a year 
Over 810 physicians on the hospital medical staff 
Nursing staff of over 713 









Figure D.10. Dialog Box for Description of Alternatives 
We previously chose a representative example for each CIKRKA in the National 
Capitol Region and included pertinent information about the CIKRKA both in IDS (Figure 
D.10) and Inquisite (Figure D.6). Each of the attributes (threat, vulnerability, consequence, 
and perception) were defined in IDS as qualitative, so as to grade them using the same 
linguistic scale. Utilities for the overall or parent attribute (risk) were assigned to these 
grades (from our linguistic set of none, very low, low, medium, high, and very high) as 
shown in Table D.8. The utilities were chosen arbitrarily, but it may be worth exploring, 
during future research, how to assess and incorporate the utilities of those providing inputs 
for the ER model. These values could easily be revised in future iterations of the model. 
For our purposes, a risk grade of none would be ideal and thus would receive a Utility of 1. 
The remaining grades were ranked accordingly. Utilities, unlike probabilities, need not sum 
to 1. 
Table D.8. Grades and Utilities 
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None 1 




Very High .1 
To relate parent and child attributes, the following belief degrees were used for each 
child (threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception). These values could also be 
adjusted easily in future iterations of the model. For example, if the child grade of threat is 
very low, that could relate to a parent grade of none, very low, and low risk with belief 
degrees of .25, .50, and .25, respectively. However, in the interest of keeping this model 
simple, belief degrees were assigned using the identity matrix (Table D.9). These belief 
degrees that relate the parent and child grades are not the same belief degrees that are 
selected by respondents during data collection when they chose the grade they deem 
appropriate for a given combination of alternative and attribute. 
Table D.9. Belief Degrees for Relating Parent and Child Grades 
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1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 
o 0 0 0 0 1 
Weights are then used to relate the child attributes to the parent attribute. This can be 
done using visual scoring or using a pairwise comparison of attributes. Again, future 
versions of the model could work with respondents or subject matter experts to complete 
the pairwise comparison approach provided with the IDS software, which is basically an 
AHP approach for weighting the child attributes. For this example, we used the visual 
scoring approach, selected normalized to ensure the weights added to 1, and while the 
weights initially started as equal (.25, .25, .25, and .25), it was decided that perception 
might not be considered equally important as the other attributes, so it was valued as 
approximately half as important as the other attributes (where the other attributes were 
weighted equally) as shown in Figure D.l 1. 
Relative Weights of Attributes 
O) 0 20 
9> 0 16 
Threat Vulnerability Consequence Perception 
Attributes 
Figure D.l 1. Attribute Weights Using Visual Scoring 
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Finally, if this model were to be deployed in vivo, we would provide data for each 
attribute. For each combination of alternative (asset) and attribute (threat, vulnerability, 
consequence, and perception), a user would select a grade and a belief degree. The user 
could select more than one grade, so long as the sum of the belief degrees is less than or 
equal to 1. IDS would initially value the belief degrees equally across the selections, but the 
user could override these values (Figure D.ll). Instructions provided by IDS would guide 
the user through the data entry process. The user would have access to the definitions of the 
alternatives, attributes, and grades from this dialog box. And the user could also provide 
evidence and comments to explain their selections (these are merely typed responses). 
For the perception attribute, this is where we would use the distribution of the 
frequencies of respondents' Inquisite survey selections (captured during the first phase of 
the risk quadruplet) as the belief degrees for the grades. Respondents would complete a 
simple survey to select the grade they feel most adequately reflects their opinion of the risk 
to each of the CIKRKA alternatives. If 10% of respondents choose a grade of very low for 
the perception attribute of the first asset, CI, whereas 10% of them chose low, and 80% of 
them choose medium, then the belief degrees would be assigned to those grades as . 1, . 1, 
and .8, respectively. For the threat, vulnerability, and consequence data we would use the 




INQUISITE RISK QUADRUPLET SURVEY (IN VIVO) 
Page 1: Introduction 
Please review the following pages which provide definitions and an example for three 
alternatives: 
• Critical Infrastructure - The George Washington University Hospital in 
Washington, DC 
• Key Resource - Motor Gasoline in Virginia 
• Key Asset - The Lincoln Memorial in Washington, DC 
Next, a scenario will be described: 
• Risk Scenario - Tornado 
Then, perception and a series of perception grades will also be defined. 
Please use all of this information to select the perception grades which you feel most 
closely reflect your opinion of the risk to each of the alternatives. 
Page 2: Alternatives — Critical Infrastructure 
Definition: government and private systems essential to the operation of our nation in 
any or all aspects of the lives of its citizens (health, safety, economy, etc.), such as 
utilities, facilities, pipelines, etc. 
Example: The George Washington University Hospital, 900 23rd St., NW, Washington, 
DC 20037, http://www.gwhospital.com 
Facts and Figure s (2010 Statistics) 
• 371 beds 
• 17,016 inpatient admissions 
• 86,414 outpatient visits a year 
• Over 810 physicians on the hospital medical staff 
• Nursing staff of over 713 
• The emergency department is a Level I Trauma Center seeing 71,242 patients a 
year. 
Additional Information 
• Street parking is limited and metered. 
• Access via Metro is recommended, if possible. 
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Page 3: Alternatives - Key Resource 
Deflnition: public or private resources essential to the operation of our nation's 
government and economy, such as fuel or goods. 
Example: Motor Gasoline in Virginia, Energy Information Administration 
Reserves & Supply (September 2011) 
• Motor Gasoline Stocks (Excludes Pipelines): 266K barrels (US Share: 0.7 %) 
Distribution & Marketing (2008) 
• Fueling Stations: 4,140 (US Share: 2.6%) 
Consumption (2009) 
• Motor Gasoline Consumed: 94.5M barrels (US Share: 2.9 %) 
Environment (2008/2009) 
• Alternative-Fueled Vehicles in Use: 21,505 (US Share: 2.8 %) 
• Ethanol Consumed: 8,616K barrels (US Share: 3.3 %) 
• Ethanol Plants: 0 
Page 4: Alternatives - Key Assets 
Deflnition: those buildings, geographic regions, monuments, or icons, whose destruction 
would cause a crushing blow to our nation's ego, morale, and identity, but which are not 
essential to the operation of our nation, such as the Washington Monument or the Statue 
of Liberty. 
Example: Lincoln Memorial 
Facts and Figure s (2011) 
• Located on the National Mall in Washington, DC 
• Surrounded on three sides by water 
• Approximately 6M people visit annually 
• Open to the public 24 hours a day 
• Free to visit 
Additional Information 
• The memorial was built to honor Abraham Lincoln, but it has become a symbol of 
the American Civil Rights movement as it is also the site of Martin Luther King, 
Jr.'s famous "I Have a Dream" speech. 
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Page 5: Risk Scenario - Tornado 
Definition: natural or man-made occurrence, hazard, individual, entity, or action that has 
or indicates the potential to damage an asset. 
Example: Tornado, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 
National Climatic Data Center (NCDC) 
• FO (<73mph): Some damage to chimneys; branches broken off trees; shallow-
rooted trees pushed over; sign boards damaged. 
• F1 (74-112mph): Peels surface off roofs; mobile homes pushed off foundations or 
overturned; moving autos blown off roads. 
• F2 (113-157mph): Roofs torn off frame houses; mobile homes demolished; 
boxcars overturned; large trees snapped or uprooted; light-object missiles 
generated; cars lifted off ground. 
• F3 (158-206mph): Roofs and some walls torn off well-constructed houses; trains 
overturned; most trees in forest uprooted; heavy cars lifted off the ground and 
thrown. 
• F4 (207-260mph): Well-constructed houses leveled; structures with weak 
foundations blown away some distance; cars thrown and large missiles generated. 
• F5 (261-318mph): Strong frame houses leveled off foundations and swept away; 
automobile-sized missiles fly through the air in excess of 100 meters (109 yds); 
trees debarked; incredible phenomena will occur. 
NOAA NCDC Data r4/30/1950 - 9/30/2011) 
• Magnitude: Count, Deaths, Injuries, Property Damage 
• F0: 20, 0, 0, $2,653,000 
•  F l :  44 ,  0 ,5 ,  $3 ,468 ,000  
• F2: 14, 0,3, $1,628,000 
• F3: 5, 2, 53, $300,000 
•  F4 :0  
•  F5 :0  
• Totals: 83, 2, 61, $8,049,000 
Page 6: Attribute - Perception 
Definition: subjective judgment about the severity of a risk scenario to an asset; may be 
driven by sense, emotion, or personal experience; generally measured qualitatively; 
referred to merely as perception throughout this research. 
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Page 7: Grades 
Below are the perception grade choices and examples. 
• None: "I perceive this CI, KR, or KA to have no risk from this risk scenario." 
• Very Low: "I perceive this CI, KR, or KA to have very low risk from this risk 
scenario." 
• Low: "I perceive this CI, KR, or KA to have low risk from this risk scenario." 
• Medium: "I perceive this CI, KR, or KA to have medium risk from this risk 
scenario." 
• High: "I perceive this CI, KR, or KA to have high risk from this risk scenario." 
• Very High: "I perceive this CI, KR, or KA to have very high risk from this risk 
scenario." 
Page 8: Instructions - Perception Grades 
Please select your perception of the risk to each asset given the information described on 
the previous pages. You may only select one option. 
Critical Infrastructure (GWU Hospital) (Choose one) 
o none 




o very high 
Key Resource (Motor Gasoline in VA) (Choose one) 
o none 




o very high 
Key Asset (Lincoln Memorial) (Choose one) 
o none 




o very high 
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APPENDIX F 
INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT (IN VIVO) 
Informed Consent Document 
Dr. Gheorghe and Kara Norman Hill are studying models to integrate assessments of risk, 
vulnerability, consequence, and perception for improved ranking of critical infrastructure, 
key resources, and key assets. This study will present examples of critical infrastructure, key 
resources, and key assets, as well as a hypothetical risk scenario, then ask participants to 
provide grades, based on their perceptions of the risk to the critical infrastructure, key 
resource, and key asset. The goal is to test the viability of the risk quadruplet methodology 
for integrating this subjective, qualitative perception data with objective quantitative and 
qualitative data from threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments. 
You are invited to participate in this study by providing your risk perception opinions after 
reviewing an information packet describing examples of critical infrastructure, key resources, 
and key assets, as well as the hypothetical risk scenario. The research project is anticipated to 
continue for no more than one year from the date of data collection. 
There are no potential risks to respondents completing this survey. All scenarios are 
hypothetical and only personal opinions are being solicited and the respondents will remain 
effectively anonymous insomuch as the data will not be associated with any personally 
identifiable information. Similarly, there are no immediate benefits to participation, however, 
participants are encouraged to contact the researchers for additional information on the risk 
quadruplet model should they be interested. 
The researchers will keep a record of your informed consent document in order to ensure 
compliance with the policies of the Institutional Review Board. Your perception data will not 
be connected to any personally identifiable information and will be stored in a separate 
database. Only the researchers will know the identity of study participants and that 
information will not be published as part of the research, although the research will indicate 
that the participants are subject matter experts and will cite the agencies and/or universities 
represented in the sample of survey participants. 
Your signature on this form means that you understand the information presented, and that 
you wish to participate in the study. You understand that participation is voluntary, and you 
may withdraw from the study at any time. 
Signature of Participant 









DATA SIMULATION (IN VITRO) 
Phase 1. Perception Data Simulation 
If we had been able to deploy the in vivo risk quadruplet methodology using a survey to 
collect risk perception data, respondents would have selected a single grade for the CI, KR, 
and KA, based on their perceptions of the risk to that asset (as shown in the survey 
provided in APPENDIX E). Then the respondents' selections would be used to calculate the 
belief degrees. For the in vitro approach to the risk quadruplet, we simulated this data. 
Generating perception data from a uniform distribution would be similar to respondents 
providing an equal number of responses for each of the grades, insinuating that their 
perceptions are completely random (with a response of none as equally likely as very high), 
without any pattern. Any model results using that kind of data would be meaningless as the 
impact of the perception attribute would be washed out in the risk quadruplet. However, it 
is assumed that a group of respondents, when analyzing risk to CIKRKA, would provide 
similar perception grades. We see evidence for comparable subject matter expert behavior 
when exploring the risk perception comparison of experts in the 2012 WEF Global Risks 
Report (Figure C.19). Subject matter experts tended to provide comparable estimates 
(collected with a risk perception survey) on the likelihood and impact of risks across almost 
all of the different risk categories ("Global Risks," 2012). Therefore, we must explore 
another means of generating perception data. 
First we created a set of 100 respondents who were programmed to randomly choose a 
value between one and six, based on the Triangular Distribution. In probability theory and 
statistics, the triangular distribution is a continuous probability distribution with a lower 
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limit represented by a, an upper limit of b, and a mode given by c  ("Triangular 
Distribution," 2012). Given a random variable U drawn from the uniform distribution along 
the interval (0, 1), the following random variable, X, can be used to generate random 
numbers from a triangular distribution ("Triangular Distribution," 2012). 
(  X  =  a  +  V y (ib^-aj(c-^a) f o r  0 < U  <  F ( c )  
[x  =  b  -V( l  - U X b - a X b - c )  f o r  F ( c )  <  U  <  1  
Equation G.l. Generating Triangular-Distributed Random Variables 
For our simulation, a corresponds to 1 (which, in turn, corresponds to a grade of none), 
and b corresponds to 6 (which relates to a grade of very high). In order to simulate the 
effects of respondents working from similar background information, such as a common 
risk scenario and contextual information regarding the CIKRKA we adjusted the mode of 
the triangular distribution depending on the asset for which the simulated respondent was 
providing their perception (Table 4.3). By varying the mode across the CIKRKA, we will 
be able to better see how the perception attribute affects the overall risk score. 
Our ER model, which must ultimately integrate this perception data with threat, 
vulnerability, and consequence data consists of alternatives (CIKRKA assets) and attributes 
(risk, threat, vulnerability, consequence, and perception). For the threat, vulnerability, and 
consequence attributes, this produces a limited number of combinations of CIKRKA and 
attributes. There would only be one observation for each combination of asset with the 
threat, vulnerability, and consequence (which would be the resulting scores from those 
assessments). However, there could be multiple observations for each combination of asset 
with the perception attribute as the perceptions would be collected from multiple 
respondents for the in vivo risk quadruplet methodology; for the in vitro viability testing, 
k. 
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the perceptions would be collected from our 100 pseudo respondents. We used the 
proportion of respondents who chose each grade (from our linguistic set of none, very low, 
low, medium, high, and very high). The simulated respondent choices (the random values 
between one and six generated from the Triangular Distribution) corresponded to those six 
grades. The belief degrees for each grade were then calculated as the proportion of 
respondents who selected that grade within a given alternative. 
Phase 2. Threat, Vulnerability, and Consequence Data Simulation 
Similarly, in the in vivo risk quadruplet methodology the threat, vulnerability, and 
consequence data would have been leveraged or collected. However, those data are not 
readily available due to the sensitive nature of such information. Therefore, attempting to 
access historical assessments to test the viability of the risk quadruplet is not a practical 
option for this research. It is assumed that the data for threat, vulnerability, and 
consequence assessments could be leveraged or collected to fit our in vivo model in the 
future. However, it was decided, for the purposes of this research, that this data could be 
simulated for an in vitro test of the viability of the risk quadruplet methodology. 
It seemed appropriate to simulate the data as qualitative, using the same linguistic set as 
the one used for the simulated risk perception data (which would have also been the same 
set used in the in vivo Inquisite survey). In IDS, a user would select a grade and a belief 
degree for each attribute. The user can select more than one grade, so long as the sum of the 
belief degrees is less than or equal to 1. IDS would initially value the belief degrees equally 
across the selections, but the user can override these values (Figure D.5). 
If we had leveraged or conducted actual threat, vulnerability, and consequence 
assessments, then we would have assigned a grade and belief degree based on those 
assessments to the different alternatives (CI, KR, and KA) in our IDS model. For the 
simulated data, though, we opted for generating belief degrees from a uniform distribution. 
For each belief degree within each attribute (threat, vulnerability, and consequence), as 
well as across each of the nine alternatives (CIKRKA), we chose a random number 
between 0 and 1, then constrained those values such that the sum of the belief degrees 
added to 1 for each attribute. The resulting pseudo-random values were used as belief 
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